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African states are increasingly engaging with China--politically, socially and
economically--especially through the machinations of the Forum for China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC). This dissertation asserts that Africans are willing partners of the
Chinese, motivated by their state-centric belief that engagement with China is in their
national interest. This assertion contradicts the assumption of most literature to date that
appears to borrow from the logic of dependency theory and presents African nations as
pawns, subject to the demands of a dominant and exploitative China, who is benefiting at
Africa’s expense. Economic trends from the decade before the launch of the FOCAC and
the 10 years following indicate that increasing engagement with China has not been
detrimental to African economic development. Following the establishment of the
FOCAC in 2002, Africa as a region is reporting significantly higher GDP growth rates,
increased GNI, and GDP per capita. Additionally, African states and China have on the
whole experienced a balanced trade flow with few exceptions of uneven balances not
always in favor of China. Clearly African states are benefiting from their relationship
with China. A case study of Nigeria in 2011 revealed that Nigerians are willing to
experience a continued trade deficit with China in order to achieve other important
objectives. Nigerians are looking to learn from China’s industrialization process and the

economic policies that have resulted in higher growth rates and amelioration of poverty.
Chinese investments in Nigerian and African infrastructure development are considered
significant and relevant for economic and social development. The influx of affordable
Chinese goods has increased the spending power of the average Nigerian and increased
the profit margins for Nigerian retailers. Nigerians are engaging with China because it is
in their best interest and as this relationship continues to grow, it will need to be managed
in order to maximize the benefit to Nigeria.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The recent growth of Chinese influence and enterprise across Africa has drawn
world attention. As a result, both economic and political implications are emerging at the
global level, raising concerns among actors in the world economy. Efforts to secure
energy sources, among them oil, and to locate natural resources to meet increasing
demands of China’s domestic industry have spawned an abundance of publications on
China’s presence in Africa, attempting to address potential repercussions to the African
populace, the estimated consequences to Western interests in Africa and overarching
effects at the global level.
By all accounts, it would appear that Africa is allowing China free reign. In 2008,
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows to Africa have increased from
USD$74.8 million in 2003 to $5.5 billion a 7,239 percent increase (Ministry of
Commerce, People’s Republic of China, 2009). Simultaneously, the percentage of
China’s outward FDI allocated to Africa rose from 2.6 to 9.8, a 277 percent increase.
Obviously, Chinese FDI to Africa is rapidly accelerating, with more and bigger
investments from Chinese enterprise. In 2007, FDI to Africa tripled from $519 million in
2006 to $1.6 billion, and then more than doubled in 2008 to $5.5 billion (Ministry of
Commerce, PRC, 2009).
However, this assumption has not been proven empirically and no substantive
literature looks at Africa’s “China policy.” This research intends to understand and
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explain African motivations in allowing and increasing Chinese engagement.
Additionally, it investigates and challenges widely held assumptions about Chinese
exploitation and goes on to explore African perceptions of China’s involvement.
Clearly, China’s investment in Africa may change the face of global economics.
As Richard Behar writes,
In just a few years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has become the
most aggressive investor-nation in Africa. This commercial invasion is
without question the most important development in the sub-Sahara since
the end of the Cold War – an epic, almost primal propulsion that is
redrawing the global economic map (2008).
China’s foray into Africa is cause for alarm, primarily because of its potential
consequences on the global stage. In particular how China’s entry affects demand and
supply of sub-Saharan African resources as well as regional political development. This
concern has played out in the academic world, where scholars and political scientists are
beginning to grapple with such questions as: 1) What, if anything, has been the impact of
recent Chinese engagement in Africa? 2) What might be the long-term impacts of this
Chinese “invasion?”
This project argues that, to interpret China’s presence and impact, it is first
necessary to understand what Africans are allowing China to do and why, and further
posits that Chinese concerns have entered Africa because Africans want them there. In
addition, this research argues that African countries are capable of acting strategically.
This view is supported by Alden (2007) and Brautigam (2009), who both assert that
Africans play a decisive role in Chinese engagement on the continent.
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Using Nigeria as a case study, this project attempts to extrapolate the motivations
and objectives of Africans who are increasingly engaging with the Chinese. The rationale
behind the selection of Nigeria is discussed further in this chapter’s methodology section.
This research also contends that a more complex relationship is at work, distinct from
Africa’s previous pattern of international relations, and one that cannot be fully
characterized through dependency theory. Although China is making a bid for African
resources, its actions are being enacted on a different field, with different rules and thus
different results. This view is supported by Ancharaz, who asserts that African agency,
political motivations--and consequently, decision-making--are important factors in
Africa’s new connection with China (2009). Conducted primarily in 2011, this research
examines Nigeria’s current China policy to ascertain why Nigerians are engaging with
China as well as reviewing policy over the last decade. However, the relevance of this
study extends beyond Africa or China: it seeks to examine and reveal new relationships
in international relations.

Theories on Africa-China Relations
According to dependency theory, Africans are engaging with China because
China wants to engage with Africa. However, noted African scholars continue to stress
that, while the Chinese may be driven by their own domestic demands, their activity is
defined by the African governments and institutions with whom they wish to interact
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(Brautigam, 2009; Alden, 20071). As such, African motivations matter because they are
at the core of China-Africa relations. African states and their institutions are taking a
more active role than current literature gives them credit for. The reasons Africans seek
relations with China affects the nature and levels of Chinese engagement within states’
borders. In addition, levels of monitoring and types of domestic policies play a key role
in defining the character, impact and implications of China’s presence in African states.
Unfortunately, the literature lacks explanations of African perspectives and offers
minimal discussion of African actors’ roles in permitting and controlling China’s
engagement. The cases of Zimbabwe and Sudan are alluded to as representative of
African agency in Chinese-African relations (Alden, 2007; Manji and Marks, 2007).
Robert Kagan (2006) goes so far as to argue that China is buttressing authoritarian rule
and creating an “informal league of dictators” in Africa. However, not only are the cases
of Zimbabwe and Sudan atypical of the rest of the continent, Alden (2007) asserts that
Chinese engagement in Sudan and Zimbabwe has not provided the levels of support to
authoritarian regimes that many scholars claim. While Zimbabwe’s autocratic President
Mugabe has publicly attempted to woo China with proclamations of a “looking east”
policy, China’s response to his advances has actually been minimal.
Some studies claim that the impact of Chinese engagement in Africa, whether
positive or negative, whether on a comprehensive scale or a small scale benefiting the
elite, will be determined by African governments and their policies regarding China
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Their perspectives are also echoed by Askouri in Manji and Marks (2007) and Zhu (2010).
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(Brautigam, 2009; Alden, 2007). While it is clear that African states have found a new
partner for trade, aid and perhaps even political and diplomatic support to resist Westerninitiated policies and interventions, it is also apparent that to accrue any sort of lasting
benefit, African states must actively manage their relationship with China. Existing
research has yet to adequately address the motivations of Africans who choose to engage
with China and African perspectives on this growing relationship. This study will attempt
to address these questions in part by exploring Nigeria’s China policy.

The Argument
This research argues that recent China-Nigeria relations display a form of statecentric realism that would be indicative of neo-classical economic theory and not
dependency theory. Nigerian relations with the West (specifically the U.S. and the UK)
are much like those of the rest of Africa and have often been depicted as and explained
by dependency theory (Kalu, 2000; Ikejiaku, 2008; et al)2. Dependency is a condition
that evolves over time, in which a relationship--generally between two states--develops to
the advantage of a dominant state at the expense of another (Prebisch, 1950). Ajakaiye &
Kaplinsky, noting the importance of African agency and the consequences of African
decision-making, warn against returning to dependency theory as the way to understand
this new relationship, because it assumes Africa as a “quivering victim of external forces”
(2009: pp. 483). They further argue that Chinese engagement in Africa is increasingly

2

See also Patrick Bond’s Looting Africa (2006) and Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa
(1972).
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attractive, due in part to the novelty of the relationship and the aspiration for a different
nature of engagement.
Along the lines of Ajakaiye and Kaplinsky, I posit that, in a similar manner,
Nigerians are attracted to the new opportunities China presents and assert that such a
young relationship cannot be expected to exhibit reliable indicators of dependency.
Chinese policy in Africa is driven by economic diplomacy and a businesslike relationship
with minimal political interference, allowing the pursuit of arrangements aimed at
producing mutual benefits (Alves in Alden et al, 2008; Moyo, 2009). Additionally,
Chinese engagement in Africa has been marked by a significant investment in
infrastructure in African states (Mutukwa, 1977; Alden, 2007). Increases in the amount
and quality of infrastructure have been linked to positive economic growth and reduction
in income inequality; Calderon and Serven go so far as to argue for the development of
infrastructure as an effective method for ameliorating poverty (2004). With these factors
in mind, it does not appear that a dependent relationship is developing between China and
Nigeria.
Dependency theory emerged in the 1950s as a way of understanding relations
between countries, in particular those between more developed and less developed
countries (Ferraro, 1996).3 Neoclassical economic theory, however, assumes that
economic growth results in net benefit to all, though not always equal benefit, a condition
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Dependency theory was pushed forward through the work of Raul Prebisch, then-director of the United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.
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referred to as Pareto optimal.4 History has shown that despite developed nations’
recorded economic growth, developing (i.e. poorer, less wealthy) countries experienced
lower levels of growth. In studying this phenomenon, Prebisch made the argument that
economic growth in industrialized countries has negative impact on developing countries
(1950)5. According to this logic, developing countries sell raw materials to developed
countries that use those materials to create manufactured “value-added” products that are
then sold back to the developing countries at a higher price. The finished goods cost more
than the raw materials; thus, developing countries cannot accrue enough income to both
pay for their exports and grow their economy. This unbalanced exchange creates a state
of dependency for developing countries where “dependency can be defined as an
explanation of the economic development of a state in terms of the external influences-political, economic, and cultural--on national development policies” (Sunkel, 1969: pp.
23).
Dependency theory provides an explanation of why developing countries stay
poor while industrialized, developed countries become wealthier. However, dependency
theory has since been discredited because it lacks cohesion and clarity (Harding, 1976;
Chilcote, 1978; Snyder, 1980). More importantly, it fails to account for the influence of
local elites’ political policies in developing countries and the resulting impact on
economic growth (Smith, 1979; Smith, 1981; Sandbrook, 1993). However, many of the
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Pareto Optimal resource distribution is that which betters at least one person and harms no one else.
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The same argument was also made by Andre Gunder Frank (1969; 1975).
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arguments made on the nature of economic relations between China and African states
still borrow heavily from the logic of dependency theory.
Relations between China and Africa require close examination, and this project
seeks to address two major issues. First, it intends to test and investigate whether or not
dependency theory explains the nature of Nigeria and China’s relationship. Furthermore,
it will address whether dependency theory can adequately describe this relationship. This
research is supported by Dos Santos’ assertion that dependency is a “historical
condition… in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the
development and expansion of another economy to which their own is subjected” (Fann
and Hodges, 1971: pp. 226). I argue that China, like Nigeria, is a dependent-peripheral
state6, with no dyadic history of dependence. At present, in its early stages, the
relationship between China and Nigeria cannot definitively be characterized in terms of
dominance and dependence, as dependency theory requires. In addition, if African states
play a significant role in determining the nature and scope of their relationship with
China to the extent that Brautigam and Alden allege, then dependency does not exist
within this setting. Dependency theory dictates that peripheral, developing states (such as
those in Africa) are pawns in a system enforced by powerful, dominant states that repress
development (Smith, 1979). If in fact African agency is at work, exemplified by rational
behavior and decision-making, then it seems that dependency theory offers an inadequate
framework for understanding this new relationship between China and Nigeria.
6

Ferraro argues that the dominant (non-dependent) states are the advanced industrial nations in the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) of which neither China or Nigeria are
members, according to the OECD’s website:
[http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html].
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This study also attempts to determine and define Nigeria’s China policy and
identify its specific objectives. Given this goal, this research fits within Van Evera’s
classifications as a theory testing dissertation, in this case, testing dependency theory to
see if it provides a sufficient framework for understanding Nigeria-China relations
(1997). The majority of this research contributes to understanding the motivations of
Nigeria’s engagement with China.
The argument for a state-centric realist relationship between China and Africa
stems from the apparent inadequacy of dependency theory to describe this relationship.
Subsequently, the following hypotheses were generated in contradiction of dependency
theory. Thus, if dependency theory holds true, then the data will reflect support for the
null hypothesis.
This study has one central hypothesis as follows:
Nigerians are increasingly engaging with China because they believe
it will result in a net benefit for themselves and for their country.
This hypothesis is inductively generated from data collected from interviews, news
articles, and published literature on Sino-African relations and Nigeria-China relations.
Afrobarometer surveys on public opinion in Africa indicate that, despite the growing
literature asserting that Chinese engagement in Africa is detrimental to Africans, most
Africans and Nigerians view the Chinese with positive regard (Gadzala & Hanusch,
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2010)7. This dissertation intends to take those findings a step further, demonstrating that
not only do Nigerians have a positive outlook towards China’s involvement, but also
revealing the underlying rationale and motivations that drive the Nigerian side of Chinese
engagement.
China-Africa trade and investment continues to grow at exponential rates. In the
same pattern, China-Nigeria trade and investment is also growing. Chinese outward FDI
stock to Nigeria has grown at an average rate of 101.7 percent8 from 2003 to 2008
(Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China). In fact, in 2010, the bilateral trade
volume between Nigeria and China was recorded at over $7.5 billion, according to the
Chinese Consul-General in Nigeria (Okoh, 2011). This level of increasing cash flows can
be expected to boost economic activity and increase economic growth rates in Nigeria,
thereby making Chinese engagement more attractive to Nigerians. It is likely that this
research will find that Nigerians are motivated to do business with China because it
increases their revenue stream, leading to economic growth.
Economic growth and benefit in Nigeria may also benefit from Chinese
investments in infrastructure and Chinese aid to Nigeria. As a result of China’s tendency
to attach aid agreements to larger business agreements, Nigerians can also be expected to
show increasing interest in doing business with China (Brautigam, 2009). Regarding
China’s approach to aid, Sahr Johnny, the Sierra Leonean Ambassador to Beijing said,
7

This is especially true when economic engagement increases in general, and when African exports to
China increase relative to Chinese imports in Africa in specific (Gadzala & Hanusch, 2008).
8

Author’s calculations based on Chinese outward FDI stock statistics to Nigeria, as reported by the
Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China (2010).
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“The Chinese are doing more than the G8 in making poverty history. If a G8 country had
wanted to rebuild the stadium, we’d still be here holding meetings. The Chinese just
come and do it.” (Gadzala and Hanusch, 2010: pp. 2). Many others share similar
sentiments. Sautman and Hairong argue, “China, unlike Western states, is not obstructing
development in the world’s poorer countries” (2007: pp. 93). They are supported by
Ching who notes that Chinese aid is distributed with a particular focus on infrastructure
and human capital development (2005). The argument has been made that investments in
infrastructure are vital to economic and social development, and the alleviation of
poverty (Calderon & Serven, 2004). The Chinese have been noted for taking on
infrastructure development projects in Africa (Ching, 2005; Gadzala & Hanusch, 2008).
Chinese aid in the form of large public works projects can be expected to improve
development in Nigeria and in Africa. Although corruption may exist in such agreements,
following the logic of Calderon and Serven (2004), I argue that investments in
infrastructure remain significant because they create an environment conducive to
increased economic growth and therefore potential amelioration of poverty.
China’s aid policy in Africa is interesting in its departures from the Western aid
policies normally contingent on standards of governance and at times, human rights;
recent Chinese aid has typically been supplementary to trade agreements and diplomatic
endeavours rather than interfering with or limiting how governance occurs (Brautigam,
2009). Chinese aid in Africa also differs from Western aid in terms of dollar value;
Chinese aid is lower. Brautigam, who has decried the popular notion of China as a “rogue
donor”, asserts that the Chinese provide policy prescriptions with no apparent need to
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understand policy problems in Africa. As such, China does not claim to know what
African development might require.
Finally, information on Chinese aid to Africa is not comprehensively available,
especially when aid is a part of a broader business arrangement; Brautigam points out that
this lack of public information does not adhere to Western transparency standards (2009).
In addition, China’s previous attempts at aid programs were unsustainable, but making
changes in the types of programs and how they are operated might bring about
sustainable net benefit to Africa, a true “win-win” situation where Chinese aid and
infrastructure investment might lead to improvements in standards of living and reduced
poverty in Nigeria (Brautigam, 2009). However, the veiled nature of Chinese aid makes it
difficult to determine its precise impact. To add to lack of transparency, aid sometimes
takes the form of commercial credit, forming the financial base that allows promotion of
Chinese exports in African countries. The building of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway,
often cited as an example of Chinese aid to Africa, was “financed by selling Chinese
consumer goods through Zambian and Tanzanian state trading organizations; a
commodity credit agreement provided for the importation of Chinese goods during the
period of construction of the rail link” (Yu, 1975: pp. 135). This raises the issue of
credibility of Chinese aid based on the general understanding of what constitutes aid
versus what doesn’t.
If in fact the capacity of Chinese aid falls short of expectations, the question
remains: does the actual investment in infrastructure outweigh the adverse impacts of the
trade agreements that sometimes come packaged with Chinese aid? Following Calderon
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and Serven’s notion that investment in infrastructure leads to economic growth and
reduced poverty, it is reasonable to assert that, while total benefits may be reduced due to
corruption or mislabeled aid, it is rational for Nigerians to expect improvement in their
economy and standard of living-- as long as investment in infrastructure continues
(2004).
Chinese engagement with Africa follows the same parameters as Chinese aid to
Africa; the Chinese have adopted a policy of non-interference, based on the recognition
of the sovereignty of African states. This project argues that China’s policy of noninterference allows African governments to deal with their own problems without
undermining attempts at developing good governance. China’s approach has permitted
partnerships and allows African states to be active participants in the development
process (Brautigam, 2009). Akin to Weiss et al., I argue that active participation can
foster sustainable growth and exceed the benefits of structural adjustment programs and
prescriptive policies forced upon African states as pre-conditions for Western aid and
loans from international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (Weiss et al., 2009; Armstrong et al, 2007; Barnett and Finnemore,
2004). While Chinese engagement in Africa may not be the saving grace of the continent,
I contend that the more active African states and governmental actors become in their
own development process, the greater success will be evident in addressing not only the
symptoms of poverty and underdevelopment but also their root causes.
In support of the central hypothesis, this research reveals that Nigerians believe
engagement with China is to their benefit. Interview respondents noted that China is an
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increasingly significant global actor and that Nigerians at all levels of society are looking
to learn from China’s example in order to improve their present situation. Although the
current trade relationship is heavily imbalanced in China’s favor, Nigerians are
purchasing more Chinese-manufactured products. This research examines this growing
relationship to identify the drivers of increasing Nigerian engagement and expects to find
evidence in support of the central hypothesis that Nigerians are engaging with China
because they believe it will further Nigerian objectives and result in a net benefit.
An Overview of the Methodology
This project has two main objectives: first, to examine economic trends to see if
increasing economic engagement with China through trade has adversely affected
African economic performance, as would be expected in a state of dependency. Second, it
presents a case study of Nigeria with the goal of revealing the drivers behind increasing
Nigerian engagement with China.
Dependency theory dictates that China would be the main and perhaps sole
beneficiary of increasing economic engagement. Accordingly, much of the literature on
Chinese engagement in Africa insinuates that a dominant China is engaging with African
states in a manner that maximizes its own benefits while minimizing those of Africans,
even causing some degree of harm. To test these assertions, this study looks at measures
of economic performance, in particular, gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, gross
national income (GNI), and GDP per capita. Viewing Africa as a regional entity, this
study examines twenty years of economic trends: the decade prior to the launch of the
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Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the decade immediately following. Borrowing
from Kaufman, Chernotsky & Geller’s propositions defining the indicators of high
economic dependency, this study examines these economic trends to see if, as in a
dependent relationship, aggregate Africa is exhibiting low rates of economic growth and
an unfavorable trade balance with China (1975). This study asserts that African states
should post higher economic growth rates after the launch of FOCAC and that the
China/Africa trade balance between China and Africa should be even (or nearly even),
lending credence to the view this that dependency theory is an inadequate framework to
understand or explain growing Sino-African relations. This study attempts to see if
conditions of dependency as defined by literature exist, and does not attribute changes in
African economic growth solely to the entry of China. Included in this economic trend
analysis is an examination of Sino-Nigerian relations to see if economic trends would
support the idea of a dependent relationship. This researcher posits that as Nigeria
increasingly engages with China, economic performance indicators like GDP growth rate
and GNI as well as GDP per capita will increase and fail to support the argument of a
dependent relationship. However, this study expects to find--in support of a dependent
relationship--a considerably unfavorable balance of trade to the benefit of China.
This study expects that examination of economic trends will provide an
inconclusive picture of the nature of the relationship between Nigeria and China. In order
to better understand Sino-African relations, an in-depth case study is required. This
research uses a Nigerian case study in to better comprehend the nature of Sino-African
relations. This study argues that, not only is dependency theory an inadequate framework,
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but that identifying motivators for Africans who engage with China is crucial in
understanding Sino-African relations. To this end, fieldwork was conducted in Nigeria,
primarily during the months of July and August 20119 utilizing a strategic case-study
approach that employed an open-ended interview format.10 A case study was necessary to
understand new phenomena that have not previously been addressed by scholarship. In
sum, approximately 130 interviews (informal and formal) were conducted with Nigerian
that engaged with China. Engagement with China was operationalized as any sort of
interaction with China and Chinese people. There were 62 formal interviews conducted.
To be considered formal, an interview required a signed informed consent form11 and was
usually voice-recorded. Interview respondents included government officials, politicians,
lobbyists/policy specialists, business and industry representatives, market traders, and
academics, as well as Chinese industry representatives and a Chinese diplomat. To get a
better picture of Nigerian engagement with China, interviews were conducted in multiple
geographic locations and strong efforts were made to speak with a varied selection of
Nigerian ethnic groups. Data collected through these interviews were then coded to
identify themes in responses to the questions posed, the most significant of which is:
Why are Nigerians engaging with China? To validate the findings of this study, the
researcher relied on interviews with and peer reviews by Nigerian academics and political

9

Fieldwork on this project commenced in January, 2011, but the bulk of the data was amassed in July and
August.

10

The interview protocol is included in Appendix A.

11

The informed consent form used for this research is included in Appendices C through E.
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scientists. The methodology used for this case study and the ascertained themes are
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

Outline of Chapters
The following is a breakdown of the chapters in this dissertation and a summary
of their content. Chapter 2 presents an overview and critique of the literature on ChinaAfrica relations since the 1980s, paying particular attention to the recent permutation of
Chinese capitalism in Africa. Chapter 2 also outlines China’s African policy – how it is
being realized and perceived — and its proposed impact on African states.
Chapter 3 examines dependency theory in Africa, noting that its logic has been
applied to much of the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa. The chapter begins
with a discussion of dependency theory, its roots and development, followed by an
interpretation of the current state of affairs in Africa and Nigeria, and a discussion of the
relationship with China viewed through the lens of dependency theory. The chapter then
presents state-centric realism as a more adequate framework through which to understand
and evaluate China-Africa and China-Nigeria relations, in particular African and
Nigerian aspect of engagement with China.
Chapter 4 tests dependency to see if increasing engagement with China has been
detrimental to African economic development as dependency theory suggests. It
examines economic trends in Africa from the ten years prior to the first FOCAC
conference and the 10 years immediately after to see if increasing engagement with
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China has an observable detrimental impact to African economies as measured by gross
domestic product (GDP) growth rates, GDP per capita and gross national income (GNI)
figures. It also explores balance of trade data to see who benefits the most from ChinaAfrica trade. At a micro level, this chapter also investigates trends in Nigeria-China
economic relations from 1995-2009, in view of broader Nigerian economic trends over
the same period.
Chapter 5 examines Nigerian agency and tests the central hypothesis of this study.
This chapter looks to see if Nigerians are indeed pursuing increased engagement with
China because they believe it will result in a net benefit for themselves and for their
country. It examines the motivations of Nigerians in their growing engagement with
China, answering the questions of who in Nigeria is engaging with China and why.
The sixth and concluding chapter discusses the findings of this study and their
potential implications, ending with a call for continued research in this increasingly
relevant issue area.

19

Chapter 2: Chinese Capitalism in Africa

The purpose of this literature review is to summarize the scholarship on Chinese
engagement in Africa and to illustrate its apparent focus on the Chinese perspective and
the absence of an African perspective in regard to China’s engagement in Africa. Most
of the literature examines Chinese objectives in Africa over the last 20 years. Much of the
information on recent Chinese engagement in Africa is contained in journalistic accounts,
some of which are in-depth book-length reports, and growing scholarship in this area
relies heavily on these accounts. While these perspectives advise how African states
should approach Chinese counterparts, the literature does not speak explicitly to whether
or not an African policy on China exists, nor does scholarship define present African
motivations. This chapter first critiques the scholarship on recent Chinese capitalism in
Africa, looking at the noted drivers of Chinese engagement, and paying particular
attention to allegations of an imperialist China in Africa. The next section examines the
literature on Chinese aid in Africa, illustrating some of the ways in which China chooses
to distinguish itself from the West. Finally, this chapter attempts to extrapolate the main
arguments in the literature on Africans’ motivations for engaging with China, noting the
scarcity of scholarship in this area. In all, this literature review points to the need for
systematic study into Africa’s engagement with China, and in particular demands new
research investigating the primary motives of Africa’s new democracies as they continue
to engage with China.
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I. The New Imperialists
Recent Chinese engagement in Africa builds on the foundation established by
Sino-African relations during Africa’s independence period in the 1960s (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs PRC, 2006)12. China’s recent effort to woo African leadership and the
general populace has included making significantly larger investments in education and
infrastructure (Shelton & Paruk, 2008). Some scholars suggest that the emergence of
China in Africa insinuates a larger campaign for world dominance, and that China has
entered Africa in the role of neo-colonialist (Kagan, 2006; Tull, 2006; 2008). Others
argue that China’s presence is no different than Western predecessors in misappropriating
natural resources (Segal, 1992; Chan-Fishel, 2007). Kagan expresses concerns that China
is striving to develop and support a global network of autocracies and like-minded
dictators (2006). In support of Kagan’s view, China’s Beijing Consensus has been well
received by African elites in light of the abject failure of the Washington Consensus. Yet
many other scholars disagree, maintaining that China is only interested in Africa’s
abundant natural resources, most specifically oil (Pan, 2006; Taylor, 2006; Rocha, 2007;
Taylor, 2007; Brookes, 2007; Alves, 2008). However, this relationship is more complex
as well as more vulnerable to an array of intervening factors; thus, its implications for
Western interests are perhaps less extreme than some of the assertions of the literature.
Some scholars, among them Snow and Thompson, depict Chinese engagement in
Africa as a study in soft power (Snow, 1988; Thompson, 2004; Thompson, 2005).
Historically, China has sought to interact with Africa through diplomacy to establish its
12

China’s Africa Policy document issued by the People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is
included in Appendix F.
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own superiority as a kingdom of civilized and sophisticated people (Filesi, 1962). The
earliest recognized mention of engagement with Africa was made in the T’ang Dynasty
by Tuan Cheng-Shih who died in AD 863 (Filesi, 1962). According to Philip Snow, even
in early relations, the Chinese took care to minimize their impact and interruption of
African life in their quest (1988). Snow notes that the Chinese, unlike the Western
colonialists that came after them, saw the exchange of goods between African coastal
states and Chinese ambassadors as a tribute, indicating allegiance with China and a fitting
obeisance to the superiority of the Chinese empire:
“The exchange of goods was laden in Chinese eyes with a symbolic
significance far outweighing the value of the goods themselves. By trading
with the fleet, the African coastal states were paying the Ming emperor the
homage they owed him as the sovereign of the world (1988: pp. 27).

This diplomatic style of interaction carried on through the 1960s which saw a
more active form of Chinese engagement in Africa. Taylor and Segal note that as China
sought to liberate itself from Soviet influence, it found sympathetic partners in African
states pursuing independence, which led to the development of China’s Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence (Segal, 1992; Taylor, 2006). Regarding foreign relations, the Five
Principles defined the following directives: 1) reciprocal respect for territorial integrity;
2) non-aggression; 3) non-interference in one another’s internal affairs; 4) equality and
mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful co-existence (Taylor, 2006 pp. 940). Application of these
principles has remained consistent even in the face of China’s recent and more businesslike approach in Africa.
Scholars such as Games and Marks claim that China’s grab for African resources
has led to both Western and African accusations of neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism
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(Games, 2005; Marks, 2006). They argue that the industrial revolutions of China and the
West led to an intensified presence of both on the African continent and China-African
trade relations reflect familiar Western traits with African resources used to fuel
technological advancements (Marks, 2007). As had previously occurred with the West,
African raw materials are sold to China in exchange for processed, valued-added Chinese
goods (World Trade Atlas, 2011; Manji and Marks, 2010). China’s persistently low
production costs have allowed access to luxury goods previously too costly for Africans
(Liang, 2005; Taylor, 2008). However, Marks notes that this lower cost of luxury goods
has devastated some sectors of African industry (Marks, 2006). The example cited by
Alden and Liang, among others, is the closure of South African and Nigerian textile
mills, resulting in job losses for thousands of Africans (Liang, 2005; Alden, 2005). This
impact has raised concerns among African politicians and scholars that if this relationship
remains unchanged, Africa will no more industrialize under China than it has under
Western influence. Worse yet, African natural resources may be further depleted,
snuffing any chances of African industrialization (Marks, 2006; 2007).
European colonialists and entrepreneurs set up shop in Africa, and established
businesses that exploited their access to African resources and ties to foreign markets
(Bristow, 2007). Bristow notes that, in a manner likened to former European settlers, an
influx of Chinese migrants has impelled competition with African businesses (Bristow,
2007). The competitive advantages of these migrants, in particular their ties to other
economies and other markets overwhelm would-be domestic competitors in Africa
(Bristow, 2007). For instance, Africans and Chinese may import Chinese-manufactured
products but the Chinese, with a cultural and language advantage as well as ties (often
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familial) to manufacturers in mainland China, may be able to reduce their supply costs
and thus market prices, thereby undercutting domestic competitors in the African
marketplace (see also Brautigam, 2003). In other cases, Chinese manufactured imports
sold by Chinese migrants may be less expensive than domestically produced versions of
the same products, making it difficult for African businesses to compete with Chinese
counterparts. From the open air African marketplace to manufacturing and industry, it is
clear that Chinese presence in Nigeria and in the rest of Africa is growing (Bristow,
2007).
Alden and Marks suggest that, while some aspects of China-Africa relations may
lead to neo-imperialist interaction, Chinese efforts may simultaneously lend equal voice
to their African partners and has potential to establish a more equitable partnership.
(Alden, 2007; Marks, 2007). Thompson asserts that Chinese relations are the result of
persuasion rather than through the heavy-handed approach of Western colonialism and
more recently Western-directed international financial institutions (Thompson, 2004).
Certainly African states have their work laid out for them should they attempt to manage
their relationship with China to maximize benefits to their constituents (Thompson,
2004).
Despite the claims of a neo-imperialist China in Africa, substantial differences
exist in China's approach to Africa, noted by Snow and Marks, when compared to the
West and these differences have been entrenched over time (Snow, 198813;Marks, 2007).

13

Snow makes the argument that when the Chinese (Ming Dynasty) first came to Africa in the Middle
Ages they sought a “gesture of symbolic acquiescence in the Chinese view of the world” (pp. 29),
different from the Europeans who came to conquer Africa.
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Along these lines, according to Tull and Kagan this increased interaction between China
and Africa appears to threaten Western interests on the continent (Tull, 2006; Kagan,
2008). However, Richard Behar points out that, while others paint China in Africa as a
greater evil than its Western predecessors (namely the U.S. and British and French
colonial powers), there may be little difference in terms of the end game for China and
the West in Africa (2008). Ultimately, Behar states,
“the sub-Sahara is now the scene of one of the most bare-knuckled resource grabs
the world has ever seen… In describing China’s exploits, it’s tempting to evoke
the image of a benign, postcolonial West being outfoxed by a ruthless and
unscrupulous neo-communist power…The American track record in modern
Africa has been deplorable -- a half-century of backing strongmen, turning a blind
eye, and taking what we can get with little or no regard for the health and welfare
of the locals” (Behar, 2008).
Behar supports the view that “today’s global economy has an insatiable need for
raw materials. That’s as true for China’s rise as it is true for the maintenance of
America’s economy” (Behar, 2008). Carmody and Owusu agree, noting that as Chinese
engagement has increased, so has the American presence in Africa, and China’s recent
economic expansion appears to be a somewhat obvious aim to dilute the power and
influence of U.S. hegemony in the region, as much as to acquire African resources
(Carmody & Owusu, 2007). This upturn appears to corroborate Klare’s claim of the
geopolitical revival in the rush to secure scarce resources (2005). No doubt, Africa
presents a new and interesting battlefield for Western and Eastern global politics.
Clapham puts forth the notion that trade is already shifting from a “Global North” to a
“Global East” orientation. Not only is China flooding the African market with goods, it is
also buying up oil, minerals and various other raw materials from African states (2005).
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Carroll observes that, with the continued expansion of China’s industry and economy,
China’s demand for industrial resources continues to climb, and resource-rich Africa has
the potential to meet this need (Carroll, 2006).
While oil remains a central focus of the literature addressing China’s African
resource grab, Rocha points out that the Chinese have been just as diligent in their
pursuit of base metals: aluminum, copper, iron ore, nickel and zinc to name a few
(2007). Chinese demand for copper has driven up global prices from $1,319/tonne in
2001 to $8,800 in 2006 (Kaswende, 2005; The Economist, 2005, 2006). By 2005,
Chinese firms had invested $170 million into the copper mining industry in Zambia
(Lyman, 2005). China also signed a US $1.3bn agreement that for its investment in
energy, it would gain access to Zimbabwean chrome (BBC News, 2006a). Additionally,
Carmody and Owusu point out that 90 percent of the world’s chrome reserves are found
in Zimbabwe and South Africa (2007). In Gabon, a Chinese consortium won sole rights
to exploit massive untapped iron ore reserves (Terradaily, 2006). The Chinese agreement
with Gabon also included oil, two timber-processing plants and an industrial fisheries
firm.
Beyond the industries mentioned, Chinese investments in Africa are increasingly
dedicated to agricultural development not only to promote food security for African
states, but also to ensure China’s food sources (Carmody & Owusu, 2007). However,
Cotuela and Vermeulen disagree, stating that Chinese agricultural interests in Africa aim
to exploit business opportunities and “to secure access to non-food resources where
Chinese demand outstrips domestic supply” (2009: pp. 1,236, 2011; see also Brautigam
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& Xiaoyang, 2009). As China continues to urbanize and industrialize, the ability to
support local demands has been threatened as land and resources are repurposed.
Carmody and Owusu argue that China sees in Africa the potential to alleviate the
increasing deficit from Chinese agricultural producers (2007).
Carmody and Owusu also highlight China’s differing approach to Africa, noting
that the U.S. treats Africa primarily as a “site of humanitarian intervention, resource
extraction and security threat,” while China views Africa as more a strategic economic
space (2007: pp. 506). True to form, China has been engaging with African states in a
largely business-focused manner (French 2004; Moyo, 2009). Specifically, in discussing
China’s approach, a Nigerian government official asserted, “China is engaging Nigeria
seriously. They understand us. They know our problems.”14 This official is not alone in
this view; several scholars agree that Chinese projects in Africa have been noted for their
comparative suitability for African conditions (James, 2002; Liang, 2005; Carmody and
Owusu, 2007). Another unique element of Chinese engagement has been the employment
of payment-in-kind strategies to finance Chinese loans, reducing African states’ financial
burdens and encouraging African exports to China (Carmody and Owusu, 2007). For
example, in Zimbabwe, tobacco exports are used to pay off the balance on Chinese loans
to state agencies (Hilsum, 2006).
By entering into negotiations with African governments, some scholars claim,
China affords them legitimacy and acknowledges both their sovereignty and ability to
make independent decisions (Hongwei, 2005; Rocha, 2007; Alden 2007). In contrast,
14

Interview with a Nigerian diplomat, Washington, DC, April 6, 2011.
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Western influence and capital has often been used to force developing countries into
accepting Western policy prescriptions (Ellis, 2005; Carmody and Owusu, 2007).
However, again the Chinese approach is noted as less domineering, with China even
going so far as to agree to limit exports to protect the domestic industries of African trade
and economic partners (Hall, 2006; Marks, 2007). This behavior supports the notion that
China is in fact pursuing a long-term strategy in Africa.
Carmody and Owusu argue that Chinese behavior is indicative of objectives to
dilute Western influence in the global economy; they identify the following as motives
for Chinese engagement beyond access to critical natural resources: 1. investment of
China’s significant foreign exchange reserves; 2. continuing development of Chinese
multinational corporations; 3. locating markets for Chinese products; 4. developing
African agriculture to provide food and non-food products for Chinese consumption; and
5. establishing a cadre of African professionals and knowledge workers to support
Chinese objectives of global economic transformation (2007). China has recently
invested quite heavily in developing a skilled African workforce (FOCAC 2004k;
Servant, 2005; FOCAC, 2006c; 2008; 2009e; 2009g). This workforce development, noted
by many scholars, serves as an important component of China’s African aid policy (King,
2007; Shelton & Paruk, 2008; Brautigam, 2009; Taylor, 2011). Thompson argues that
these skilled workers are a part of China’s plan to overhaul the current economic system
(2004). By developing a skilled and intellectually prepared African workforce, China and
Africa are equipped to offset the “unjust and inequitable world order” that has routinely
marginalized the interests of non-Western states. This intellectual partnership provides a
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means to draw focus to issues pertinent in developing countries to combat Western
dominance of world politics (Efande, 2003; Muekalia, 2003).
The argument that China has routinely sought to establish a relationship and then
partner with African states (or kingdoms and tribes) to promote its domestic political
agenda has some merit--and a long history. In the Middle Ages, goods procured from
African states indicated the excellence of the Emperor and the approval of the sovereigns
(Filesi, 1972). Scholars agree in the 1960s, the People’s Republic of China needed the
support of African states to assert itself in the global community and thereby discredit the
legitimacy of Taiwan, and to separate itself from the Soviet Union and earn recognition
in the United Nations (Yu, 1988; Segal, 1992). As the Chinese economy grew in the
1990s, China again turned to Africa to find resources to satisfy its booming industry and
to meet increasing domestic demands (Rotberg, 2008). Daniel Large asserts
…there is greater reason than ever before to suggest that more than an
ephemeral phase, China’s engagement with Africa will persist and
deepen and that the present phase represents a departure from its past
involvement. Observers considered that the PRC was in Africa to stay
in the 1960s; some even dismissed its importance in Africa in the early
1990s. However, the context of relations has importantly altered. A
progressively interdependent China, the future of whose Communist
Party state is now more firmly linked to its performance at home, must
continue to engage in order to guarantee essential supplies to maintain
its development.
China needs, and will continue to need, African resources more
than previously. (2007: pp. 157).
According to Smith and Larimer, rational choice theory dictates that states or at
least state actors will always act in a manner that promotes their self-interests (2009).
China's foreign policy in Africa can be viewed as a direct function of ruling elites’
strategy to remain in power, and in the process guarantee control over domestic politics.
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Five decades ago, African states had the votes necessary to seat the People’s Republic of
China at the United Nations (Segal, 1992). Today Africa still has the numbers necessary
to protect Chinese interests on the world stage.
Some scholars, among them Pádraig Carmody and Francis Owusu, support the
view that China is seeking to reset the global economy and the politics that surround it
(2007). This is supported by a significant push by Nigeria and South Africa for African
representation on the United Nations Security Council.15 Not only does Africa possess
the raw materials and resources to sustain China’s economic climb, African states have
the voting power to shift a currently Western focus to a more inclusive perspective
undoubtedly more favorable to China (Kagan, 2006; Carmody and Owusu, 2007).
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the April 1990 Chinese publication ChinaAfrica,
was quoted as stating, “[The] vast number of Third World countries [will] surely unite
with and stand behind China like numerous ‘ants’ keeping the ‘elephant’ from harm's
way” (Taylor, 1998: pp. 459). Clearly, China has intended to use a contingent of ‘small’
developing states as a shield. However, Chinese global objectives today transcend simple
defense. It appears that Beijing intends to use this army of “ants” to gain additional
leverage at the global level.
What the literature makes clear is that China is pursuing its own interests. Yet, an
exhaustive empirical study has yet to be conducted, proving that China either is or is not
exercising an imperialist agenda in Africa. A major shortcoming of the literature is that it
15

According to multiple interviews with Nigerian government representatives during this research process
and corroborated by an address by Mr. Olusegun Obasanjo, President and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the 54th Session of The
United Nations General Assembly, Thursday, 23 September 1999 (included in Appendix L).
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is a collection of points of view, and despite the diversity in arguments concerning
Chinese motivations in Africa, the claims made by many of the scholars are simply that:
claims that lack supporting evidence. These arguments, though logical and reasonable,
have yet to be substantiated through rigorous empirical scholarship. Many of these
scholars’ assertions stem from journalistic and newspaper accounts of Chinese
engagement with Africa. Despite the growing collection of literature on Chinese
engagement in Africa, it is quite clear that there is room for research development. Much
of the available literature is anecdotal and normative in language, with uncorroborated
judgment on the positive or negative impact of engagement with China. Many studies
also approach Chinese engagement in Africa as an isolated activity unaffected by
international politics or external shocks. In addition, most of the literature on
China/Africa relations originates from Western-based scholars and journalists, such as
Alden, Behar, Brautigam, Large et al, Michel & Beuret, Tull, many of whom have
adopted a zero-sum game mentality on China’s increasing presence and its repercussions
for Western interests .

II. Chinese aid to Africa
A growing area of focus in the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa is aid,
now attracting attention because it differs sharply from Western aid (Brautigam, 2003).
Western aid with policy prescription seeks to shape African states within a certain
framework; it affords a form of legitimacy but also constrains and limits states’ behavior.
In contrast, the Chinese express their interest in empowerment and emancipation of
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African states (Carmody, 2007). Chinese aid pales in comparison to Western aid in terms
of dollar amounts; Western aid to Africa is much larger (Brautigam, 2009). A profound
difference in Chinese versus Western aid is its secrecy; China’s aid is not subject to the
transparency standards Western aid imposes (Brautigam, 2003). This shrouding of aid
packages means that very little is truly known--and therefore understood--about the
nature of Chinese aid to African states. As such, a number of unsubstantiated claims have
been made. For example, Chinese aid has been characterized as “untied aid” because it is
not subject to standards of governance and Western human rights principles, while
Western aid is contingent upon certain conditions (Moyo, 2009). Additionally, Chinese
aid is typically supplementary to trade agreements and political maneuverings, again free
of Western contingencies, including transparency (Brautigam, 2009). This difference is
likely due to Chinese political preferences. Aid and trade with African states is predicated
on their recognition of the One China policy, which symbolizes respect for China’s right
to determine its own domestic policy, and China reciprocates with its policy of noninterference (Brautigam, 2009). Brautigam argues, with merit, that Chinese aid is a
function of Chinese foreign political policy more than economic policy (2011).
China’s policy of non-interference and absence of policy conditionalities has
earned it the label of “rogue donor”. However, Brautigam posits that Chinese aid’s
differences from Western aid does not equate it as rogue (2009). The Chinese do not
claim to understand policy problems in Africa, nor do they claim to know what is
necessary for African development; Chinese aid and policies reflect this. On the other
hand, Western aid policy is notably prescriptive, with policy solutions that have a track
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record of failure in Africa (Brautigam, 2009). Perhaps the most significant difference
between Western and Eastern aid in Africa has been the demand-driven versus donordriven dynamic. Western aid in Africa has been largely donor-driven (Brautigam, 2009).
Western countries and policy makers outside of Africa decide to donate aid to African
states, yet in many ways are out of touch with the circumstances Africans face. Still,
Western donors persist in determining aid policy objectives and designate aid
accordingly. A marked example of this disconnection is in the agricultural sector. The
Western practice of agricultural dumping under the banner of aid and humanitarian
principles has not always found a welcome mat (Easterly, 2006). Zambia drew great
criticism from the global community from an executive decision in 2002 to ban
genetically modified maize, a decision that kept U.S. food “aid” out of Zambia (BBC,
2002; Manda, 2003; Henriot, 2010). China, in contrast, has worked with African states to
dispense aid in ways that African elites see fit, often investing in infrastructure
development (Shelton & Paruk, 2008; Gadzala & Hanusch, 2010).
Chinese aid also differs from Western aid in scope. Western aid is often
associated with grand, large-scale projects across Africa. The Chinese often engage in
smaller projects: building a single hospital or clinic staffed by Chinese professionals,
constructing a school or road, providing professionals to consult with African
counterparts on specific issues (Brautigam, 2009). The argument can be made that these
smaller-scale, community-specific projects are more likely to result in sustainable
change. Sautman and Hairong assert that these characteristics of Chinese aid make its
contributions less susceptible to exploitation and corruption (2007):
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“Chinese aid is often dispensed in such a way that corrupt rulers cannot
somehow use it to buy Mercedes Benzes…. [It] is often in the form of
infrastructure, such as a railroad network in Nigeria or roads in Kenya and
Rwanda. Or in the form of doctors and nurses to provide health care to
people who otherwise would not have access. China provides scholarships
for African students to study in its universities and, increasingly funds to
encourage its businessmen to invest in Africa” (Ching, 2005; as quoted by
Sautman and Hairong, 2007: pp. 87).

These arguments have done nothing to assuage concerns of China’s critics who
note the secretive nature of Chinese aid and the inaccuracy of the “untied” label.
Moreblessings Chidaushe cautions that, because the general public has no access to these
aid agreements, the possibility of hidden conditionalities exists in Chinese aid, rather than
the widely exhorted “no conditionalities” or “untied aid” (2007). In this Chidaushe is
correct; it is erroneous to assume that compounding political conditionalities in Western
aid therefore means that Chinese aid lacks conditionalities. While Chinese aid does veer
away from political conditionalities, the fact that it is often attached to larger trade and
economic agreements indicates that it is laden with economic conditionalities
(Brautigam, 2009). These economic conditionalities mean that some Chinese aid tends to
appear more often in the form of debt cancellation and loans as opposed to the Western
system of grants (King, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). Farzad argues that loans are perhaps
better suited for African needs (2007). Chinese loans are notably cheaper that Western
loans and China offers Africans the opportunity for payment-in-kind arrangements, a
‘working off’ of their debt (BBC News, 2006a; Carmody and Owusu, 2007; Chidaushe,
2007). Logically, grants and donations can create a situation of dependency that
undermines the capacity of Africans to develop the systems and programs necessary to
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fend for themselves in the long run. Some of the blame for increased poverty in Africa
has been cast on development aid and its ineffectiveness (Easterly, 2006; Chidaushe,
2007). The veiled nature of Chinese aid makes it difficult to assess or predict the full
impact of aid agreements, but Shelton and Paruk argue that in general, Chinese
engagement--perhaps due to its differences from Western activities in Africa--plays a
positive role in Africa’s development (2008).
A major shortcoming of the literature on Chinese aid in Africa is that only one
major scholar has achieved specific expertise in this area: Deborah Brautigam. However
there is emerging scholarship16 on the issue of Chinese aid to Africa, especially viewed
through the framework of the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC). FOCAC
has become a platform for increased engagement between China and Africa and its
conferences a place where Chinese aid commitments are increasingly publicized. An area
of concern with FOCAC and scholarship thereon is that much of the information on the
FOCAC conferences and ensuing policies are official statements released by the Chinese
government. In the case of the FOCAC conferences, the agreements made public often
appear to be Chinese promises of aid to African states, as well as vocalizations of
political support in the call for UN reform (King, 2007).
However, like the details of other major agreements, economic or otherwise, aid
agreements between China and African states are not fully publicized. The release of
Chinese aid agreements can be construed as a continued ploy to curry African favor.
What remains evident is that specific elements of Sino-African economic and political
16

In particular King (2007), Shelton and Paruk (2008), and Taylor (2011).
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relations, including administration of aid17 continues to be inaccessible. The challenge of
not only defining Chinese engagement, but ascertaining its unique impact, persists.
Without clear and complete information it is hard to assess the impact of Chinese aid in
Africa. This deficit is further exacerbated by the fact that Chinese aid is offered in small
amounts and aid agreements publicized through FOCAC are project based, with a
continental focus: 50 schools in Africa, as opposed to 1 school per African state (Davies,
2007). Brautigam warns that, just as “sensationalism and rumors cloud our ability to
understand China’s growing engagement in Africa” (2011: pp. 1), significant
misinformation on Chinese aid in Africa lingers, noting that some of this misinformation
stems from erroneous media reports, some is government-generated and inadequately
measured and analyzed. What remains indisputable is that Chinese influence in Africa is
growing. This condition then introduces the question: why are African states increasingly
engaging with China?

III: Scholarship on African Engagement with China: Why the draw for African
states?
Chris Alden and Deborah Brautigam contend that Africans play a central role in
increasing Chinese engagement on the continent (2007; 2009). As such, the motivations
of African actors in Chinese engagement matter, not only because these motivations drive
the process, but because they determine the nature of the relationship between China and
African states. Rocha puts it well when he asks, “What is the driving force behind
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Africa’s sudden economic interest in China? Is it part of a well-calculated approach to
unlock the continent’s true economic potential or is it merely a meek response to an
unfolding development?” (Rocha in Manji and Marks, 2007: pp.31). Though posed by
several scholars, these questions have yet to be adequately addressed by empirical
research. It is unclear whether or not a ‘win-win’ relationship18 is at play between China
and Africa, as China’s president, Hu Jintao claims (FOCAC, 2006b). Alden, Shelton and
Paruk, among others, assert that Africa’s governmental leadership needs to exploit the
opportunities afforded by China and the West (Alden, 2007; Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky,
2008). To do so, government actors must have human and financial capital, as well as
adequate project management and policy implementation protocols to apply the proffered
resources to benefit citizens (Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 2008). In discussing China’s
relationship with Zimbabwe, Karumbidza asserts, “On the whole, it would not be fair to
blame the Chinese for acting to further their interests. It is incumbent upon the
government of Zimbabwe and its people (and any other African country for that matter)
to put in place a programme and strategy for chanelling [sic] funds and direct investment
in a way that contributes to the growth of its own economy” (Karumbidza, 2007: pp. 8788). However, published works to date have failed to sufficiently address the motivations
of African states and measure either their intent or capacity to maximize on this win-win
opportunity.

18

Hu Jintao (President of the People’s Republic of China) (2006) ‘Work Together to Forge a New Type of
China-Africa Strategic Partnership’, address to the National Assembly of Nigeria. 27 April
<http://jm.chineseembassy.org/eng/xw/t259668.htm>.
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Some research exists on the benefits of engagement with China to Africa. Rocha
observes that increasing economic engagement with China has raised market prices of
certain African commodities, which in turn has led to additional revenue and economic
growth for African states (Rocha, 2007). Furthermore, Chinese investment in African
infrastructure development is increasingly noticeable across the continent (Michel &
Beuret, 2009). Private Chinese firms are winning bids to develop public works, build
roads and dams, and renovate airports and railways. In Sudan, a Chinese-built
hydroelectric dam is expected to double the country’s electricity output, which in turn
should have a positive impact on oil exportation (Crilly, 2005). As a part of an agreement
for sole rights to Gabonese iron ore reserves, the Chinese government committed to
building a new railway from the mines to the seaport, and also pledged to build a new
hydroelectric dam to provide power to the mines (TerraDaily, 2006). In deals signed with
Nigeria in the early part of the 2000s, the Chinese government agreed to develop the
country’s oil refineries and power plants and to renovate the railway system (African Oil
Policy Initiative Group, 2001; Lyman, 2005). Further south in Angola, the Chinese have
done the same: renovated and developed the roads and railway systems and installed a
fiber optic network (Mark, 2006). Many of these infrastructure development projects are
part and parcel of larger Chinese trade agreements with African states. Some of these
initiatives are the direct result of FOCAC ministerial conferences while others are the
culmination of the Chinese government’s efforts to encourage Chinese enterprise to
embrace the African market. Chinese investments in infrastructure are to the benefit of
African states and the African people.
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Beyond the short literature on the advantage to Africa of engaging with China,
there is a growing argument on Africa’s attraction to China as the source of a different
model for development. This section of literature is perhaps the best attempt at deducing
African motivations. Stephen Marks makes the argument that China exemplifies and
instructs on an alternative for African development (Marks, 2007). Seemingly
independent of Western methods, the Chinese have expanded their economy and raised
standards of living for the general population (Guerrero, 2006; Marks, 2007). This nonWestern route has been termed the “Beijing Consensus,” or, the anti-thesis of the
Washington Consensus19. China ignored the principles of the Washington Consensus to
stabilize, privatize and liberalize; as other developing states displayed economic demise,
the Chinese economy rather shockingly expanded at an exponential rate (Sautmann &
Hairong, 2007).
According to Thompson, the so-called Beijing Consensus as China’s way to
recent economic success is under consideration by African elites and policy-makers as a
potential path to African development and economic growth (2005). There is no doubt
that the Beijing Consensus has--on paper--improved the living conditions, economic, and
social welfare of the Chinese people, in pure statistics. As of 2006, China was the “fourth
largest economy in the world… [and] market reforms and China’s opening to the global
economy gave millions of people there an increased standard of living” (Guerrero, 2006).
19

The Washington Consensus was the name given to an economic policy package designed to promote
economic development and democracy in developing countries. The Washington Consensus contended
that economic growth could and would be achieved when government intervention in economies and
market systems was minimalized. Through privatization, liberalized trade and macro-economic stability
(essentially “free markets”) economic growth was theorized as achievable. Washington Consensus was
ultimately considered a failure by scholars and policymakers (Stiglitz, 1998; Gore, 2000; Mkandawire,
2005; Adesina, 2006; Adesina, Graham & Olokushi, 2006; Rodrik, 2006; Easterly, 2009).
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Weisbrot observes that over the last three decades, the Chinese economy has been the
fastest growing in the world, especially during a period when other economies were in
substantial decline (2011). Even after the global economic crisis of 2008, the Chinese
economy has continued to post remarkable growth rates and is now ranked second in the
world20, lending credibility to the potential of China to teach Africa a thing or two about
development (Weisbrot, 2011). This Chinese model decries the importance of
privatization and instead touts sophisticated but low-cost technology appropriate for
African countries, focusing on alleviation of poverty as well as development of micro,
small and medium-sized enterprises (Liang, 2005).
According to Rocha, it is quite likely that neither the Beijing Consensus Model
nor the Washington Consensus Model is the way forward for Africa. The uniqueness of
the circumstances that face individual African states makes it hard to believe that a single
policy package could adequately address such a range of problems. Rocha asserts,
“There is also a growing realisation that traditional relations and
partnerships with the West have not helped Africa overcome the
structural obstacles to eradicating poverty and reversing its economic
marginalisation. Rather than develop, Africa is haemorrhaging while
the rest of the world accumulates wealth at its expense through the
unbalanced exploitation of its natural resources and the enforcement of
a distorted international economic system. Logically, strengthened
cooperation with China is seen as a way of addressing some of these
structural imbalances” (John Rocha in Manji & Marks, 2007: pp. 17)
Perhaps Rocha has in this statement noted the most pressing issue: that the
prevalence of China in Africa, has afforded African states new leverage in relations with
the West. Not only does China provide a new market for African goods, driving up the
20

April 2011 projections by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has the Chinese economy surpassing
that of the USA to be the world’s largest economy by 2016.
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prices of commodities, Chinese goods are also competing with Western goods, with
Chinese goods reputably more affordable (Taylor, 2008). In addition, increasing Chinese
influence can be accurately seen as a threat to Western influence (Manji & Marks, 2007;
Rotberg, 2008; Alden et al, 2008). The Chinese have made it obvious to the African elites
that progress, whether economic growth, increased political influence or even sovereignty
and autocracy can be achieved independently of Western protocols and policy
recommendations (French, 2004). Based on this logic, there is no doubt that the growing
influence of the Beijing Consensus could become worrisome for longstanding Western
interests on the African continent (Campbell, 2007).
Still, the literature does very little to specifically address African motivations.
Even though Brautigam, Rocha and Alden make valid arguments on the perceived
benefits to African states, like much of the rest of the literature on Chinese engagement in
Africa there is a dearth in empirical data supporting the arguments of the scholars and
pundits. So while there are observable benefits to African states, there is no evidence to
demonstrate that these benefits are the drivers for growing African engagement with
China. A growing body of literature from the African Economic Research Consortium
(AERC) out of Nairobi, Kenya examines the economic impact of Chinese engagement in
Africa, specifically the impact of trade, investment and aid. These studies present
empirical data that display the potential of benefit to African states, but while they call
for better management on the African side of engagement with China, they again do not
speak specifically to African motivations (Ajakaiye, 2006; Ademola, Bankole &
Adewuyi, 2009.). A glaring hole in the literature on African motivations to engage with
China remains. If, as notable African scholars including Alden, Brautigam, Ajakaiye and
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Kaplinsky allege, African motivations factor prominently in this new iteration of
international relations, and this relationship has potential global consequences, there is a
pressing need for research that addresses Africa’s motivations.

Conclusion
In sum, most existing literature fails to adequately address why Africans choose
to engage with China. A growing body of work by the African Economic Research
Consortium (AERC) is beginning to address the African perspective on China-African
relations21 (Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 2009). Ajakaiye and Kaplinsky note that these
economic analyses, including scoping studies and detailed case studies, have fallen short
of revealing agency on the part of Africans (2009). Other research focuses on the Chinese
perspective, speaking to China’s possible motivations and policies in Africa (See Tull,
2006; Alden, 2007; Broadman, 2007; Large et al, 2008; Behar, 2008; Rotberg, 2008;
Brautigam, 2009; Michel & Beuret, 2009). The running assumption among scholars and
analysts seems to be that the Chinese are in Africa because they can be and want to be.
These observations seem to allege that China’s involvement in Africa is a modern
iteration of dependency, in which China’s economic growth and development as a result
of engagement with Africa will have a retarding effect on Africa’s own growth and
development. Accordingly, most published literature appears to base assessments of

21

There are a number of articles and studies published by AERC. AERC was established in 1988 and its
publications on Chinese engagement in Africa have been published over the last few years, ranging from
country-specific economic analyses to regional, industry and development analyses. These studies assess
the scale and impact of increasing engagement with China.
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Chinese engagement on the assertion that Africans have no choice and instead are pawns
of China’s foreign policy; Tull is perhaps the best example of this view (2006; 2008).
From early accounts of Chinese engagement in Africa during the Middle Ages,
most existing literature has concerned itself primarily with the Chinese perspective of this
relationship. However, noted scholars have reiterated the importance of African agency
in the current permutation of Chinese engagement in Africa. Observations that the
Chinese have had to curry African favor to promote their businesslike, non-interfering
style of engagement indicate that the specific motivations of African actors matter. This
view appears to directly contradict the arguments of other scholars and pundits who
suggest that Africa is an unwitting pawn in Chinese foreign policy, with no influence or
say in the relationship. Regardless of how well developed or logical any of these
arguments may be, they remain unsubstantiated by rigorous empirical research. This
researcher contends that to fully understand Chinese-African relations, the African aspect
of the relationship must also be studied in greater detail. An exploration of Africa’s China
policy, especially in the case of non-authoritarian African states, is missing. China is
engaging with Zimbabwe and Sudan, and also with many other African states, including
Nigeria, a regional economic giant. The question remains: what benefits await African
states that engage with China?
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Chapter 3: Dependency Theory in Africa

This chapter explains dependency theory and comments on its many forms. The
discussion examines the applicability of dependency theory in explaining
underdevelopment in poor countries. The chapter also addresses whether dependency
theory can define the nature of Chinese relations with Africa and Nigeria, observes
China’s reliance on soft power to win over African states, and asks whether dependency
theory relates to China’s need to develop an international economic regime. Following
the discussion of dependency theory, an alternative theoretical framework through which
to understand and evaluate China-Africa and China-Nigeria relations is presented, with
the assertion that China-Africa and China-Nigeria relations fall short of defined
requirements for dependency and instead display an identifiable form of realist national
self-interest.
Current literature on recent Chinese political and economic interaction with
African states (either on individual or aggregate levels) has yet to adequately describe, let
alone analyze, the inscrutable nature of relations between China and Africa. As the
previous chapter described, most of the literature focuses on two disparate views: the
anti-China in Africa delegation and the view that supports new opportunities/partnerships
for Africa and China. The anti-China scholarship, with its own proponents22, notably
22

The first voice of caution and warning of a negative outcome of Chinese influence on the African
continent is probably Emmanuel John Hevi, who studied medicine in China for 18 months from 19601962, under a scholarship provided by the early communist Chinese government. Disillusioned by his
experience, Hevi cautioned African elites to think for themselves and reason through circumstances to
make decisions with Africa’s best interests at heart; he encouraged Africans to learn from the foreigners
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Kagan, Tull, and Behar, has exercised less restraint by broadcasting perceived impacts of
increasing Chinese engagement in Africa and posing possible reasons for increased
African collaboration (2006; 2006; 2008). The new opportunities perspective is best
represented by the works of Alden and Brautigam, who offer rather conservative
discussions of the potential impacts of Chinese engagement (2007; 2009). Most of the
literature along this vein reports on Chinese activity in Africa—both positive and
negative--and reiterates new opportunities afforded African state actors concerned with
development and economic growth. But despite a somewhat positive outlook,
dependency theory fails to critically and empirically assess the impact of China’s
activities in Africa.
In many ways, the analysis of China’s impact in Africa reads like the literature
on underdevelopment. The logic is laden with neo-imperialist concepts borrowed from
dependency theory: the idea of a passive Africa, inconsequential except for its usefulness
as an economic pawn for China’s sole benefit. These assertions, however, are not clearly
or always attributed to dependency theory.

Dependency Theory
Dependency theory is an economics system theory that seeks to explain
why rich countries become richer while poor countries become poorer. Dos
Santos defined dependency as:

but to accept offers only after critical consideration. (Hevi, 1966). It is important to note that most of
Hevi’s disdain for the Chinese 1960 African policy was aimed specifically at China’s radical push for an
African revolution (Ya-chun, 1981; US Congressman Lawrence P. McDonald in Pearson, 1977)
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“...an historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world
economy such that it favors some countries to the detriment of others and
limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economics...a
situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is
conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to
which their own is subjected” (Dos Santos, 1971: pp. 226)23.

Dependency theory also suggests that, despite increased trade with poorer
countries, the international system is controlled by dominant (richer) states
seeking to maximize their benefits at the expense of poorer states (Smith, 1979).
Ultimately the poorer states are rendered powerless and subjected to economic
policies that will always favor the interests of richer, dominant states.
Dependency theory, then, provides the framework for understanding why
developing countries stay poor while the industrialized developed countries
become wealthier. Dependency theorists made the argument that dominant
developed countries had established a world economic system that they controlled
and it was the machinations of this system that allowed wealthy countries to
prosper and poor countries to suffer (Smith, 1979).
Initially, dependency theory emerged as a critique of neoclassical economic
theory that assumes economic growth results in net benefits to all, though benefits are not
always equal (Ferraro, 1996). In other words, neoclassical economists expected that trade
would automatically have a positive effect on all participants. However, dependency
theorists showed that although developed nations recorded economic growth, developing
countries did not grow at similar rates (Prebisch, 1950; Ferraro, 1996).

2323

See also (Dos Santos, 1973: pp. 76)
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The primary and most oft-cited study establishing dependency theory is Raul
Prebisch’s examination of Latin America. In attempting to extrapolate the rationale
behind the poor economic performance of Latin American countries, Prebisch, then
executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA),
divided states into two sections of the world economy: states with established
industrialized centers and less industrialized peripheral countries, the purveyors of raw
materials and primary products. Prebisch argues that the industrial capabilities and
technological advancements of the center states such as the United States and Western
European countries provided a distinct advantage in the ability to amass greater
proportions of net benefit of trade with peripheral states like Latin American nations
(Prebisch, 1950). Thus, increased trade on the part of peripheral states was unlikely to
result in growth in their local economies. In fact, according to this logic, “an increase in
the traditional exports of a typical Latin American country might well produce no
increase in national income” (Booth, 1975: pp. 55).
This explanation was without a doubt an alarming but plausible reason for the
absence of economic growth in Latin American and by extension all developing countries
including African countries that fit the same criteria. To even the playing field,
protectionist policies were urged by dependency theorists to cushion domestic industry
from damaging competition (Smith, 1979). Scholars argued that these policies only
served to further exacerbate the inequitable situation, increasing peripheral countries’
dependency on outside capital and external actors (Booth, 1975; Bernstein, 1979). The
ECLA’s idea of center-periphery relations and a structuralist approach to
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underdevelopment served as the foundation for the emergence of various dependency and
underdevelopment theories (Snyder, 1980).
The straightforward logic of dependency theory asserts that developing countries
sell raw materials to developed countries who use those materials to create manufactured
“value-added” products which are then sold back to the developing countries at a higher
price (Ferraro, 1996). Finished goods cost more than raw materials; thus developing
countries cannot accrue enough income from their exports to pay for their imports,
resulting in debt and decrease of economic growth (Ferraro, 1996). This imbalance
creates a state of dependency for developing countries where “dependency can be defined
as an explanation of the economic development of a state in terms of the external
influences--political, economic, and cultural--on national development policies” (Sunkel,
1969: pp. 23).
The economic North’s control of the world economy created a state of neocolonialism for the southern states. Neo-colonialism refers to the Western domination of
the world market and economic policies affecting non-Western states that have allowed
unequal economic growth benefiting Western industrialized capitalists, at a significant
cost to the non-industrialized world (Bosch, 1997). The North’s control of the global
economic system was such that, even when industrialization emerged in developing states
that manufactured finished goods, they remained under the influence of multi-national
corporations in the developed North (Cardoso, 1972; Cardoso, 1973). The
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dependentistas24 central argument asserts that underdevelopment is a function of
imperialism, which “changes in form but not in fact” (Smith, 1979: pp. 250)25.
Dependency theory emerged in the 1950s as a way of understanding relations
between countries, in particular relations between more developed and less-developed
countries (Ferraro, 1996). However, beyond this core argument, multiple versions of
dependency theory have risen out of the intellectual and political tradition of Marxism,
especially during the 1970s. Not all permutations can be characterized as Marxist
(Snyder, 1980), primarily because dependency theory attempts to explain and understand
variations in the economic performance of countries in capitalist systems within a
capitalist world society. Despite booming success for developed countries during the
same period, a group of disadvantaged countries—African states serve as obvious
examples--saw little or negative economic growth: the rich got richer and the poor got
poorer in a system that advertised success for all.
Snyder (1980) argues that most of the underdevelopment and dependency
theorists did not subscribe to an empirical approach to social science. Instead they
followed the logic of Marxian political economy, employing the notion of successive
approximations, which “consists in moving from the more abstract to the more concrete
in a step-by-step fashion, removing simplifying assumptions at successive stages of the
investigation so that they may take account of and explain an ever wide range of
phenomena” (Sweezy, 1968: pp. 11). Consequently, the importance of context rather than

24

Borrowed from Tony Smith’s classification of dependency theorists.

25

See also Theotonio Dos Santos’ “The Structure of Dependence.”
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statistical rigor is particularly heightened because it allows for a more comprehensive
understanding of the phenomena under study. For dependency and underdevelopment
theorists, the significance of context is evident in the value and emphasis placed on
history and socio-economic elements that define social reality, asserting that historical
context determines varied interpretations of reality (Thomas, 1974). Thus, when applying
dependency theory it is important to employ a holistic approach, reinforcing the stance
that a better understanding at the macro level allows for a better understanding at the
micro level (Frank, 1969; 1975).
Dependency theorists have attempted to answer the question, “dependency for
whom?” understanding that pursuing dependency theory’s logic may result in very real
political conclusions—i.e., the lessons and conclusions of dependency theorists
influenced the policy process, and did not always have a positive outcome (Smith, 1979;
Ferraro, 1996). In addition, dependency theory is by nature normative; the key terms of
development and underdevelopment are largely subjective. Quite naturally, a moral
rhetoric has become a part of dependency theory because it seeks to discern
circumstances leading to underdevelopment in order to improve the status quo (Snyder,
1980; Bosch, 1997). “Dependency theories articulate the interests of particular groups or
classes and simultaneously embody preconceptions, raise questions and propose
explanations” (Snyder, 1980: pp.744). The normative and subjective nature of
dependency theory has led to multiple permutations of dependency concepts.
Despite a body of published work categorized as dependency theory and the
consistency of language addressing unequal development and economic growth,
dependency theory essentially lacks theoretical coherence and has resulted in notable
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political inefficacy (Snyder, 1980). “There is no such thing as a single unified body of
thought called dependency theory,” Harding states. (Harding, 1976: p.3). Chilcote puts it
more bluntly, “no unified theory of dependency yet exists” (1978: pp.55; see also Fagen,
1977). Chilcote argues that dependency theory was at its best a heuristic model, not a
formal theory of modernization (1978). Since a heuristic model is largely an explanatory
tool which describes use and action, dependency theory has been applied to explain the
discrepancies in economic growth between nations; to this end dependency theory has
shown itself a heuristic. But a theory attempts to do more than a heuristic, not only by
explaining a current state of affairs but by predicting and analyzing the conditions leading
to one action or another. Following this logic, dependency theory can hardly be
characterized as a theory. Not only is there no comprehensive dependency theory, Smith
argues that the concepts readily claimed by dependency theory lack explicit and concrete
definitions and their interpretation differs from one scholar to the next (1981). Even
among dependency theory scholars, discord persists concerning its purpose. Regardless
of increased attention from academia, dependency theory has remained “ambiguous” and
“fragmentary” (Snyder, 1980). As such, dependency theory is perhaps at its best an
approach or even a framework and, despite its name, not a theory (Duvall, 1978; Snyder;
1980).
This research is not intended to discredit dependency theory. The dearth of recent
publications in this review of dependency theory serves to illustrate the fact that
dependency theory as a means of understanding international political economy, world
systems and the effects of the relationships between industrialized and less-industrialized
countries has fallen into disrepute. Further examination reveals that dependency theory
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inaccurately overemphasizes the impact of economic processes26 and does not account
for other influences in assessing development. Thus, it fails to note that chronic
underdevelopment is not simply a function of unequal exchange and external decisionmaking but a direct consequence of the political decision-making patterns of local elites
(Smith, 1979; Smith, 1981). According to Gabriel Almond “One cannot escape the
conclusion that the dependency movement …may have been intellectually
counterproductive” (1990: pp. 253). James Caporaso disagrees, asserting that
“Dependency theory died out more from neglect than frontal criticism” (1993: 470).
Regardless, dependency theory as a means of interpreting international relations or
explaining economic relationships has lost traction in academia, and has for the most part
been abandoned.
While dependency theory has been phased out of scholarship on
international/political economy, its influence remains. The argument can be made that the
most important contributions of dependency theory are its normative stance on global
economic influence on politics and the constant call to action. These influences are clear
in the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa. It is quite easy to see how the expected
impact of Chinese engagement in Africa can be framed using the language and logic of
dependency theory. Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of the South African Institute of
International Affairs, referring to trade relations between China and South Africa, states,
"We sell them raw materials and they sell us manufactured goods with a predictable
26

“[Dependency Theory] holds that economic processes are the basic structural force of history, and that
over the last several centuries it has been northern capitalism (first in its mercantile, then in its freetrade, later in its financial and today in its multinational guises) that has been history’s locomotive”
(Smith, 1981: pp. 756).
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result--an unfavorable trade balance against South Africa" (as quoted in Mooney, 2005).
This resonates with Cox and Jacobson, who assert that, in a state of dependence,
“Economic growth is skewed so as to induce and perpetuate balance of
payments deficits, to distribute income and wealth in a highly unequal
manner, and to increase marginality in society. The relationship of
dependency is created and maintained by a coalition of individuals in
both the dominant and subordinate states who benefit from it and who
act to insure that their states pursue appropriate policies. The overall
system, however, provides greater benefits for the dominant states than
for those in subordinate positions (1974: pp.1)”

If, as implied by Mr. Mbeki and supported by Cox and Jacobson, dependency exists in
Sino-African relations, then we can expect the following:
1. Increased economic engagement with China should result in little, no or reverse
economic growth for African states. Cox and Jacobson argue that in a dependent
system dominant states benefit most (1974) because they control the world
economic system (Smith, 1979). It is important to note that Cox and Jacobson fail
to clarify the nature of this benefit, whether it is economic or political.

2. China is the main and arguably the only driver in Sino-African relations.
Dependency theory is inherently a systems theory. A major critique leveled
against dependentistas, is their inability to account for the actions of the parts
(individual actors) in their drive to explain the whole. The actions and motivations
(agency) of Africans are not a significant influencing factor in this relationship.
However, existing evidence cannot evaluate whether these expectations are borne out. To
begin with, characterizing Sino-African relations as dependent seems inaccurate. A
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significant element of the explanatory power of dependency theory is built on the basis of
a shared history (Dos Santos, 1971). Historical context is a necessary standpoint to
determine if dependent relationships are imposed upon peripheral, resource-rich states.
Dos Santos argues that conditions of dependency are not immediately impressed upon
peripheral states but are instead developed over long periods of time (1971). While they
have persisted through centuries, Sino-African relations have largely consisted of
diplomatic interactions devoid of the political and economic characteristics that
dependency theorists argue influence the emergence of dependent conditions. SinoAfrican relations have only recently begun to develop significant political and economic
traits that may over time culminate in conditions resembling dependency. The last 15
years have marked this new relationship with the FOCAC conferences commencing in
2000, which have catalyzed increasing relations. China and Africa’s shared history is
really only now being written. In light of this more visible relationship, it is problematic
to contend that present relations show Africa’s dependency even though the possibility
exists that a dependent relationship may develop over time.
However, quoting Samir Amin, who states “the starting point, as always, is
imperialism,” Peter Evans suggests, “imperialism remains the frame for the analysis of
dependent development” (Evans, 1979: pp. 16; Evans, 1979, pp. 50). As with the general
claim of dependency, as yet no empirical research or evidence has adequately depicted
the recent Chinese foray into Africa as imperialistic or colonialist. Even though some
insist that China is pursuing a neo-colonialist agenda in Africa, these claims have not
been rigorously examined. Furthermore, what is known of Chinese engagement in Africa
does not fit Kwame Nkrumah’s definition of neocolonialism, where “the state which is

54

subject to it [neocolonialism] is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings
of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is
directed from outside” (1966: pp. ix). Without a historical foundation rooted in
imperialism, as asserted by proponents of dependency theory, it appears that the present
permutation of Sino-African relationship is not a dependent one
In addition, characteristics of dependency theory are typically defined as
vulnerability to external forces, lack of autonomy, trade imbalance (Smith, 1979).
Chinese trade with Africa is at the aggregate level fairly balanced; at the individual level,
some of the dyadic relations are imbalanced in favor of China and others are imbalanced
in favor of the African country, e.g. Angola or Sudan. Chinese policy in Africa has been
labeled “economic diplomacy” (Alves in Alden et al, 2008), and Moyo points out that
Chinese policy in Africa adopts a decidedly business-like tone (2009), without political
interference27, which allows for the pursuit of arrangements that, if properly executed,
have the potential for positive results. African states do have autonomy in their
engagement with China; they are active participants that choose this relationship. While
the literature has not fully addressed the motivations of African elites and the African role
in increasing engagement with China, there is little question that African approval and
agency is necessary for this relationship (Alden, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). It can also be
argued that engagement with China has reduced African vulnerability to external forces
as the Chinese option has afforded African elites new leverage in their dealings with
other states and external actors. In addition, the Chinese have shared technology with
27

Askouri argues that Chinese support of and work with ruling elites in African states is a form of indirect
political interference (2007).
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African states and are increasingly recognized for their efforts in the development of
infrastructure (Mutukwa, 1977; Alden, 2007). Theoretically speaking, these activities
could result in economic growth, increased standards of living, and poverty amelioration,
which run counter to expected indicators of underdevelopment or dependency (Calderon
and Serven, 2004). It does not appear that Chinese-African relations can be appropriately
characterized by dependency theory.
Today, international politics faces new conditions, and the changing global puzzle
requires new theories, ideas and frameworks to provide adequate understanding of
international relations and political economics. While Africa’s history with the West fit
quite well with the story and explanation presented by dependency theory, this logic can
no longer be automatically superimposed on Africa’s relations with China. Chinese
forays into Africa have introduced and shared new capital and technology that has diluted
and diminished Western control of those resources. According to Evans, this control of
capital and technology plays a significant role in the development of dependency
relationships (1979). If China is not developing a dependent relationship with African
elites, it is logical to infer that China is developing a new international economic
relationship to address the changes in the global political economy.
State-centric Realism
Dependency theory was developed around and during the period of the Cold War;
the influences of realism and idealism are apparent in the literature. Realism refers to the
individual’s quest for self-interest. Gilpin notes that following the end of the Cold War
there has been a shift from Marxist economic doctrines like dependency theory and an
increasing adoption of liberalism (2001). The influence of neo-liberalism in the
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structural adjustment policies of the Washington Consensus is evident. Neo-liberalism
argues that economies grow best when the market is free of limiting state interventionist
policies (Gilpin, 2001). However, the reduction of the state in the market, and the
promotion of free market economies in the manner proposed by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, have failed to attain sustainable economic growth for
African states. Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo also contends that “after the end of the Cold
War, it has become intellectually and philosophically more difficult, using the dominant
paradigms in international relations, namely realism and idealism, to predict the behavior
of actors and structures of actions in international relations” (1999: pp. 1). Gilpin presents
a different perspective for analyzing international political economy, state-centric
realism. State-centric realism identifies the state as the principal actor in international
affairs motivated by national interests, and not a system of states influenced by the
distribution of power as Waltz's neo-realism argued (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 2001). Gilpin
therefore suggests "the interests and policies of states are determined by the governing
political elite, the pressures of powerful groups within a national society, and the nature
of the 'national system of political economy'" (2001: pp. 18). In part, Gilpin's idea of
state-centric realism marries the constructivist perspective and the realist perspective,
acknowledging that social constructs, ideas, and human volition--like nationalism--allow
for agency, and play an important role in state behavior and international affairs (Gilpin,
2001). The analytic perspective of state-centric realism accounts for African agency in
Chinese engagement in Africa; it supports the arguments made by key African scholars
that the motivations of African state actors matter.
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This study asserts that, just as dependency theory inadequately describes
underdevelopment in Africa and the role of the West therein, it is even more unsuitable
for explaining current Sino-African relations. It argues instead that growing Sino-African
relations can be viewed as African states’ self-interests, exercised in the pursuit of
political and economic objectives as much as China’s interests, a realist pursuit of
national interest. This research is most concerned with African agency and asserts that
Africans are increasingly engaging with China not because of a systems theory of
dependency that paints Africans as “powerless” pawns. Ajakaiye and Kaplinsky warn,
“A reincarnation of dependency theory, in which Africa was seen as a quivering
victim of external forces, must be abandoned, both in order to understand better
what is happening and why it is happening, and in helping Africa to make the best
of the opportunities opened up by the rapid emergence of the Asian Driver
economies and the consequent restructuring of the global order in the twenty-first
Century” (2009; pp. 482).
The argument this author promotes is that the phenomena at hand more closely resemble
Gilpin’s state-centric realism. In other words, African states are trading with China in a
way that resembles inter-state relations.
As demonstrated in earlier chapters, scholars of African politics are adamant that
Africans are significant actors in their engagement with China but they stop short of
discussing the precise role of African states and the drivers behind growing engagement
with China. This project argues that, contrary to dependency theory that assumes African
states are passive players, African states choose to engage and in particular to trade with
China for the same reasons that all states trade with each other: because as liberal
economic theory and a state-centric realist perspective support, international trade is in
their national interest. Stephen Krasner argues that the four basic state interests are
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economic growth, aggregate national income, political power and social stability (1976).
Growing African engagement with China can be argued as a means to attain all four of
these objectives. That is, African states chose to engage with China because it is a path
to increasing economic growth, accruing aggregate national income, improving social
stability and leveraging political power in the global arena.
African states are increasingly engaging with China because they believe it is in
their national interest and will result in increased aggregate national income and
economic growth. Trade has perhaps been the most noticeable demonstration of Africans’
increasing engagement with China. This research argues that the presence of China as a
new market for African exports, even more significant because China buys African
products at market prices, has the potential to add to aggregate national income.
Consequently, an increase in national income is positive economic growth. This is
because China is a new trade partner for African states, in addition to and not in lieu of
prior trading partners. Thus, trade with China provides marginal income, an additional
revenue source for African economies. African states can earn more because they can sell
more. As a result they will accrue more income and this will in turn lead to economic
growth, thereby meeting two of Krasner’s basic state interests. In addition, Chinese
foreign direct investments in African economies have provided important capital that has
the potential to contribute to sustainable economic growth.
This study contends that the ability of the Chinese to fill some of the needs of
African society is an important motivating factor for Africa’s increasing engagement with
China. Chinese manufactured products are cheap and affordable; thus, trade with China
has made luxury goods more accessible and increased the spending power of the average
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African28. Combined with Chinese investments in infrastructure development, this higher
spending power has the potential to make significant improvements to living standards
and the amelioration of poverty and under-development in Africa. The previous chapter
highlighted the proclivity of Chinese aid towards the construction or rehabilitation of
public service works, large scale projects like the construction of roads, hydro-electric
power stations, telecommunication systems and lesser projects like schools, hospitals and
skills training, all necessary for economic growth and the reduction of poverty (Calderon
& Serven, 2004). The argument can be made that improvement in living standards can in
turn lead to a happier and less volatile society. A more satisfied society, therefore, can be
expected to be a more stable one.
In addition to trade and aid, the previous chapters also noted increasing political
collaboration between African states and China. With the end of the Cold War and
current U.S. involvement in two expensive wars, China’s influence is growing as the
Chinese economy flourishes; Lumumba-Kasongo claims that as China’s influence
increases so does uncertainty at the global level. Theories applied to international
relations fall short of addressing current events in general, and in particular, Africa’s
demand for global change (1999).
With increasing globalization, the nature of state interaction is shifting, influenced
by advances in communications and information technology that has the power to change
the face of international relations. Gilpin asserts that there are three types of change:
systems change, systemic change and interaction change (1981). The argument that this
28

Based on interviews with Nigerian respondents and observations of the researcher.
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study advances is that Africans are engaging China to effect change, in particular
interaction change. African engagement with China has been noted as markedly different
from typical African foreign relations, in particular with Western states; it is a
relationship with a distinctly business-like tone, laden with negotiation aimed at the
realization of mutual objectives and mutual benefit. The Chinese government has
implemented incentives that encourage Chinese businesses to engage in Africa29.30
Through the machinations of international organizations, Chinese support and
South-South solidarity can also draw attention to issues that concern Africans. The
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is an international organization with a
framework that has allowed consideration of African concerns. Additionally, with its
policy of non-interference and adherence to the recognition and respect for state
sovereignty, China allows African states to play a role in their own policy process. This
was demonstrated in the address then-President of Egpyt Hosni Mubarak made at the
fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference, November 8, 2009 that presented African ideals
and principles in increasing Africa-China engagement (FOCAC, 2009d)31.
This study argues that the nature of engagement between African states and the
Chinese, through strategic partnerships and negotiated agreements, creates an
environment that compels Africa states to become determinants and decision-makers in

29

Informal interview with a Chinese diplomat in the Commerce sector of the Chinese consulate, July 15,
2011, Abuja.

30

In addition, a major part of FOCAC conferences (held every 3 years) is trade meetings and agreements
between Chinese and African entities.

31

President Mubarak’s Ten Principles of Africa-China Cooperation is included in Appendix G.
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their own development process. By playing an active role in its own policy and
development process, a greater possibility exists for Africa to realize sustainable change
and growth, especially when the outside policies of international financial institutions
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have blatantly failed to
improve African economies (Weiss et al., 2009; Armstrong et al, 2007; Barnett and
Finnemore, 2004). Engagement with China positions Africans as important players that
form a prominent part of the solution and policy process. This new role indicates a
significant shift in African international relations, and one that fits Gilpin’s concept of
interaction change. This shift has the potential to culminate in global change, an overall
shift in the way African states interact with all other states, a transformation that,
Lumumba-Kasongo posits, Africans demand (1999). This study therefore asserts that
African states are engaging with China because they believe a different method of
interaction, one with increased African particiaption will lead to an increase in political
power, with the capability to change the way African states interact with others.
There is sufficient reason to believe that state-centric realist African states are
choosing to engage with China because it allows them to realize their interests in
increased aggregate national income, greater economic development, improved social
stability and expansion of political power, internally and on the world stage. To test the
argument that Africans are choosing to engage with China because it is in their national
interest, a case study of Nigeria was conducted. The following are the hypothesis to be
tested in this study:
Nigerians are increasingly engaging with China because they believe it
will result in a net benefit for themselves and for their country.
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This hypothesis first examines Gilpin’s argument for state-centric realism by
investigating the notion that Nigerians who engage with China are motivated by national,
cultural or societal ideals. It aims to determine if Nigerian governmental actors identify
national interest (or ideals that would fall under the purview of national interest) as
motivating factors in Nigeria’s increasing engagement with China. These interests
include: Nigerian belief that Chinese investments in infrastructure and Chinese aid will
lead to improvements in standards of living and a reduction in poverty; and, Nigerian
belief, especially by governmental actors, that engagement with China reinforces their
sovereignty and affords them new international legitimacy.
This study further examines Krasner’s specific areas of national interest, in
particular aggregate national income and economic growth, as well as Krasner’s national
interest of social stability, examining the argument that Nigerians believe that increased
engagement with China will improve the lives of the Nigerian people. This argument
suggests that the improvement of standards of living will in turn lead to happier citizens,
resulting in a comparatively more stable society. This hypothesis tests whether or not
Nigerians believe that political power or some new form of leverage in the international
political arena will accrue as a result of increased engagement with China. The argument
that this hypothesis explores is that Nigerians believe the presence of China as a strategic
partner and potential alternative to Western states creates a condition in which these
countries (Western states) must change the way they interact with Nigeria or at least
indicate an interest in addressing international issues of concern to Nigeria. This study
tests whether Nigerians believe they can realize these objectives through increased
engagement with China.
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The next chapters test the central hypothesis of this study to see if, as argued,
dependency theory is an inadequate descriptor of growing Sino-African relations and if
Africans, in particular Nigerians are choosing to increasingly engage with China because
they believe that it is in their best interests and in-line with national interests.

Conclusion
Dependency theory emerged as a way to understand the phenomenon of rich
states getting richer and poor states getting poorer at a time when liberal economic theory
purported that increased trade would lead to economic benefit for all. Presently, political
economists have abandoned dependency theory. Although it has explanatory power,
dependency theory fails to account for other factors that influence economic growth, in
particular the effects of elite decision-making. However, the influence of dependency
theory has persisted in underdevelopment literature, and more recently in the literature on
Sino-African relations, especially from those who accuse China of neo-colonialist
behavior in Africa. These claims have yet to be rigorously examined through empirical
research. Furthermore, evidence of economic growth in African states due to China’s
increased demands for African products, as well as increasing agency on the part of
African actors, indicates that a relationship unlike that described by dependency theory is
at work.
This study argues that state-centric realism is the phenomenon at work in growing
engagement between China and African states. In a context of state-centric realism, all
actors are driven by their own interests and act in pursuit of them. The motivations of
both sides are important determinants of the nature of the relationship. As most literature
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on Chinese engagement in Africa has explored the issue from the Chinese perspective,
this project is concerned with understanding the African side of this relationship. This
study argues that African states matter because their behavior in this iteration of
international relations is motivated by a belief that engagement in China will result in the
realization of national interests. These national interests, as identified by Krasner, include
aggregate national income, economic growth, political power and social stability (1976).
The next chapters explore the argument that dependency theory is not an adequate
descriptor of growing Sino-African relations and test the hypotheses that state-centric
realist African states are engaging with China because they believe that it is in their
national interest, with primary focus on Nigeria as a case study.
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Chapter 4: An Economic Win-win?

Introduction
If applied to current Sino-African engagement, dependency theory asserts that,
despite increasing trade, African states will not benefit and are instead insignificant
pawns subject to the demands of Chinese objectives. However, demonstrable economic
benefits to African states support this project’s central argument that dependency does
not adequately describe the relationship between China and African states. This chapter
explores the idea that African dependency results in adverse economic conditions in
Africa and in Nigeria, particularly in the areas of economic growth and trade balance32.
To investigate these indicators, the following chapter seeks to determine any evidence of
mutual economic growth as trade increases between African states and China, and
assesses levels of benefit from trade. To accomplish this, economic growth and trade
balance are measured at two levels: the aggregate level (all of Africa as a single entity)
and the individual state level (Nigeria case study). This chapter does not assert that
positive economic trends are due to increasing engagement with China, but instead
asserts that the economic trends do not indicate a state of dependency for African states.
The first half of this chapter focuses on Africa and is split into two sub-sections.
The first subsection looks at Africa’s aggregate economic growth, noting trends in gross
domestic product (GDP) growth rate, gross national income (GNI), and gross domestic
32

See previous chapter for all indicators of a dependent relationship.
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product per capita during the ten years preceding the first Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation and the ten years following (1990-2009). The second subsection
concentrates in particular on the balance of trade between China and Africa from 19952009 to reveal any indicators of dependency. The second section of this chapter examines
economic trends between Nigeria and China from 1995 to 2009 to see if dependency
theory is a fitting framework for understanding growing China-Nigeria relations.
Testing dependency theory is a challenging undertaking. As Vengroff asserts, this
difficulty results from the numerous and diverse approaches by scholars to empirically
examine dependency theory (1977; 1977b). Kaufmann, Chernotsky and Geller allege that
many of these studies intended “to build and illustrate dependency theory, rather than
subject it to the possibility of disproof” (1975: pp. 303). Just as scholarship on the
ideology behind dependency theory lacked cohesion, so do empirical analyses of
dependency theory as a subset of underdevelopment literature. Although dependency
theory is viewed as an economics systems theory, scholars hold that there are different
kinds of dependency: economic, political and military. Further still, each scholar
operationalizes dependency differently (Kaufman, Chernotsky & Geller, 1975; Vengroff,
1977b). For example, Kaufman et al. operationalized economic performance within
dependent conditions in the following manner:
“1: Countries with high levels of economic dependency are likely to have low rates
of economic growth.
2: Countries with high levels of economic dependency are likely to have an
unfavorable balance of trade.
3: Countries with high levels of dependency are likely to have unstable,
fluctuating growth patterns” (1975: pp.308).”
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Such attempts at empirical analysis of dependency theory have generated mixed results,
including Vengroff’s, which examined dependency in Africa (1975; 1977b). Vengroff’s
analysis of newly independent African states failed to demonstrate a negative relationship
between dependency and economic performance, which the author attributed to
methodology problems as opposed to “fundamental inadequacy of the theory,” asserting
that the “analysis has provided at least a partial confirmation of dependency theory”
(1977b: pp. 630). Kaufman and others were more blunt, leveling critiques against
dependency theory later echoed by Tony Smith, noting “the concept of dependency…
requires refinement and redefinition” and further still, declaring that dependency theory
needs to account for the influence of political, social and cultural factors that can
influence economic performance (175: pp. 329). As illustrated in the previous chapter,
dependency theory fell out of favor amongst scholars; therefore this chapter does not look
to test dependency.
The argument for state-centric realism posed by this study suggests that
dependency is not at work between China and Africa, but instead that state leaders and
individuals are engaging with China because it is in their best interest. Though a lot of the
literature and research reveals the benefit for China of African trade33; this section
focuses instead on whether or not African states are demonstrating growth despite
China’s more obvious profit.

33

See Gu & Humphrey (2006) and Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira (2008b).
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Sino-African Relations— Mutual Economic Benefit
In 2000, the first FOCAC conference in Beijing formally marked the start of
burgeoning trade between China and Africa. Over the next 10 years, the FOCAC
conferences have served as an engine for growing Chinese engagement in Africa, thus
indicating the significance of FOCAC as a chronological marker of Chinese engagement
in Africa (Shelton & Paruk, 2008). This study relies upon the start of the FOCAC
conferences as the indicator of the Chinese economic partnership with African states.
Trends prior to 2000 the year of the first FOCAC conference show African economic
activity without Chinese interaction and trends after indicate the perceived influence of
the Chinese. A 20-year period will be examined, first exploring limited Chinese
interaction (1990-1999), and then increasing Chinese interaction (2000-2009). Economic
trends for China are indicated on the same graphs to illustrate China’s positive economic
performance over the same 20-year period, although discussion dwells on African
economic performance.
If indeed economic engagement between China and Africa is producing favorable
outcomes for both sides, borrowing from the framework provided by Kaufman et al., the
following propositions will be tested:
1: Africa should exhibit higher economic growth rates in the decade after the first
FOCAC conference (2000-2009) than the preceding decade (1990-1999).
2: Africa should have an even or nearly even balance of trade with China.
These propositions challenge Kaufmann’s first two assertions regarding the
relationship between dependency and economic performance, and unfavorable trade
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balance in countries with high rates of dependency. This chapter’s research posits
positive trends due to the absence of a dependent state. Examining economic trends to
test these propositions can reveal empirical results to support or discredit the argument of
a dependent relationship between China and Africa. If the evidence supports these
propositions, no dependent relationship is at work; if the evidence shows no support for
these propositions, then it would appear there is some merit to the claim of a neoimperialistic China promoting a dependent economic relationship with African states.
This chapter does not attribute African economic growth to increased engagement with
China, noting that there are a number of other factors including African’s continuing
engagement with the West, in particular the USA34 that influenced economic
development in the region. The purpose of this chapter is to determine if a state of
dependency exists for African states.
Mutual Economic Growth
The first indicator of economic performance is growth in gross domestic product.
According to Fig 4-1, aggregate African GDP growth rates prior to the 2000 launch of the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation stayed close to global growth rates. After 2000,
however, African growth rates maintain an approximate 2 percentage point lead over
world growth rates for the following decade with the exception of 2004, which
demonstrated a 4 percentage point difference. The following graph illustrates that, after
34

In 2000, the US government also introduced the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which
“offers tangible incentives for African countries to continue their efforts to open their economies and
build free markets” (see www.agoa.gov for more information). Though not maximally exploited by
African states, it has increased the US trade deficit with African states over the same time that FOCAC
has been in operation.
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the launch of the recent iteration of Sino-African relations as defined by the FOCAC
Summit of 2000, African economies on average fared well as China’s economy grew at
higher rates than the rest of the world. This is likely due to the increase in the price of
commodities over the 10 year period, partly driven up by increased Chinese demand.
This distinct separation between the African growth rate and that of the world
after the launch of FOCAC may lend credibility to the notion that a mutually beneficial
relationship driven by state-centric realism is displayed. This following graph indicates
that all engaging African states and China experience mutual benefit and economic
growth as reflected in GDP rates.
Figure 4-1. Real Gross Domestic Product Growth Rates of Africa, China and the
World, 1990-2009 (percentages)
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For the purposes of this study, gross national income (GNI) serves as another
indicator of mutual economic benefit. China’s gross national income and aggregate
Africa’s GNI is depicted in the following graph (Figure 4.2). China’s willingness to
purchase African raw materials at market prices has provided a new market for exports
and given African countries an additional revenue stream. This added income can then be
invested as Africans see fit, for example, into economic stimulus to bolster growth of
local economies or to develop infrastructure. From 1990 to 1999, Africa posted an
average GNI of USD$515,491.81 million dollars. As the figure below (4-2) illustrates,
this amount nearly doubled over the next decade, when the average GNI reached
USD$954,692.79 million. Figure 4-2 displays this significant change in the growth rate
of GNI following China’s formal entry into Africa.
Figure 4-2. Gross National Income of Africa (Aggregate) and China, 1990-2009
(Millions of US Dollars)
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Examining mutual economic benefit at the per capita level, GDP per capita in
Africa appears to mirror the same trends displayed by GNI over the 20-year period. As
shown in Figure 4-3 below, in the ten years preceding the first FOCAC conference and in
the five years that followed, the African GDP per capita fell below $1,000. However,
after 2004, per capita income experienced steady growth, topping $1,610 by 2008 and
falling only slightly to $1,489 by 2009. Notably, per capita GDP almost doubled that of
the previous decade (1990-1999) when it hovered at an average of $751.44.
Figure 4-3. Gross Domestic Product Per Capita of Africa and China, 1990-2009 (US
Dollars)
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Asserting that these significant gains in indicators of African economic growth
have directly resulted from increasing Sino-African political and economic relations
would be incorrect. Such a conclusion makes the brazen assumption that China-Africa
relations exist in a vacuum, and Sino-African trade is the major variable in African
economic growth, immune to other external variables. Though China is quickly
becoming Africa’s top trading partner, Africa is also trading with others, including the
United States, the EU, and to a lesser degree other African states. However, the figures
represented in these graphs clearly display that within the first decade of active
engagement with China, African states do not appear to have suffered the economic
setbacks anticipated within a dependent relationship.
China-Africa Balance of Trade
Figure 4-4. below illustrates the rapid and steady growth of trade between China and
Africa over time. The blue bars show the value of goods from Africa purchased by China
and the pink bars show the value of Chinese products purchased by Africans,
demonstrating benefits accrued by aggregate African states compared to China’s. As
depicted here, trade volume does not significantly lean in favor of one side over the other.
Figure 4-4 also illustrates changes in trade volume between China and Africa
during the two decades (1995 to 2009). At its onset, trade between China and Africa
appears imbalanced; Chinese exports are nearly double African imports. However, as the
total trade volume climbed, Chinese imports from Africa have for the most part kept pace
with Chinese exports to Africa, with the significant exception of 2009. During this year,
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the overall trade volume retracted as a result of global financial crises; Chinese exports to
Africa measured approximately $5.5 billion over imports from Africa.
According to WorldTrade Atlas, during this 15-year period, aggregate imports
from Africa to China totaled US$233.3 billion, while Chinese exports to Africa totaled
$239.8 billion, a difference of US$6.5 billion, or approximately 1.4 percent of total trade
activity over the same period (2011).
Figure 4-4. Volume of Trade between China and Africa, 1995-2009 (Billions of US
Dollars)
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This means that trade between China and Africa at the aggregate level cannot be
construed as being significantly imbalanced if at all; trade volume between China and
Africa measured in terms of monetary value is fairly balanced and even. Although
aggregate trade might indicate a more even trade balance between China and African
states, it would be erroneous to assume that this equity is characteristic of trade at the
individual state level. In certain cases, for example, some countries (among them Sudan,
Congo and Angola) have shown significant positive trade balance with China (see Table
4-1). Most of these states are notably resource-rich, and their exports to China consist
almost exclusively of crude oil (WorldTrade Atlas, 2011). Others, like Nigeria (as
discussed later), have a trade balance tipped in favor of China, despite Nigeria’s large oil
supply base, and the fact that crude oil accounts for approximately 75 percent of
Nigeria’s exports to China (WorldTrade Atlas, 2011). On the individual [African] state
level, significant trade imbalances exist, that do not favor African states but also do not
favor China. This means that analyses of Sino-African economic relations that address
Africa as a single entity do not accurately depict the relationship that individual African
states have with China, and so, overarching claims on the impact of China in Africa, may
not be supported by the evidence. As Figure 4-5 and Table 4-1 illustrate, both China and
Africa are winners and losers in terms of trade balance in their increasing economic
engagement.
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Figure 4-5. Trade Balance between China and African states, 1995-2009 (Millions of
US Dollars)

According to the data presented by Figure 4-5 and Table 4-1, it appears that trade
between China and Africa does in fact result in mutual economic benefit. As illustrated in
Figure 4-5, the trade balance between China and most African states hovers fairly
consistently around zero from 1995 to 2009. This consistency is supported by Table 4-1,
which shows trade balances by African country over the same period. Figures in red
show years when the balance favored an African state. Balance of trade data has often
been relied upon by scholars to indicate and empirically demonstrate economic
dependency.

Table 4-1. China's Trade with Africa 1995-2009: Trade Balance (Exports to China minus Imports from China)
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Table 4-1 cont’d. China's Trade with Africa 1995-2009: Trade Balance (Exports to China minus Imports from China)

78

79

However, this table (4-1) brings to light an interesting trend: as trade between China and
African states increases, more African states are experiencing a positive balance of trade.
In other words, for some African countries, increasing trade with China may actually bear
greater benefit for the African state than for China. An example is Angola (represented
by the brown dot in Figure 4-5), which over the 15-year period posted a positive trade
balance every year.
As evidenced in Table 4-1, it is important to note that the countries are ranked by
the absolute value of their 2009 trade balance rather than total trade volume with China,
i.e., the figures in the table are the result of subtracting the value of goods procured from
China from the value of goods sold to China. They are then ranked by their absolute
value, which is the magnitude of value whether positive or negative. This means that the
states are ranked by the degree of trade imbalance in 2009, from highest to low, and
states with more even trade balances place closer to the bottom of the table. As a result,
the figures in this table do not reflect the actual volume of trade between China and
African states. For instance, South Africa falls lower in Table 4-1, although it is one of
China’s biggest African trading partners (WorldTrade Atlas, 2011). The lower ranking of
South Africa would indicate that trade between South Africa and China is close to even
but the magnitude of Chinese trade with South Africa cannot be ascertained from Table
4-1. However Table 4-2 presents China’s top trading partners in Africa in 2009 and their
volume of trade.
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Table 4-2. China’s Top 10 African Trading Partners, 2009
Country

Total Trade
(Imports + Exports, Millions of USD$)
$ 90,006.64

Share of Africa Total
Trade
-

Angola*

$ 17,045.77

18.94%

South Africa*

$ 15,138.88

16.82%

Nigeria

$ 6,373.94

7.08%

Sudan*

$ 6,363.80

7.07%

Egypt

$ 5,858.06

6.51%

Libya*

$ 5,163.30

5.74%

Algeria

$ 5,126.20

5.70%

Morocco

$ 2,500.95

2.78%

Congo*

$ 2,105.46

2.34%

Benin

$ 2,046.34

2.27%

Africa

Source: World Trade Data
*Countries with a positive trade balance in 2009

The previous table presents trade data on China’s top ten African trading partners
in 2009. Together these ten states account for 75.24 percent of total trade between China
and Africa. Half of the top ten partners posted positive trade balances with China in 2009.
These data lend support to the claim that a mutually beneficial relationship driven by
state-centric self-interest is developing between China and Africa. These findings
challenge the notion of Africa’s dependency on China. The evidence presented here does
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not support dependency as defined by various scholars, including Kaufman et al (1975).
If Africa is benefiting from bilateral trade as much as China--and in some cases more--an
argument for state-centric realism, not dependency, perhaps has merit.
A major argument put forward by dependency theorists is that economic
dependency creates a condition in which, even with increased trade volume, dependent
states do not record significant (if any) economic growth. Booth asserts, “an increase in
the traditional exports…might well produce no increase in national income” (1975: pp.
55). These traditional exports are raw materials and natural unprocessed resources,
notably Africa’s primary exports to China. As the following graph (Figure 4-6)
illustrates, this trend is increasingly corroborated over time.
Figure 4-6. Chinese Imports from Africa by Category, 1995-2009 (Millions of US
Dollars)
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Clearly, exports of raw materials are the main driver for a balanced trade relationship
between China and African states at the state level. The reason for this is two-fold: China
is paying high market prices for African commodities and Africans are paying low prices
for cheap Chinese products.
Contrary to dependency theory, where profit margins from value-added products
increase economic benefit to dominant states while impeding benefit to dependent states,
China-Africa trade appears to follow a different trajectory. China pays more for African
exports and Africans pay less for Chinese exports (Alden, 2004). China purchases raw
materials from African countries at current market prices, which has boosted the
economies of African states; profit margins of Chinese manufactured goods are rather
minimal. Without a doubt, current economic conditions are quite different from the
conditions that provided the foundation for the development of dependency theory. Part
of the logic of dependency theory is that developed countries as sole providers of finished
goods could sell at premiums over market value.
However, China’s entrance as an additional supplier has not only drawn market
prices down as a result of increased supply: Chinese methods of under pricing goods
meant that profit margins and net gains to China have been minimal (Carmody and
Owusu, 2007). In the case of Chinese-produced goods, the impact of “value-added” on
net returns and subsequent trade benefit is not adequately explained by the dependency
theory framework, despite continued focus on Chinese finished goods as initiating
lopsided economic development. It is also important to note that some caution is required
when dealing with raw trade data, because a percentage of the total value of a finished
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good comes from imported inputs, including raw materials acquired from African states.
Xing and Detert assert, “conventional trade statistics greatly inflate bilateral trade deficits
between a country used as export-platform by multinational firms [China] and its
destination countries” (2010: pp. 9). Domestic value-added for Chinese manufactured
products vary by product from as little as 10% of the wholesale value of the imported
good to 65% (Dean et al, 2007; Xing and Detert, 2010). This means that although trade
data may show significant benefit of trade to China, not all of that benefit is actually
accrued to China.
Over the last decade of increased engagement with China, African states have
posted observable increases in economic growth. While the research presented here has
noted that this growth has occurred parallel to increased engagement with China (in
particular exponential growth in bilateral trade) it does not allege that these changes in
economic trends are directly attributable to the China/Africa relationship. African states
do not trade solely with China; their economic activity is influenced by other factors,
including trade with other nations, shocks to the world economy and policy decisions of
domestic state actors. A growing body of literature by African scholars from the African
Economic Research Consortium attempts to examine the impact of Chinese engagement
in Africa. Researchers note the dearth of empirical research, as well as data to promote
further research (Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 2009; Oyeranti et al., 2010). However, current
data indicates that Chinese engagement in Africa offers opportunities, expanding
infrastructure and service provision, which ultimately improves the welfare of the African
people (Oyeranti et al., 2010). Empirical studies of Chinese engagement in Africa
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contradict the popular rhetoric of a disadvantageous relationship with a dependent Africa.
By most measures, Africa is gaining observable economic benefits by engaging with
China, pointing to a nondependent relationship.
Case Study: Nigeria
Nigeria is heavily populated compared to other African countries, making up 20
percent of the total African population. It is also a consumer nation, in which domestic
industry, with appropriate management, might successfully compete with Chinese
imports. Recent news articles cite Nigeria as having the highest population of Chinese in
an African country which lends credence to the assumption that a comparatively higher
level of engagement and trade can be expected between China and Nigeria as compared
to other African states (Yisa, 2011). With Nigeria’s significant political influence on the
continent, the argument can also be made that Nigeria’s engagement with China might
have a ripple effect on other African countries subject to China’s exploitation. A key
purpose of this project is to determine the nature of China-Nigeria relations and to
ascertain Nigerian motivations in this engagement.
Oil influences Nigeria’s characterization as a resource-rich country, and it would
be easy to assume that China is interested in Nigeria because of its oil. While that
assumption may be accurate, it does not tell the full story of China’s interest. Nigeria
does provide oil for China and factors significantly into China’s resource grab in Africa.
In 2005, Nigeria and China signed an $800 million crude oil sale agreement (Onyebuchi,
2005). However, while Nigeria is a leading producer of crude oil in Africa, Nigeria is not
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a leading supplier of African oil to China (Rocha, 2007). Figures from WorldTrade Atlas
indicate that Nigeria was China’s 7th ranked supplier of African crude oil35, supplying
only 2 percent of the African crude oil purchased by Chinese entities36 from 1995 to 2009
(2011). China’s relationship with Nigeria differs from most other African states, as
engagement with Nigeria was marked early on by the exchange of information and
technology, where Chinese know-how contributed to the development of local industry
(Brautigam, 2003). Alden notes that Nigerian traders still say that they learn and adopt
Chinese practices and methods in industry and manufacturing (2007).
Nigeria is also in many ways a political anomaly in Africa, a regional and
continental self-determined powerhouse that has, since independence, adopted and
maintained a policy of political neutrality in foreign relations. Because of its influence,
Nigerian significance in Africa is arguably necessary for any actors looking to make a
strategic power play, economic and otherwise, on the continent. Nigeria’s influence in
West Africa, active role in peacekeeping efforts, as well as in development and
governance make Nigeria a key player in African politics. Chinese efforts to collaborate
politically with African states on the global level can no doubt be bolstered with
Nigeria’s support. Where one in every five black Africans is a Nigerian, the Chinese
cannot afford to overlook Nigeria if they aim to be players in Africa.

35

China’s leading supplier of African crude oil is Angola which accounted for 52% of the African crude sold
to China from 1995 to 2009. Sudan (16%), Congo (9%), Equatorial Guinea (7%), Libya (7%) and Algeria
(2%), account for another 42% of the total crude purchase over the same time period.

36

The US Department of State notes that the United States is the leading trade partner for Nigeria,
bolstered by American purchase of Nigeria crude oil. The Department of State estimates that
approximately half of Nigeria’s daily production of crude oil is acquired by American firms.
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The selection of Nigeria as a case study is based on both political and economic
contexts. The influx of Chinese goods into Africa, particularly inexpensive textiles, has
hurt domestic industries in Nigeria, leading to the loss of several thousand jobs and
diminishing the added value associated with the sale of finished goods (Alden, 2007).
Nigerian policies regarding China have shown the influence of local business, which has
been active in provoking the government to adopt or at least promote the protection of
domestic industry (Alden, 2007). They have also shown the influence of public opinion.
A case in point: consumers rallied the government to reopen Chinatown in Lagos for
access to cheap Chinese goods after it was closed down due to quality concerns raised by
local business regarding counterfeit and subpar products (Alden, 2007). The Nigerian
government’s responsiveness to concerns with Chinese engagement, though not perfect,
has yet to be adequately addressed by literature on growing Chinese engagement in
Africa.

Trade
Trade between Africa and China has grown at a rate of nearly 44 percent each
year since 2000 (Moore, 2011). Chinese manufactured products are ubiquitous--from the
USD$1 plastic sandals and chintzy-looking fabric flowers to steel security doors and
generators of all sizes. In 2010, trade volume betweeen the two nations reached US$7.5
billion (Okoh, 2011; Williams, 2011). As of 2011, the Chinese completed 117 projects in
Nigeria, worth $2.1 billion; Chinese contract investments had already reached $13.3
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billion by November of 2010 (Williams, 2011). According to the president of the China
Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Nigeria is China’s fourth
African trade partner and the second largest African export market. Though largely
focused on oil reserves, Chinese investments also targeted natural gas, agriculture and
steel processing (Moore, 2011; Daily Champion, 2011). At present, the Chinese are
building an economic free trade zone in Lagos as a part of recent trade agreements with
the Nigerian government. Chinese investment can be seen across the country in
infrastructure development: communications technology, road development and
construction, to name a few.
Though Chinese trade with Nigeria is booming, a glance at export and import
values shows that the trade balance heavily favours China (see Figure 4-7 and Table 4-3
below). The apparent imbalance, for all intents and purposes looks like textbook
dependency theory in action. However, based on calculations using World Trade Atlas
and UNCTAD data, Chinese exports to Nigeria from 2000 to 2009 grew 871.08 percent,
an approximate average annual growth rate of 40 percent, with the exception of 2009
when the value of Chinese exports fell below that of 2008 (WorldTrade Atlas, 2011;
UNCTAD, 2012). On the other hand, Nigerian exports to China grew by 206.64 percent
during the same period, at an average annual growth rate of 62.71 percent. This growth
rate statistic does a poor job of demonstrating that Nigerian exports to China fluctuated
tremendously during this period, with extreme rates ranging from -47.3 percent to
+545.35 percent. While this may give the appearance of a dependent relationship
uncontrolled by Nigeria, this author argues instead that this volatility demonstrates the
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novelty of the trade relationship and exists because China was not yet a major buyer of
Nigerian exports.
Table 4-3. China’s Trade with Nigeria, Imports and Exports and Percentage
Change, 2000-2009
Year

Imports from Nigeria
(Millions of US$)

Percentage
Change

Exports to Nigeria
(Millions of US$)

Percentage
Change

2000

292.93

60.52%

563.88

42.40%

2001

227.44

-22.36%

917.15

62.65%

2002

121.31

-46.66%

1,047.09

14.17%

2003

71.68

-40.91%

1,787.49

70.71%

2004

462.58

545.35%

1,719.27

-3.82%

2005

527.06

13.94%

2,305.28

34.08%

2006

277.75

-47.30%

2,855.67

23.88%

2007

537.49

93.51%

3,800.19

33.08%

2008

509.92

-5.13%

6,758.13

77.84%

2009

898.23

76.15%

5,475.71

-18.98%

Source: World Trade Data

As the bar graph below indicates, Chinese exports to Nigeria grew at a faster rate
than Nigerian exports to China. In speaking of Nigeria-China economic relations, a
government official remarked, “Our engagement with China…has not been as fruitful as
it should be. We have not exploited; instead it’s [trade balance] tilted towards China. The
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only thing is, we sell them oil.”37 Even with the increasing sales of oil to China, as Figure
4-7 shows, there remains a somewhat significant imbalance in favor of China.
Undoubtedly, the trade data do not present a full picture of the economic and political
relations that exist between China and Nigeria, and do an even poorer job of displaying
the impact of Chinese engagement with Nigeria.
Figure 4-7. Chinese Trade with Nigeria, 1995-2009 (Millions of US Dollars)

Further still, this graph does not adequately demonstrate the degree of China’s
significance and magnitude in Nigeria’s overall trade. Examining this data from another
perspective by including Nigeria’s overall trade balance over the same period, it appears
that, overall, increased imbalance of trade with China may not have had an adverse an
37

Interview with Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bilateral Relations officer, August 11, 2011, Abuja.
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effect on Nigeria, at least in the short term, because China’s trade with Nigeria is
substantially overshadowed by Nigeria’s overall trade balance much less Nigeria’s total
trade (See Figure 4-9 below). Trade with China still only accounts for a small portion of
Nigeria’s total trade activity. Aggregate Nigerian trade balance has continued to show
positive growth with a few exceptions, the most notable in 2009 when a global recession
affected the performance of many countries.
Figure 4-9. China’s Trade with Nigeria, and Nigerian Aggregate Trade Balance,
1995-2009

A closer look shows that the trade between China and Nigeria pales in
comparison to Nigeria’s overall trade balance which would indicate that trade with China
may not yet have a significant impact on Nigerian economic development. Furthermore,
the recent positive economic trends may not directly relate to engagement with China.
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According to the Washington-based Emerging Capital Partners (ECP), Nigeria has been
noted as having economic growth prospects, as a result of growth in new technologies
and sectors such as television over internet, insurance and real estate (Abiodun, 2011).
Nigerian government officials have done their part to attract foreign investors,
including the Chinese to Nigeria. In 2011, then Nigerian Minister of State for Commerce
and Industry, Josephine Tapgun encouraged Chinese businesses to invest in Nigerian
industry, in particular agricultural development (Bello, 2011). In Calabar State, the
Calabar Free Trade Zone and Tinapa resort have been recently developed, and local and
federal governments are seeking outside investors. The governor of Calabar State, Liyel
Imoke, has hosted Chinese delegations and in a meeting with the General-Consul of
China, extolled the economic potential and opportunities that the Free Trade Zone has to
offer Chinese investors (Inyang, 2011). In Lagos State, a new free trade zone is under
development. The Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry organizes an annual
international trade fair where investors and entrepreneurs are recruited through efforts of
the LCCI, as well as the other investment promotion agencies and foreign embassies and
networking organizations. In all, these efforts have been successful, as evidenced by
growing Chinese enterprise and population in Nigeria. More and more Chinese are
making big money in Nigeria, but Nigerians are also pursuing trade with the Chinese.
It is important to recognize that true economic impact is made in the long-term.
Because China’s presence on the continent and in Nigeria has increased so recently, the
argument can be made that it may be too soon to guess--much less gauge--what the real,
far-reaching economic impact of Nigeria-China trade will be. Chinese exports to Nigeria
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(and many of the other countries on the continent) are not just mass quantities of cheap
little manufactured plastic products and textiles but also expensive equipment used to
construct roads, railways, and factories. In other words, a significant amount of Chinese
exports to Nigeria includes the necessary components for successful infrastructure
development in the country. Such equipment is helping build power generation facilities
like dams, refineries, telecommunications towers, satellites, etc. Still, the argument has
been made that, despite investments in infrastructure development, the influx of cheap
Chinese products is leading to the de-industrialization of Nigeria’s indigenous enterprises
especially textile manufacturing (Akinrade and Ogen, 2008). While the view presented
by Akinrade and Ogen is valid, increased efforts by the Nigerian government to improve
monitoring of imports into Nigeria, as well as investing more heavily in domestic
economic development may offset the anticipated negative impact of trade with China.
Although Nigeria is presently running a substantial trade deficit, there is no evidence that
the Sino-Nigerian dynamic will remain this way, particularly given China’s movements
to increase oil imports from Nigeria. Increased oil importation from Nigeria to China,
coupled with increased sourcing of other raw materials by Chinese corporations,
including but not limited to natural gas, solid minerals, gold and other metals.
Conversely, while most of Nigerian imports have been spread across many categories38,
the top three products are telecommunications equipment, motorcycles and generators.
In fact, approximately 80 percent of the top 20 product categories in 2009 can be
construed as capacity-building imports, not comprised entirely of finished goods;
38

According to the WorldTrade Atlas, Nigeria’s biggest import category from China is telecommunications
equipment and that accounts for 5.2% of Nigeria’s total trade with China
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approximately half of these categories were identified as ‘parts39’ (WorldTrade Atlas,
2011). It can be argued that continued investment and trade between China and Nigeria,
under appropriate management, can and should promote industrialization in Nigeria.
While this may not be the picture of industrialization as emblazoned by the West some
time ago, China presents an opportunity for economic development in Nigeria and
forward social progress.
OIL
Although oil may comprise a significant portion of Chinese imports from Nigeria,
the Chinese purchase of Nigerian oil exports is significantly overshadowed by other
international players, in particular the United States, which occupies the number one spot
as the primary trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. buys about 50 percent of
Nigeria’s daily production, which account for nearly 10 percent of the total U.S. supply40.
The US Energy Information Administration reports Nigeria as the US’s 4th largest oil
supplier in 201041. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of African
Affairs, the U.S. trade deficit with Nigeria in 2010 was $26 billion, largely due to crude
oil; Nigeria’s imports from the U.S. were valued at just over $4 billion in the same year
(U.S. Department of State, 2012).

39

These range from automobile parts, non-identified engine parts, construction equipment etc.

40

Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm,

41

Source: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=3050
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Notably, while China is a growing partner for Nigeria, (economically, politically
and otherwise), it is not the only international player in Nigeria. Calculations of the
International Trade Centre (ITC), based on UN COMTRADE statistics, rank China as
Nigeria’s second highest (by U.S dollar value of imported wares) supplying market in
2010, constituting 16.56 percent of total Nigerian imports and as the fourteenth largest
import market for Nigerian exports, or 1.66 percent of Nigerian total exports (2012). The
ITC also ranked the United States as the leading importer and exporter to Nigeria.
Although this information differs from that provided by the U.S. Department of State’s
rankings above, they both serve to illustrate the point that the effects of trade with China
on Nigeria will be challenging to isolate for a number of reasons (2012).
China and Nigeria do not interact within a vacuum; Sino-Nigerian relations and
economic activity are vulnerable to outside influences and the behaviors of other players
and other markets. Additionally, there are so many other players and factors in Nigerian
economic activity that may or may not fall under the direct influence of China.
Supporters of the position heralding China’s neo-imperialist agenda in Nigeria must then
also address the issue of China’s diluted impact. If China is pursing the same objectives
as other actors in Africa as Behar argues, how then can specific impacts and outcomes be
attributed to China (2008)? While the Chinese are increasingly significant trade partners,
it is important to assess Chinese engagement and impact in context, acknowledging that
they make up a part and not the whole, of a much greater picture.
China/Nigerian trade’s rapid growth, especially in the informal sector, is largely
due to Nigerian traders’ recognition that business with Chinese suppliers and enterprises
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provides higher profit margins. The U.S. State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs,
in its review of Nigeria and Nigerian-American engagement, also notes that the Nigerian
economy’s informal sector--which is grossly unmeasured--is increasingly significant in
propelling the entire Nigerian economy forward. The Bureau states specifically, “the
economy continues to witness massive growth of ‘informal sector’ economic activities,
estimated by some to be as high as 75% of the total economy.” Having spent a
considerable amount of time in Nigeria, I would venture that the 75 percent may be too
low an estimate. In every office space I entered, formally employed individuals with what
would be considered good jobs also engaged in informal business ventures. Examples: a
cultural attaché renting out living space, a fully promoted42 government employee selling
laptops and electronics from business trips and raising chickens and catfish in the
backyard. Outside the Chinese embassy, I came across a trader, Mary, waiting to pick up
her travel documents and approved visa43. As a market trader, Mary’s income is selfreported and her income tax derived from the figures she provides the government. While
Mary’s integrity is not relevant here, it is important to note that self-employed individuals
have the opportunity to under-report earnings, and when enterprises are not registered
businesses, they can choose not to report those earnings at all. Mary travels to China six
times a year, for her business also stopping in Thailand and Indonesia, to buy mother and
baby care products. After every trip to Asia, she nets N 4 million (or approximately

42

43

At the highest pay-grade of government employees.

Interview with market trader Mary, outside the Chinese embassy, waiting on travel documents, July 18,
2011, Abuja.

96

USD$$26,666.00)44 in profit after all expenses. With six trips a year, Mary pulls in a total
of ₦ 24 million (or USD$160,000) annually by doing business with the Chinese. These
figures do not take into account the additional profits from her biannual trips to the U.S.
and the United Kingdom, also for her business. Her husband is formally employed for the
Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) and brings in a steady paycheck of
approximately USD$30,000 per year as senior management. His paycheck is likely the
only accurately measured household income for their family and is tracked statistically by
the government and other interested agencies, and factored into income per capita figures
used to assess the economy. Such figures present a false picture of Nigeria’s economic
situation, and lead to inaccurate results, including assertions that most Nigerians live on
less than USD$2 a day. While this story seems to portray an atypical face of the informal
sector at work in the Nigerian economy, it really is not unique. A different market trader
noted that if he spent ₦3 million purchasing goods in China, after expenses were
accounted for, he was sure of about ₦1.6 million in profit. Clearly, the degrees of
profitability and earnings from the informal sector differ from person to person.
Nonetheless, huge sums of untracked cash are flowing through the market system and the
informal sector, and a growing population of unmeasured nouveau riche individuals in
Nigeria has recognized the opportunities presented by China and are working hard to
exploit them to maximize personal gains.

44

Nigerian Naira to US $ exchange rate has wavered around N150 to $1. Bloomberg Business Week
reports the Naira to Dollar exchange rate at N150.01 to $1 on October 24, 2011
(http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-24/nigeria-naira-weakens-as-bank-fails-to-meetdemand.html).
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Nigeria-China’s State-Interest Driven Engagement
At the onset it might appear that Nigeria’s engagement with China is indicative of
a dependent relationship with a dominant country. However, limiting China’s
engagement with Nigeria to an “unequal relationship” is to belittle and dismiss the
greater objectives that drive this relationship. The rest of this chapter is therefore focused
on discussing aspects of the Nigeria-China relationship that demonstrate that what is at
play in this dyad is a state-centric realist relationship driven by national interest.
Value-Added Chinese Goods
Chinese finished goods are noted as affordable and sold at very low prices, so low
that the value added and profit made on the Chinese produced finished goods is minimal,
and in some cases likely negative. A Nigerian interview respondent asks, “How do you
import shoes from China to come and sell it for N150 in Nigeria? […] It’s about USD$1.
So what kind of material is that? And I have not talked about shipping. So was the shoe
produced for 50¢?”45 This question describes many Chinese goods in the Nigerian
markets. Market traders assert that since China has become a major source of
manufactured products in Nigeria, prices of consumer goods have for the most part
halved and remain at half of what they were years ago. Similarly an interview with an
industrial engineer from an investment bank46 revealed a case where Chinese
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Phone interview with Nigerian US Consulate Officer, April 6, 2011, Washington DC.
Interview conducted January 6, 2011, Kaduna.
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manufacturers sold industrial equipment for a fifth of the cost charged by a German
supplier47.
Inexplicably low Chinese price points beg the question: what is the actual valueadded ultimately accrued to the Chinese? Pricing levels made possible through undervaluation of the Yuan would imply that Chinese value-added on the manufacturing
process is somewhat limited. That the Chinese purchase raw materials from Africa,
including Nigeria, at market or close to market price has been noted in the general rise in
income for most African countries as a result of engagement with China. With the end
product of Chinese-manufactured goods sold at low prices, it stands to reason that the
domestic Chinese value-added on a Chinese manufactured product may actually be less
significant in monetary worth than the domestic value-added of African raw materials.
Note also that the Chinese value-added to the manufacturing process is of a lower
monetary value for two major reasons. First, it is measured in Yuan, and as previously
mentioned, Yuan is strategically undervalued in global currency markets. Second,
Chinese labor is readily available and cheap, so the overall cost of production in China is
comparatively less than cost of production elsewhere. Therefore, with most Chinese
manufactured products, the highest domestic value-added is most likely from the raw
materials used in the manufacturing process.
In accordance with this reasoning, if the African value-added is more significant
than the Chinese value-added, then this hardly looks like a situation of dependency. In a
47

This particular Chinese firm previously supplied the German firm with the same equipment but was
locked into a contract that did not permit sales to other parties. Once the contract was up, the firm was
free to sell the equipment on their own.
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dependent relationship, the dominant state has more at stake because the accrued benefit
is greater than it is to the dependent state. In this situation, because raw materials have the
highest value-added, Africans stand to benefit even more from trade with China than the
Chinese do, comparatively speaking, assuming that Africans are producing the raw
materials, or are at least managing the production of the raw materials. As such, in the
context of value-added, it would appear that this economic relationship is not heavily
imbalanced in favor of the Chinese.
This argument only stands, however, if Africans are producing raw materials.
Unfortunately, in many cases of Chinese engagement in Africa, this is not the case. The
Chinese have been noted, by scholars as well as journalists, for controlling the major part
and in some cases the entire process of production, often because the Chinese secure
African government contracts to extract raw materials. Where labor management and
employment laws are lax, the Chinese bring in their own workers, and with Chinese
equipment and resources, extract the resources that they need, then export the materials to
China to produce finished goods. As long as the Chinese control the production of raw
material for manufacturing, they stand to benefit the most from relationships with African
states. If the Chinese win contracts from African governments and as such pay only
market price for the raw materials, deducting their costs of extraction, it is highly possible
that in these circumstances a dependent relationship could emerge.
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In their efforts to support African attempts towards development and
industrialization48, the Chinese have stressed education and training as a significant part
of their non-economic relationship with Africa. The Chinese are in many ways living up
to their promise to assist Africans, especially Nigerians. In northern Nigeria, a mining
company’s sign proudly proclaims “Technical Assistance from China Minerals and Metal
Cooperation and Yunnan Copper Group”; the bold letters say “Nigeria-China” in English
and Chinese characters. Though this is actually a Nigerian firm, they are just a few miles
away from another mining company that clearly has some significant Chinese ties:
Zhonghao Ziyuan Development Ltd, Minerals Exploration and Exploitation. The Chinese
foreman at the Nigerian mining firm has been in Africa for over ten years working in
mining and raw materials industries in many countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Zambia,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, South Africa and now, Nigeria. He states49
that this mining company, a joint venture with the state (provincial) government, is
incorporated with a Chinese firm tasked with developing the company until it is able to
conduct all aspects of the production process: prospecting, exploration, exploitation,
processing and export. Once its local employees have mastered these procedures, the
company will be left in the hands of Nigerians to continue and increase production. The
company currently employs 11 Chinese workers, a number that will grow to 30 once
construction of the new plant is completed. Presently, the company employs 30-50
48

A look at any of the speeches as well as any of the action plans of any of the four Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) conferences, as well as China’s African Policy document published in 2006,
supports this assertion.
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Phone interview with Chinese manager of a Nigerian-Chinese mining company, August 10, 2011,
Zamfara.
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Nigerian workers dependent on workload; two are managers. This number is expected to
increase to 300 once the enterprise is fully realized. The company is currently operating,
but due to limited facilities and lack of skilled employees--as well as equipment and
technology--the company is focused on the second stage of mining, exploration,
producing gold concentrates and crystals. These products are sold to a Chinese company
that processes the material into gold bars. Eventually, the company in Zamfara intends to
produce and export fully processed, 99.999 percent pure gold bars.
Unfortunately, the training of Nigerian employees has been stalled by the
challenge of the language barrier. Chinese managers do not speak English; their Nigerian
employees have just as poor a grasp of English. To get around this, the Chinese foreman
is having his translator tutored in Hausa, the local language, a step that is bound to help
improve communications with his Nigerian workforce, but does little to help workers
read the controls on equipment they operate that are labeled with directions in Chinese.50
Although Zamfara state is significantly mineral-wealthy, as is evidenced by the sight of
multiple mining companies along the major highways that cut through the state, very
little has been done to develop this industry. As with most of the states in the Nigerian
Federation, the state’s economy was left dependent on allotment from oil revenues.
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Michel & Beuret (2009), in China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing’s Expansion in Africa also mention the
challenge of Chinese equipment and technology, for African employees who do not recognize or read
Chinese characters. Clearly equipment manufacturers can switch to English labels to get around this
problem, or individual companies can re-label their equipment or train some of their employees in basic
Chinese. However Chinese equipment and technology has been noted as being comparatively simpler
and more accessible to Africans and so the language issue may not pose a significant problem to African
machine drivers and/or engineers.
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Though interview respondents note the intent of the government to invest in
developing other aspects of the Nigerian economy, continued governmental focus on oil,
has created much opportunity for exploitation and unchecked corruption in the
exploration and production of raw materials, especially in the sparsely populated but
resource-rich north.51 The entry of the Chinese provides chances to increase the
productivity and economic output and growth in this underdeveloped region. Interview
respondents in this study demonstrated a great belief in Nigerian ability to produce but
also an understanding of some of Nigeria’s latent issues, (for example, corruption), that
have limited innovation and development. Nigerian businessmen, lobbyists and
academics as well as informed government officials all agree that Nigeria has the
capacity to produce and meet some of the demands of the local market, but in light of
challenges to industrial development, Nigeria needs to focus on improving its
technological base by borrowing and learning technology from China.
Chinese training has not been limited to technical skills and expertise or even
higher education. There is a select cadre of businessmen who are making their money by
bringing the successful Chinese business model, Tianshi, to Nigeria. Tianshi is a Chinese
version of a pyramid selling (also known as network marketing, and referral marketing)
agency that employs a multi-level marketing strategy, where salesmen are independent
self-employed contractors earning on a commission basis. Through selling products
(health products, in this instance), their income increases with every unit they sell, and
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Interview with executive at The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, a parastatal agency,
August 12, 2011, Abuja.
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when contractors recruit new salespersons, they earn an additional commission from the
recruited individuals’ sales. This particular Chinese-run company is primarily based out
of Kaduna, in northern Nigeria, although it is expanding to new cities around the country.
Salesmen are recruited through current Nigerian employees as well as through classified
ads in newspapers. Nigerian employees stated that all management positions at this
company are held by Chinese nationals; however, as the company is still young they are
hopeful for promotion. In interviews with a number of Nigerians employed by this
company, all noted that the most significant draw with this business was the autonomy it
allows. With such flexibility, employees are able to determine how much they want to
work and therefore their take-home income, and they also receive bonuses on a regular
basis. An employee of just a few weeks stated that he had made approximately $200 in
his first month, roughly enough to cover his initial cost of joining the agency; a more
established employee noted that he had developed his sales program to the point that he
was taking home USD$800-$1000 every month, and could now afford to quit his formal
employment. These employees indicated that not only through this new business model,
but on the whole, the entrance of the Chinese into the Nigerian marketplace has created
competition which is forcing Nigerian counterparts to improve their operations processes
and increase efficiency.
Even though cultural differences exist and interpersonal relations between the
Nigerians and the Chinese are not ideal52 and, may not exist beyond the financial aspect,
52

According to interviews with Nigerians employed by Chinese and the Chinese manager at a mining
company and corroborated by interviews with government officials as well as academics at the Nigerian
Institute of International Affairs.
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engagement with the Chinese has afforded new opportunities for employment. A
government official in the Federal Ministry of Information and Communications assigned
to the bilateral relations desk, and specifically China, states, “China has opened doors in
Nigeria for Nigerians.”53Nigerians are learning how to be just as shrewd as the Chinese,
if not more; they are by nature entrepreneurial and are known to exploit any opportunity
to improve their circumstances. According to data gathered through this research, the
influx of low-quality Chinese goods into Nigeria has a greater Nigerian dynamic than is
known. Some Nigerian entities actually go to China to source the lower quality goods,
thereby reducing the expenses to the manufacturers and also themselves, ultimately
increasing their profit margin.
It is possible that some are likely to persist in asserting that the Nigeria-China
relationship fits within the parameters of a dependent relationship. However, the level of
probable dependability comes into question. Over the course of history, the West has
typically had a monopoly in Africa, especially as the marketplace for African
commodities and raw materials. The arguments surrounding dependency theory and
underdevelopment assert that dependency is a condition that is developed over a long
period of time (Dos Santos, 1973; Ferraro, 1996). The West’s relationship with Africa
has arguably followed the dynamic, with both sides in the same roles since the
colonialization of Africa, which intensified particularly in the 19th and early 20th
century. The West has remained “master” and “commander” and Africa “servant” and
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Interview with high level government official in the Federal Ministry of Information and
Communications, July 19, 2011, Abuja.
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“purveyor” of raw materials and vast riches providing support and growth to western
economies. The Sino-African relationship differs greatly because China54 needs African
political support, which arguably was the impetus for the initial development of
significant Sino-African relations during the 1960s. Distinct effort was made to develop
relationships of partnership between developing (Third World) China and developing
Africa. Despite the fact that China’s recent industrial revolution has vaulted it past Africa
in terms of development and measures of a developed state and economy, China’s return
to Africa following its emergence from isolationism was built on the foundations of
1960s Sino-African relations, partnership and mutual benefit. As such, the Chinese
government has had to go to additional, cost-inducing lengths to make sure that there
were clear indicators of the benefits of this budding relationship on both sides. Towards
that end the Chinese are building schools, hospitals, roads and hydro-electric plants
which undoubtedly will assist African states on the road to development and help assuage
some of the poverty and poor living standards. Even then, China, much like the West,
makes efforts to retain some of the value of aid contributions. A Nigerian foreign service
officer shares,
“The effect of Chinese engagement in Nigeria can be measured in so
many ways. In the educational sector, the Chinese came and they were
building us model primary schools, granting us aid here and there, small
aid. They are going to build another edifice in Nigeria, the Nigeria-China
Friendship Association Building. It’s a cultural building. […] during our
fifth bilateral joint commission for bilateral cooperation, they amassed $25
million for that. That $25 million, more than half of it will go back to
China because the design of the building will be done by Chinese
54

In this particular situation, the People’s Republic of China as opposed to the Republic of China.
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architects, some of the workers and the consultants will have to be
Chinese.55.”
The argument here asserts that at the aggregate level, Chinese infrastructure built
across Africa is an essential part of the required foundation if sustainable development
and industrialization are to be realized across the continent. However, concerns have been
voiced--not in regard to the benefit of Chinese development of infrastructure but instead
on the reliability and dependability of Chinese construction. For many years news reports
have highlighted problems with quality control that have plagued Chinese manufacturers
and contractors following industrialization. These domestic issues have spilt on to the
world stage and have affected the reputation and perceived value of the “Made in China”
label. Nigerian regulators and government agencies, primarily the Standards Organization
of Nigeria (SON) and the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and
Control (NAFDAC) have had to impress upon their Chinese counterparts the need to be
more diligent in monitoring the quality of products that leave China for foreign markets.
Market traders and businessmen with extensive ties to China assert that, while there are
products for every price with quality diminishing as the price declines, good quality
products can be had from the Chinese. In multiple interviews, Nigerian traders and
businessmen noted that higher quality products manufactured in China were typically
reserved for European and North American markets. Therefore, if the Chinese habitually
reserve higher quality products for other markets, how much stock should then be placed
in the actual and long-term value of their investments into African infrastructure?
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Phone interview with Nigerian US Consulate Officer, April 6, 2011, Washington DC.
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An economist at the African Development Bank56 notes that the Chinese are
winning a lot of contracts in Africa (especially in construction) because they are almost
always the lowest bidder. However, when the Chinese win bids, they employ imported
Chinese labor, which does nothing to improve conditions for indigenous workers,
inducing a negative impact on the Nigerian (and African) labor sector. In addition, recent
reports and articles have begun to call into question the efficiency and efficacy of
Chinese construction in Africa, with growing concerns for quality and the observation of
standards. Chinese projects nearing completion are exhibiting tendencies toward delays
and questions are rising on whether or not they will be completed properly and
punctually. These allegations call into question the value of Chinese investments in
infrastructure in Africa and whether they will have a true positive impact. It is important
to note that these concerns have yet to either be corroborated or dismissed by evidence. In
truth, as stated by this research, little empirical research has been published with regards
to Chinese engagement in Africa (including Nigeria) and its resultant impact. The
relationship is still young and as yet it remains difficult to attribute specific developments
in Africa solely to the influence of the Chinese. Concurrently, most of the literature on
56

The African Development Bank Group is made up of three constituent Institutions, namely, the African
Development Bank (ADB), the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF) and is
one of a few African-driven continental-wide development initiatives, with a membership of 53 African
countries and 24 non-African countries as of October 2011.
According to their website (www.afdb.org), "The African Development Bank (AfDB) Group’s mission is to
help reduce poverty, improve living conditions for Africans and mobilize resources for the continent’s
economic and social development. With this objective in mind, the institution aims at assisting African
countries – individually and collectively - in their efforts to achieve sustainable economic development
and social progress. Combating poverty is at the heart of the continent’s efforts to attain sustainable
economic growth. To this end, the Bank seeks to stimulate and mobilize internal and external resources to
promote investments as well as provide its regional member countries with technical and financial
assistance."
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Chinese engagement in Africa has been limited to largely normative arguments- clearly
more research is needed. Only time will tell whether or not Chinese investments in
infrastructure in Africa will play a decisive role in African development--or lack thereof.
The AfDB economist continues, asserting, “If you're going to really unlock the
potential within Africa, then infrastructure should be a top priority. Infrastructure
development. And for that reason, we have what we call core priority areas for
interventions. Infrastructure is number one. Private sector development, agriculture,
health, in basically the social sector. But if we're really going to unlock the potential in
the whole continent for economic development, infrastructure is key, there's no question
about it. And in Nigeria it is even more critical."57 Nigeria’s underdeveloped
infrastructure, in particular the unreliable power supply, insufficient water, bad roads, and
poor transportation systems (such as the decaying rail network), have proved to be
catastrophically limiting to the development of Nigerian industry. It is not that there are
no Nigeria manufacturers but instead that Nigerian manufacturers are under a lot of strain
and often fail under the burden of very high overhead (expensive generators to power
factories and fuel costs to keep generators running) and no easy way to get their products
into the hands of consumers domestic and foreign. Although not all Nigerian
manufacturers have floundered, the high costs of operations create a situation in which
Nigerian-made products, though of good quality, are significantly more expensive than
imported alternatives. This means that consumers who would rather buy locally made
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Interview with AfDB economist A, July 27, 2011, Abuja.
Two different AfDB economists were interviewed on the same day for this study, both of whom
declined to be personally identified and mention of their position would violate IRB regulations and
reveal their identity.
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more durable, better-quality products than the Chinese imports, find that these Nigerian
products are too expensive.
Assessing Africa’s development in the light of the recent entry of the Chinese into
Africa, but solely under the lens of the dyadic relationship between African states and
China, does give weight to claims of exploitation and the development of a dependent
relationship between China and Africa. However, this perspective also quickly dismisses
the significant overt and covert influence of the West in African affairs. Despite the
Nigerian government’s continued efforts to stress its policy of nonalignment, adopted and
upheld since Nigerian independence in 1960, a government official stresses that Africans
are not that easily separated from the West. During the research process for this study, a
conscious decision was made to remove reference to Western engagement with Africa in
the official questions posed to interview respondents. However, comparisons of the West
versus China would organically materialize; in many ways Chinese engagement in
Nigeria has differed from that of the West. Taylor notes that Chinese engagement in
Nigeria is largely in fixed assets, providing examples like refineries and factories; these
sorts of investments are not characteristic of Western enterprise in Nigeria (2007).
The draw of the Chinese has stemmed from the differences in the ways they have
chosen to relate to African states, especially when compared to their western
counterparts. The Chinese are actively pursuing engagement with African states, while
Nigerian government officials note that on the whole the U.S. and European states do not
seem to be reaching out to African states in the same manner. The West has presumed
upon Africa and made policy prescriptions on African development that by and large
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have had disastrous effects across the continent. The Chinese are diplomatically nonimperial and, best of all, appear willing to share their technology to assist African states
in catching up to the rest of the world. Also, the Chinese economy has very quickly gone
from relatively non-significance to very high significance in the global arena. The
extreme growth rate of the Chinese economy especially in the light of the recent global
recession has many African states (Nigeria included) taking notice, hoping to learn a trick
or two from the Chinese.
The Nigerian government recently made a rather bold decision in choosing to
convert 10 percent of its $33-billion in foreign reserves into Chinese currency, the Yuan
(Nyagah, 2011). This strategic move was intended to boost growing trade relations
between both countries but also to safeguard the Nigerian economy and foreign reserves
from the economic downturn in Europe and the United States. The ingenuity of this
decision by the Nigerian government speaks not only to the intentionality of Nigerian
decision-makers in engagement with China, but the timing of it also shows a side of
African international politics not often showcased in the media or even in scholarship on
international relations and comparative politics. China’s economic explosion has been
largely due to the decision of its centralist government to under-value the Chinese
currency system, the Renminbi. Undervaluing their currency has meant that Chinese
exports to the rest of the world continue to undercut market prices and remain
inexpensive. On the domestic front, an undervalued currency system has led to expensive
imports for Chinese consumers and manufacturers and this has led to a need for creativity
to meet and support burgeoning demand. While this economic policy was arguably
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necessary to extricate Chinese economy and industry from the deplorable conditions that
launched the Cultural Revolution and produced the economic powerhouse that it is today,
it is not a policy that can be maintained indefinitely. The actual value of the Chinese
currency is much higher than the present government controlled rates. Government
control of currency exchange rates is not sustainable and when the Renmibi’s Yuan soars
up to its true market value, 10 percent of the Nigerian government foreign exchange
reserves will soar with it. These policy moves by the Nigerian government indicate an
element of intentionality in the Nigerian aspect of Chinese engagement in Nigeria. They
demonstrate a relationship motivated by national self-interest rather than dependency
because of the very active role that Nigerians across all spheres of society are taking in
this relationship and also because of the levels of learning and mutual benefit that are
inherent in this relationship.
Conclusion
Dependency theory as a means of understanding international (economic and
political) relations between developed and developing countries, and the
underdevelopment of the latter, lacked cohesion conceptually and this made evident in
the operationalization of dependency theory. Scholars differed in their tests of
dependency, and critics noted that tests of dependency theory were used to bolster the
arguments of dependency theorists and not to test the soundness of the dependency logic
as a theory. Most studies centered on the argument that indicators of dependency, in
particular economic dependency, were related to poor economic performance. An
examination of economic trends in Africa in the 10 years preceding the FOCAC
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conferences and the ten years following the first conference would dispel the notion of an
economically dependent Africa. This chapter looked at real growth domestic product
(GDP) growth rates, gross national income (GNI), and GDP per capita. In all of the
measures examined, there appeared to be no detrimental effect to African economic
trends following the establishment of the FOCAC. In fact it appears that following the
FOCAC, African states have experienced better economic performance. Balance of trade
data between China and African states from 1995 to 2009 also show that African states
and China have a fairly even balance of trade at the aggregate level. This is in direct
contradiction to dependency theorists who hypothesized that dependent countries would
exhibit unfavorable balances of trade (Kaufman et al, 1975).
A look at Nigeria as a case study presents a different picture. Chinese trade with
Nigeria is heavily imbalanced in favor of China but Chinese proportion of total Nigerian
trade dilutes the impact of trade imbalance. Nigeria’s overall positive trade balance
overshadows its imbalance with China. So despite an unbalanced trade relationship,
Chinese trade with Nigeria is not significant enough to create a situation of economic
dependency.
The data presented in this chapter supports the argument put forward by Chapter
3, that dependency theory is not an adequate framework for understanding growing SinoAfrican relations. African states are benefiting from increased engagement with China.
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Chapter 5: Nigerian Agency

Introduction
Following the launch of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC),
which is the most visible manifestation of growing Sino-African relations, African states
appear to have benefited from engagement with China, as demonstrated in Chapter 4.
Shelton and Paruk argue, “FOCAC forms the central pillar in advancing China–Africa
relations and is the arena for constructive diplomatic interaction. It provides the
foundation for building a long-term ‘win-win’ China–Africa relationship” (2008: pp.2).
The framework of the FOCAC has been adamant in its claims of a “win-win” relationship
at play between China and African states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China, 2006; FOCAC, 2006b; Shelton and Paruk, 2008). Like other scholars
in this area, Shelton and Paruk note that the literature has largely focused on Chinese
objectives and activities in Africa, and perceived impacts on African economic and social
as well as western interests on the continent (2008; see also Alden, 2007; Brautigam,
2009). The literature focuses extensively on the benefits to China but very little research
empirically examines the benefit to African states. Further still, the literature has yet to
acknowledge what might be the interests and motivations of African states in relation to
China. This chapter attempts to fill this gap in the literature by presenting a case study of
Nigerian motivations for increasing engagement with China. This chapter first explains
the methodology used to gather and analyze the primary data for this study, and presents
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the overarching themes in response to the question: why is Nigeria engaging with China?
The chapter then discusses the three main motivators and objectives behind Nigerian
agency in this relationship, as identified by this study: first, how Chinese courtship and
respectful attitude attracts Nigerian counterparts; second, Nigerian intent to learn from
China’s recent economic and technological advancements; and finally, Nigerian goals to
maximize and exploit the economic opportunities afforded by engagement with China.
Case Study Methodology
To begin to understand African agency and find answers to the questions posed, I
conducted a case study of Nigeria. A case study is a tradition of qualitative inquiry and
research usually reserved for unknown and unfamiliar phenomena, to provide in-depth
understanding of an event, process or individual(s) (Cresswell, 2007). The methodology
employed to answer these questions was qualitative data gathering through interviews,
and analysis of government policies and trade data. The major contribution of this study
is examination of the issue from an African perspective, going beyond the jargon of
“South-South solidarity,” the “supremacy (or legitimacy) of sovereignty,” “noninterference” or an “alternative to the failed Western model” as put forward by China’s
African Policy document issued in 2006 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2006)
and by others (Behar, 2008; Manji and Marks, 2007). Since this study is interested in
what Africans think and want, the logical data would be public opinion surveys.
However, while surveys like Afrobarometer point to Africans’ attitudes regarding the
Chinese, they are not suited for identifying the factors that motivate African agency and
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African objectives in increasing engagement with China. This study seeks to understand
the active engagement of Africans with Chinese representatives.
The majority of this research required fieldwork in Nigeria, and methodology
applied a strategic case-study approach relying heavily on extensive interviews
performed during the months of July and August of 2011. Approximately 130 interviews
(formal and informal) were conducted during this period. (Respondent demographics are
discussed in greater detail in the section on sampling selection). I conducted formal
interviews of a semi-structured nature using guiding questions open to follow-up, and indepth probing was employed during the interview process (Hatch, 2002). A portion of the
methodology incorporated secondary sources as well as primary resources, including
China-related policy documents issued by Nigerian government agencies. These data
were used to establish context and corroborate facts provided by interview respondents.
The scarcity of data and the novelty of the issue area made a case study approach
the best option for this project (Stake, 2010). Qualitative research allows for inquiry into
what is not known (Stake, 2010). It also provides a framework for understanding a
usually single phenomenon at a deeper and more detailed level. In addition, the
exploratory nature of this study makes both a qualitative approach and case study
methodology appropriate. Creswell defines a case study approach as a process wherein
“the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases)
over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of
information, and reports a case description and case-based themes” (2007: pp. 73).
Regarding the research, what is particularly salient about Creswell’s definition is the key
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phrase “in-depth”, as this study is tasked with acquiring an understanding of Nigeria’s
China policy, which calls for an in-depth look at the relationship between China and
Nigeria. The added benefit of a case study methodology is its holistic approach to data
gathering; it allows the investigator to incorporate various techniques and sources of
information to understand the phenomena under investigation and, for the purposes of
this study, to interpret Nigerian motivations (Merriam, 2009).
Why Nigeria?
The selection of Nigeria as the research site relates to both the political and
economic nature of the country. Nigeria’s oil resources influence its characterization as a
resource-rich country (Brautigam, 2009). China is in Africa to acquire resources to fuel
its economy and thus is engaging with resource-rich countries, including Nigeria. Nigeria
is a source of oil for China, which factors significantly into China’s resource grab
(Brookes, 2007; World Trade Atlas, 2011). China’s relationship with Nigeria differs
somewhat from its associations with most African states; in its early stages, China’s
engagement with Nigeria was marked by the exchange of information and technology;
Chinese know-how contributed to local industrial development (Brautigam, 2003). Alden
notes that Nigerian traders and manufacturers still claim they adopt Chinese practices in
manufacturing (2007). Additionally, the influx of Chinese goods into Africa, particularly
inexpensive textiles, have hurt Nigeria’s textile industries eliminating several thousand
jobs and also resulting in added-value impacts associated with the sale of finished goods
(Akinrade & Ogen, 2008). Local businesses have been active in urging the government to
adopt--or at least promote--the protection of domestic industry (Alden, 2007). So while
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this relationship shows some of the expected outcomes of Sino-African relations, it also
makes evident the significance of the role that Africans play in this relationship.
Nigeria’s story of Chinese engagement is different than the rest of Africa. Its large
population base, projected by the United Nations Population Fund to reach 162.5 million
by 2011, can theoretically support domestic industry while at the same time consuming
large quantities of Chinese goods (UNFPA, 2011). Nigeria also has significant political
influence in Africa that if appropriately managed, can be exploited by China in other
African countries. In some ways, Nigeria presents a challenging case because of its
cultural complexities as well as its complicated political history, but this argument can
likely extend to include some other African states. Nigeria is, however, distinctive in its
relatively stronger and more independent government, and thus more likely to resist a
situation of dependency on trade with China. Nigeria’s particular differences in relation
to other African nations might have a bearing on the findings of this case study and may
limit its applicability to Africa as a whole. However, I argue that the findings of this
study can speak to and acknowledge agency on the part of other African states in
choosing to engage with China, and hopefully spur discourse and further scholarship
along these lines.
Sampling Method
In determining interviews in Nigeria, I followed Cresswell’s logic of purposeful
sampling to identify “information-rich” individuals (2002). As such, I made specific
efforts to locate individuals who directly engaged with China, particularly in business or
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government forums. Chinese foreign policy in Africa has been characterized as
“economic diplomacy,” as Chinese engagement has been led by business initiatives
backed by the Chinese government (Alves in Alden et al, 2008). The Nigerian recipients
of this diplomacy are business representatives and government officials. I chose
government officials and business representatives because they are the driving force
behind Nigerian policies that are either adopted or abandoned. These individuals have the
most expertise and the greatest interaction with the Chinese who are engaging with
Africa.
For the purposes of this study “engagement with China” is generally defined as
any sort of interaction with China and Chinese people. For business people and
entrepreneurs, the term "engagement" will generally refer to import and export
partnerships. For instance, Nigerians who sell Chinese goods and services in Nigeria, or
Nigerians who sell African goods to the Chinese. For government officials,
"engagement" refers to any and all actions that are carried out between Chinese and
Nigerian personnel, institutions and agencies, among others.
In addition to interviews with various officials, efforts were made to interview
attendees of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) ministerial conferences
and other FOCAC events to determine the objectives for Nigerian delegates and if and
how they are being realized. FOCAC, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China, is “a platform established by China and friendly African
countries for collective consultation and dialogue and a cooperation mechanism between
the developing countries” (FOCAC, 2004a). Since its inception in Beijing in August of
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2000, the policies and agreements resulting from FOCAC have centered around four
significant ministerial conferences. Since 2000, four major FOCAC ministerial
conferences have been held. The first conference was held in 2000 in Beijing, the second
in 2003 in Addis Ababa, the third, also known as the Beijing Summit, convened in 2006
and celebrated of the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the PRC and
African countries. The fourth and most recent conference was held in Egypt in 2009. At
these conferences, government and business representatives from China and Africa, as
well as other interested international actors, convene to deliberate on trade agreements,
business contracts, and aid contributions.
At the start of the data collection process, critical-case sampling was used to
identify individuals who can best illustrate Nigerian agency in Chinese. Government
officials were selected based on the offices in which they work. Chinese engagement in
Nigeria has been particularly evident in infrastructure development, information
technology, petroleum and commerce. Federal ministries with responsibilities in these
sectors as well as government agencies and parastatals were identified from a
government-issued registry. Wherever possible, interviews were conducted with officials
from relevant government agencies and various areas of Chinese engagement (identified
by the PRC’s Africa policy document58, accessed Joint Press Communiques between
PRC and Nigeria59 and the Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in Economic and
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These Joint Communiques are attached in Appendix I and Appendix J.
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Social Development following the launch of FOCAC60). A variety of other individuals
were identified and interviewed, including department directors, bilateral relations
officers, and information officers responsible for managing relations with China.
To identify interview respondents, I arrived at government agencies and requested
to speak with information and public relations personnel or bilateral relations and China
specialists, preferably directors. This helped limit but not eliminate the predictable
administration run-around. Often a series of unofficial interviews took place before I was
able to locate a government employee able to provide me with an official interview.
Many offices required an official request for information and access that was sent to the
office of the federal minister for approval before any sort of audience would be granted
even from those on the lowest rung of the ladder. In every case, the requests were
formally approved. Sometimes the approval did very little to improve the demeanor and
assistance offered by certain government officials. At other agencies, access was outright
denied despite the fact that the Nigerian government had just recently passed a Freedom
of Information Bill that on its own merit should have granted access to government
employees and information. In stark contrast, in other agencies and departments, the
letter of approval went a long way, opening doors and making information and data
typically withheld from the public available to my research. Contracts, agreements,
reports and data figures were shared.

60

Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in Economic and Social Development included in Appendix K.

121

Similarly, I walked into the local markets and asked around for traders that
travelled to China to acquire the goods and with persistence was able to locate a number
of traders who then recommended me to other traders. I made visits to the Chinese
embassy in Abuja and talked to the Nigerians who were waiting to collect their approved
visas and interviewed some traders and contractors. I also stopped by Chinatown in
Lagos, the commercial capital of Nigeria and spoke with Nigerian traders who had set-up
shop within this predominantly Asian setting. In Lagos, I made a stop at the Nigerian
Institute for International Affairs (NIIA) and spent some time with Nigerian political
scientists and academics who influence the policy-making process in Nigeria.61 Through
the NIIA, I was able to locate and speak with a Nigerian scholar recently returned from
China, where his doctorate program had been sponsored by the Chinese government. On
the drive to Niger and Burkina Faso, I came across a gold mine in Zamfara State that
receives technical aid from China and spoke with a Nigerian employee as well as the
Chinese national who ran the mine and had worked in Africa for about 10 years. On a
flight from Lagos to Kaduna State, I met a Chinese national who had just arrived in
Nigeria (and in Africa for the first time) to work as a mid-level for a Tianshi group based
out of Kaduna, whose Nigerian independent contractors I had interviewed a week earlier.
I had a chance to meet and speak with his Chinese boss on the same flight. In many ways
locating and identifying subjects to interview, in such a short frame of time was pure luck
but it was also the result of a dogged drive to get the necessary data and maximize my use
of very limited time. Sometimes I was able to grow my subject pool using snowball
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sampling to identify more individuals to interview, but often because I lacked the
necessary cushion time-wise to rely on snowball sampling, it was necessary that I kept
visiting new offices, new government agencies, talking to contractors, businessmen and
asking almost everyone I met about Nigeria’s relationship with China.
Of the nearly 130 formal and informal interviews conducted for this project, 62
were formal; the approved interview protocol was employed and respondents signed
informed consent documents. A listing of the official interview respondents is available
in Appendix F. Government representatives made up about 35 percent (22 respondents)
of the formal interviews. Among those interviewed were directors and bilateral relations
officers from the Federal Ministry of Tourism, Culture and National Orientation, the
National Planning Commission, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Federal
Ministry of Trade and Investment. The list of interview respondents also included five
prominent politicians: a current federal minister in the Nigerian Cabinet, a senator in the
Nigerian National Assembly, a former Nigerian ambassador to China, a former Nigerian
presidential advisor who had also previously served as a Federal Minister in the Cabinet
and a former presidential candidate.
Business and industry representatives accounted for approximately 47 percent (30
respondents) of the formal interviews, varying from small to mid-size traders who import
Chinese manufactured goods to bankers (and bank managers) from the Nigerian ExportImport Bank, the Bank of Industry and the Central Bank of Nigeria. Academics and nongovernmental policy specialists comprised the remaining 19 percent (12 respondents).
These respondents included economists from the African Development Bank, political
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scientists from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, and directors from business
and investment promotion agencies with ties to the Nigerian government. Examples
include the Nigeria-China Friendship Association, the Nigerian Investment Promotion
Commission and the Nigeria-China Business Council.
This study attempted to collect ethnographically representative data, to account
for differences in socio-economic, geographic and cultural variables. Varying levels of
business representatives, as mentioned earlier allowed for socio-economic diversity in the
data collected. Interviews were primarily conducted in three major Nigerian cities: Zaria,
Abuja and Lagos. This means that respondents geographically represented north, central
and southern Nigeria. In addition, some effort was made to ensure cultural diversity
among the interview respondents, and included representation from the three major
people groups of Nigeria: Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo.
Interview Protocol
Interviews were formal interviews of a semi-structured nature. The interview
protocol made use of guiding questions open to follow-up and in-depth probing into
issues raised during the interview process. The interviews were scheduled at 30-45
minutes, but duration varied, based on the amount of information provided by the
participants. The official interview protocol (see Appendix B) was split into two separate
categories, (1) government officials and (2) business and industry representatives.
Interviewees who did not fall into government official or business and industry
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representative categories were interviewed with the questions from the latter categories’
protocol.
Data Analysis
After the interviews, transcripts of interviews provided the data. When, at the
respondents’ request, interviews were not voice recorded, research notes were coded for
themes. Codes are labels, or characteristics affixed to the collected data, and used to
organize and catalogue the data to allow analysis. All of the data were coded by hand
using descriptive and analytic coding strategies. Descriptive coding provides for storage
of the interview information in a manner that allows investigators to determine patterns
and explanations and to identify theories (Morse and Richards, 2002). Analytic coding
allows for the generation of themes and categories from the collected data. According to
Morse and Richards, analytic coding can reveal thematic content, exploration of new
concepts and provide opportunities for comparisons or development of new themes
(2003). As such, both descriptive and analytic codes were identified. These codes were
then further scrutinized and categorized into three analytical groupings: intent,
relationship and effects. Using the identified groupings and codes, themes were generated
to describe the phenomena being studied.
Verification procedures
Determining validity in qualitative studies differs from quantitative studies. Issues
of reliability and generalizability, central to the issue of validity for quantitative studies,
play a lesser role in qualitative studies. Here validity is instead a reflection of "accuracy,"
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"trustworthiness," "authenticity," and "credibility" (Creswell, 2007). Some studies are
able to use multiple investigators to cross check reliability of themes generated from the
listing of codes. This particular study, however, has only one investigator and as such
needed to make a conscious effort to validate the accuracy of its findings.
This research relied heavily on triangulation, rich and thick descriptions,
presentation of discrepant information and peer debriefing to assure the validity of the
findings. Triangulation of the information provided by the different data sources is the
most significant way to prove validity. Information and references that were strongly
repeated across every interview prove the validity of a given theme. In addition, the
findings have been triangulated against other (secondary) sources including newspaper
articles, journal articles and other studies on China in Africa, a process necessary to
corroborate the information revealed by the research, in particular to verify specific
events or figures. Rich and thick descriptions of the themes, corroborated by extensive
use of quotes from interviews also serve to further assure of the validity of the findings
and the themes generated in this study. Discrepant or outlying information has also been
presented with descriptions of the context surrounding it to further enhance
understanding of the phenomena under study. Finally, this project made use of peer debriefers to ensure that the published findings "resonate" with others beyond the primary
researcher. These peer de-briefers included academics and political scientists at the
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
Ethical considerations
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Addressing ethical considerations, especially when dealing with interview
subjects is necessary. This study would be not be categorized as a harmful study; no
damage of any kind came to respondents as a direct result of participation in this study. In
addition, participants were provided with the option for self-identification in the reporting
of findings in this study. Most participants chose not to be personally identified;
therefore, reference is made to representative groups in lieu of using names. Government
officials, although approved by their ministries to participate, spoke in their official
capacity and not as private citizens; to that end, these respondents preferred to speak
anonymously. These requests were respected and identities withheld. Approximately 20
percent of the official interview respondents consented to being identified in this study.
Even then, respondents were only identified when deemed necessary by the researcher.
Most respondents were identified in an occupational capacity as opposed to being
identified by name.
Research Findings
The major findings of this study were encapsulated in an early interview with
Nigerian businessman and entrepreneur Lawal, who also invests in telecommunications
equipment62. Mr. Lawal noted that it was necessary to do business with the Chinese in
order to survive in today’s economy and to remain competitive. To date, however, his
business arrangements with the Chinese have not been as profitable as hoped, partly
because he was still learning how to best engage with Chinese counterparts. He noted that
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the Chinese provided goods at varying quality levels to match the purses of Nigerian
purchasers, and he had paid for cheap goods but not quality goods. Though he had
previously lost money, he stated that he would continue to engage with the Chinese--and
on a greater scale--because he feels it is necessary for future success. His experience and
words resonated across different facets of Nigerian life. Nigerians, at all levels and in
varied capacities, both publicly and privately, echoed these sentiments. Even though net
benefits may not be visible presently, Nigerians are choosing to engage with China
because they see engagement as the way forward for individuals and for the country.
Despite missteps, learning allows for adjustments to be made, and with the involvement
of China, quicker steps in the direction of progress. In the words of Mr. Lawal,
“sometimes, China is the only option.”63 Chinese engagement with Nigeria is creating
opportunities for Nigerians in Nigeria.
This section presents a discussion of the themes laden in the data collected as they
pertain to motivations and objectives of Nigerians in increasing engagement with China.
This study unearthed three major themes. They are:
1) Nigerians are engaging with China because of China’s courtship and
respectful attitude towards Nigeria.
2) Nigerians want to learn from China.
3) Nigerians want to maximize their economic benefit.
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The rest of this chapter describes these themes in greater detail, and discusses how they
manifest in specific groups, in particular the Nigerian government, the private sector
(business and industry) and where relevant, the consumer sector and academia. It is
important to note that this chapter is most concerned with the perceptions of Nigerians
and so quotes that best represent the expressed views of the respondents were
incorporated into the write-up. These perceptions whether or not they are couched in fact
or stem from misinformation and rumored fabrications, influence Nigerians’
understanding of their relationship with China and what they believe Nigeria stands to
gain.
The following sections first identify the role that the Chinese play and how the
differences in the nature of Chinese engagement attract Nigerians, and then explore
Nigerian objectives to learn from China to develop the Nigerian economy.
Chinese Courtship and Respect
The first and most dominant theme in the findings is Nigerians’ motivation to engage
with China because of mutual respect, in contrast to engagement with the West.
Nigerians note that China has presented a respectful alternative, although scholars at the
Nigerian Institute for International Affairs64 warn that it is perhaps misleading to portray
China as an alternative to the West, arguing instead that what China provides Nigeria
(and Africa at-large) is a strategic opportunity. However, how this strategic opportunity
has been promoted and presented by the Chinese, and its stark differences from how
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Western counterparts (the U.S., Great Britain, France and Germany) engage with
Nigerians was a strong theme that emerged in almost every interview. What makes this
theme all the more fascinating is that the interview questions contained no reference to
the West--the comparison between China and the West was a natural development
initiated by interview respondents. Although this section does not directly discuss
Nigerian objectives, it identifies factors that make the Chinese attractive to Nigerians,
which this study would argue are just as important as Nigerian objectives, as they pertain
to the Nigerian government, business and industry representatives.
It falls to Nigeria’s federal government to provide and pursue opportunities that
will foster growth and development. Engagement with China--while originally a
government-driven phenomenon65--has since transformed into a consumer and businessdriven relationship. However, government’s role remains important to Nigeria-China
relations; in many ways, the government is the quintessential facilitator of the dyadic
relationship between entities from both sides. As such, it is important to identify the
motivators that compel Nigerian foreign relations with China. When asked why Nigeria
is seeking engagement, the first answer from most government officials was that Nigeria
must engage with China; everybody must engage with China because of its growing
economic and political significance on the global stage66. As the world disengages from
the bipolar power system that characterized the Cold War, the ensuing collapse of the
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Soviet Union, and since U.S. participation in two costly foreign wars, it appears that the
world is moving towards a multi-polar system. China’s economic prominence and firm
political position make it a new contender for power and influence in global politics. In
light of these factors, it is important to understand the leading motivator of Nigeria’s
diplomatic engagement with China.
The role of Chinese courtship in Nigerian Agency
As noted in Chapter 2, most of the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa,
Nigeria included, approaches the issue from the Chinese perspective and is quite correct
in its inherent position that China is a major driver in the development of new
relationships. A major finding of this study is the relevance of the Chinese factor in
driving Nigeria-China relations and subsequently Nigeria’s China policy. The Chinese
have made it clear that they want to engage with Nigeria; their active pursuit and
courtship of increased interaction with Nigeria has advanced development of relations.
According to a government official, “China is engaging Nigeria seriously. They
understand us. They know our problems. They know we have the market. ...If you
consider all the potentials of Nigeria as a nation, as a giant in the making, there is no
country that can just brush us aside without looking for our friendship, without looking
for our market and without looking for our collaboration at the multilateral level.” He
further explains, “China is interested in engaging with virtually every country. But it has
singled out Nigeria because of our own peculiarities. We share a lot of things in common.
China is the biggest country in Asia. Nigeria is the biggest country in Africa. Now it
[China] has emerged as the second largest economy in the world. What it requires to
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grow industrially in terms of fuel and energy, keeps on expanding every day. Nigeria
produces one of the best oils in the world. The peculiarities of Nigeria, the endowments
of Nigeria, what we have, our market, we are a bride to any country - any developed
country - because we have the market. We are strategically located. We are a regional
power in the West Africa sub-region. We are very influential. We’ve done a lot of things
that would attract any developing or developed country. Let me emphasize this,
especially our market. I tell you one thing, sad enough, we are not a productive country,
I’m not sorry to say this. We are a consumer nation.”67 All these factors and more have
made Nigeria a necessary strategic partner for China and there is little question as to
Chinese intents to have this relationship grow over the long-term.
China’s Africa policy document talks about the need for collaboration amongst
developing countries like China and Nigeria (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China, 2006). According to the findings of this research there is little
question that the Chinese have actively pursued a relationship with Nigeria. In describing
the relationship between China and Nigeria, interviewees ranging from marketplace
traders to high–level government officials and political pundits all described engagement
between Nigeria and China as a “cordial relationship.” This relationship has developed
through channels such as FOCAC, (the Forum of China Africa Cooperation), which has
successfully resulted in additional partnerships between Chinese and Nigerians, in
tandem with the Nigeria-China Joint Commission for Cooperation. The Nigeria-China
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Joint Commission for Cooperation is perhaps the best policy document the Nigerian
government has created describing any explicit policy on Chinese foreign relations.
Signed in 1976, this document served to mark the formal agreement of recognition of
each state and helped define the parameters of engagement between them. Following the
guidelines set in the Joint Commission, large delegations of Nigerian and Chinese
governmental representatives, typically from every federal ministry and their Chinese
equivalents, meet frequently for “joint commissions” that fall under the purview of the
Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In league with the Nigerian National
Planning Commission and the Federal Ministry of Finance, the MFA compiles, organizes
and collates Nigerian objectives and goals to cultivate better and more fruitful
negotiations with the Chinese. The joint commissions have recently met more frequently,
alternating locations between China and Nigeria. In these meetings all aspects of
engagement are discussed, from the service agreements on which airlines will operate
routes from Nigeria to China, to desired levels of cooperation in agriculture and food
security, to cooperation in health, education, science and technology. The Nigerian
government is not alone in its efforts to coordinate increased engagement. Agencies such
as the Nigerian-China Friendship Association, NICAF, and the Nigeria-China Business
Council (NCBC) are playing a more active role in the development of Nigeria-China
relations. NICAF was founded by former Nigerian Ambassador, Victor Nwaozichi
Chibundu, who has previously served in China. NCBC is a business-driven private-sector
partnership with the Nigerian government that organizes trade missions to China and
hosts Chinese missions to Nigeria68. Spearheaded by the efforts of the government as
68
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well as these agencies, Sino-Nigerian trade is expanding (Okoh, 2011), as well as
assuring economic and political ties. A news report illustrates,
“Speaking in Abuja when they visited Nigerian Investment Promotion
Commission (NIPC), the CICIR69 President said that the trade volume
between Nigeria and China reached $7.5 billion last year.
He said that Nigeria is the fourth trade partner of China in Africa and the
second exporter market in the continent. He said that by November 2010,
the total contract investment by China to Nigeria reached $13.3 billion,
adding that some of the investments are concentrated in the oil & gas
sector” (Williams, 2011).
Expanding trade and political relations between China and Nigeria are predicated
on Nigeria’s acceptance of the One China Policy, which has always been a pre-requisite
for Chinese engagement with other countries. This requirement was clearly stated in
China’s Africa policy document (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of
China, 2006) as well as by representatives of the Nigerian government as a policy to
which Nigeria is committed. However, China recognizes Nigeria's sovereignty and even
though it demands recognition of the People's Republic of China70, it has not constrained
Nigerian economic interests in Taiwan, also a trading partner of the PRC. In recognition
of the One China Policy, the Nigerian government has no official political dealings with
Taiwan; instead, Nigerian engagement with Taiwan is limited to economic and business

Victor Nwaozichi Chibundu, August 18, 2011, Lagos.
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arrangements that are the prerogative of a sovereign Nigerian state and do not technically
renege on commitment to the One China Policy.
China’s recognition and respect for Nigeria’s sovereignty and the right of
government to make decisions and carry out policy that is not necessarily in tandem with
China’s own policies has made China an attractive partner, despite a number of
ideological differences between China and Nigeria. For instance, China is communist
while Nigeria is capitalist; China’s communism does not permit religion, while Nigeria is
a deeply religious country. Such fundamental differences mean that the Nigerian
government does not always share the same views as the Chinese government and
therefore does not always agree with China. In spite of the occurrence of incongruence
and incompatibility on policy objectives (sometimes economic and other times political)
the Chinese have continued to relate with Nigeria in a manner that shows respect for
Nigeria’s sovereignty. The visibility of this respect, even in the face of disagreement, sets
China apart and improves the state of relations between both countries and their levels of
engagement. China’s overt acceptance of Nigerian sovereignty and non-bullish attitude
plays a strong role in attracting Nigerians to pursue relations with China.
One of the more prominent political motivators for increasing Nigerian
engagement with China is China’s expressed support for UN reforms. In particular, great
discourse has been devoted to allotting a seat on the UN’s Security Council to an African
state, and Nigeria is strongly vying for that position. Although no concrete development
towards this end has materialized, especially within the UN, Nigerian government
representatives are hopeful for this outcome and avow China’s support for an African
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seat on the UN’s Security Council. The issue at stake is the frequent omission of Africa
and African states’ interests in strategic decisions made by the Security Council71.
Change is necessary, especially in light of the fact that African countries are sovereign
states, like the states that comprise the Security Council. As the source of a variety of raw
materials with increasing significance in the global market, it is important that African
interests are protected in the global arena. Concerns of under-development and
dependency only begin to shed light on the need for a more leveraged effort to protect
and pursue African interests; a seat on the UN Security Council would provide this
opportunity.
Nigerian motivations for engaging with China differ as one begins to look at
specific federal ministries and agencies that pursue objectives specific to their fields. For
instance, the Ministry of Tourism and Culture looks to promote Nigerian culture in China
and Chinese culture in Nigeria to increase cultural exposure and exchange72. Increased
personal engagement and interaction between Nigerians and Chinese can only serve to
further entrench the growing relationship between the two. Every three years,
representatives from China and Nigeria meet to discuss what specific actions will be
undertaken over the next three-year period with regards to cultural and tourist interaction
between China and Nigeria73. The Ministry of Science and Technology is engaging
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Chinese assistance in their bid to promote technological advancement in Nigeria74. The
Raw Materials Research and Development Council (RMRDC)75, and the Nigerian
Institute of International Relations (NIIA) both note that they are seeking engagement
with China because it provides training and higher education opportunities for their staff
and affiliates76. The Ministry of Trade77, Standards Organization of Nigeria78 and
National Agency for Food & Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC)79 are seeking
China’s collaboration in improving the process of monitoring of goods that enter Nigeria
from China and upgrading the system of product regulation. These entities are not alone:
Chinese Embassy reports80 (as well as news articles, FOCAC reports and interviews)
indicate that many agencies, professional journalists, members of the judiciary and others
have established partnerships with the Chinese. Through the exchange of information,
techniques and technology, they are working towards improving service offerings to
Nigerian citizens. In a variety of ways, China exemplifies a different model, and Nigerian
agencies are taking action to learn from it and apply it to the benefit of Nigerians.
Business Representatives
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Nigerian government agencies note that they are able to pursue their own agenda
and objectives in this growing relationship, because of Chinese courtship and the nature
of their engagement with the Chinese. Similarly, Nigerian businessmen and market
traders note that they too have been sought by Chinese entities. Chinese Trade expos and
trade promotion agencies working with the Chinese government81 send official
invitations to Nigerian traders that make the process of sourcing goods in China quick
and easy.82 These expos feature many different kinds of manufacturers, enough to meet
the needs of most traders, and participants could attend the expo, meet suppliers, place
orders and return to Nigeria to receive them. The Chinese had more than streamlined the
business process, it was quick, easy and efficient, and they were inviting Nigerians to be
a part of it. Similarly, Nigerians are inviting and encouraging the Chinese to trade with
them. The Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry organizes an annual international
trade fair, and working with the Chinese embassy they are increasing trade relations with
China.83
It is a logical progression to see that China’s courtship of Nigeria as well as the
development of a partnership promoting mutual respect and mutual benefit has played out
into more favorable business conditions between Nigerian and Chinese business entities.
This view is also supported by Alves’ (2008) claim that Chinese foreign policy in Africa
(and thereby Nigeria) is perhaps best described as a form of “economic diplomacy.”
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Dambisa Moyo (2009) made a similar observation when she noted that Chinese
engagement in Africa is significantly more businesslike in nature than that of the West.
The literature review, as well as the results of this research, supports the position that
Chinese engagement in Nigeria and in Africa is spearheaded by enterprise and industry.
Through promoting these economic values to Nigerians (and Africans), the Chinese have
quite clearly gone to great lengths to improve the conditions of conducting business in
Africa, and have made the business environment at the very least more attractive than the
customary Western one. This is evidenced in Chinese contractors’ bids away from
Western competitors. It is also evidenced in statements by Nigerian business and
government representatives, expressing their views that the Chinese believe in the
Nigerian economy, markets, and Nigerian businessmen. Chinese faith and confidence in
the Nigerian businessmen has welcomed and motivated Nigerian businessmen to
increasingly engage with China.
The Role of the West in Increasing Sino-Nigerian Engagement
The attractiveness of the Chinese to their Nigerian counterparts is not entirely of
China’s making. While the Chinese have done a lot to entice Nigerians, the case can be
made that a history of bad business practices and exploitation at the hands of Western
partners have also served to push Nigerians towards China. Though not specifically
addressed in the interview questions, the idea that China could provide an alternative to
Western options was recurrent in most of the interviews and a natural development in
discussions regarding the draw of the Chinese.
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Popular culture has made Nigeria synonymous with the negative labels corruption
and scams. A noteworthy example is the recent and continued fallout from the indictment
of high level Halliburton executives and U.S. politicians on charges of corruption and
bribery stemming from a Nigerian-led investigation into Halliburton’s conduct in
Nigeria. The subject of the Halliburton case was introduced by several interviewees for
this study who noted Nigerian corruption with equally culpable western counterparts has
earned Nigeria and Nigerian businesses stigma and detrimentally impacted the ability of
Nigerian business representatives to engage with western counterparts, with very limited
impact to their western counterparts.
The data collected by this study show that dishonest behavior has seeped into
Nigeria’s business practices with the West, and corruption has become habitual and
unavoidable. In addition, corruption is not only a Nigerian practice, but it exists on both
sides of the table—in other words, how can one be corrupt if there is no one else to
engage in corrupt behavior? Clearly, the years of rampant corruption made easy in
Nigeria by government instability and persistent military rule has created a business
relationship between Nigeria and the West where corruption has become customary and
inherent. These conditions are not conducive to true and sustainable business and
economic growth and development. The repercussions of such detrimental practices are
the aversion and reluctance to trade with Nigerians—not only to Nigerians but also to
western counterparts. It is quite likely the habit of corrupt business practices between the
West and Nigeria has been the motivation for the business standards and calls for
increasing transparency in trade and economic agreements.
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According to the respondents in this study, the opportunity to engage with China
seems a chance for a fresh start. This is not to say that no corruption takes place between
China and Nigeria. Chinese tendencies towards a lack of transparency in business deals
and agreements provide the right conditions for corruption. However, what this study
brings to light is that, in spite of the negative environment, engagement with China
affords Nigerian businessmen and entrepreneurs the chance to conduct legitimate, honest,
corruption-free business should they choose. Despite the past, China can serve as a clean
slate. While corruption may still exist, it is avoidable and unnecessary for business.
This finding appears to contradict a good portion of the literature which makes
reference to the Chinese penchant for corruption, and the relative ease for corruption
brought about by secretive, non-transparent Chinese trade arrangements. This issue of
corruption accusations leveled against the Chinese in Africa, especially from the West,84
was noted by an interview respondent who said, “...this is the thing that the westerners
are accusing China of…that the Chinese don’t do business ethically, but they
[westerners] have demonstrated over and over again themselves that they are not doing
business in Africa and in Nigeria particularly ethically. […]No, they (the West) can’t
accuse China 100% and get away with it. Honestly, Chinese, they can do business
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ethically. It depends on how you approach them.”85 So while corruption is quite feasible
in Nigeria/China relations, the opposite is also a readily accessible option.
In addition, the Chinese were noted by respondents to behave more professionally
than Westerners and this difference is a draw for Nigerians seeking to engage with China.
P. Ter, a supplier of Chinese-produced educational software and computer systems
remarks, “You write emails, they [Chinese] reply [to] you. You know, this issue of
advance fee fraud that is prominent in Nigeria has made European and American
companies so apprehensive, such that when you see a profile of a U.S. company or an
American company and it meets your requirement and you make inquiries, they don’t
respond for fear of being defrauded. But the Chinese companies don’t keep silent. You
make an inquiry, they will respond to you. And of course, I’m not holding forth for
fraudsters but I believe that in business if somebody makes an inquiry you respond but
you have to be careful. So one big advantage or one issue that draws some of us close to
them [the Chinese] is the ease with which they respond to our inquiry. You don’t need to
go begging them, it’s like they also want you. With the Europeans and American
companies it’s like you have to go begging them.”86
Another attractive component to Chinese trade is the affordability of Chinese
products versus Western goods. (This point is discussed to a greater extent in upcoming
sections of this chapter.) A major difference between the Chinese and the West is that the
Chinese sell technology and the West does not. A government official put it best, “We
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are engaging with China because it could be cheaper for us. Chinese engineering is
cheaper than western engineering. They have made giant strides in agriculture. They have
made giant strides in trade expansion. They have taken giant strides in industrialization.
We are engaging with them because we see them as an alternative to western technology
for which they will attach certain conditionalities before you can access. China is willing
to share. Yeah, China is willing to share with Africans, especially Nigerians.”87 A
Nigerian businessman points out the same advantage, “Chinese willingness to sell
technology, which is very, very difficult to get from Europe or Western world. So as long
as you are ready to pay, the Chinese are easily willing to sell their technology. In fact I
have procured technologies more than once, more than twice I would say. Just purely the
technology. Right now I am even discussing with my partners on behalf of someone, a
company. They just wanted technical men to come over, rehabilitate the plant and run it.
That is sale of technology. In Europe, it was always difficult. They always tied it to their
supply of the equipment and the personnel, unlike China. In fact, I think I would not be
very wrong to say that their [the Chinese] willingness to sell that technology openly
contributed to my interest in China a great deal.”88 By selling technology to Nigerians,
the Chinese are succeeding in outperforming, out-supplying, and upending their Western
competition.
A recurrent comment in research interviews was that the Chinese path to
development and industrialization was significantly shorter than the Western path to
87
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development. This shorter option is attractive to Nigeria as it seeks to quicken its rate of
development. China’s recent rapid development has provided a new way of addressing
development, and it makes sense that other countries like Nigeria would be interested in
learning from China and following in a similar path. According to respondents, part of
the rationale for looking to China as a model of development is the Nigerian belief that
Western states have made distinct efforts to curb African and Nigerian development. The
same cannot be said of China, which is visibly investing in infrastructure development in
Nigeria. There is little question that the history of relations between Western countries
and Nigeria has left a bad taste and has also adversely affected current and potentially
future Nigeria-Western relations. This confining situation has pushed Nigerians to pursue
other opportunities, other partnerships that may actually give Nigeria room to grow, to
move forward and progress as a nation. China presents itself as one such opportunity and
its marked departure from Western patterns of engagement is attracting Nigerian
counterparts. This section has illustrated the importance of Chinese courtship of
Nigerians and how that has influenced increasing engagement between both states.
Learning and Development
A major objective, which this study posits as the most significant objective
driving Nigeria's engagement with China at governmental, public and private levels, is
learning. China presents a novel picture of a state that has rapidly industrialized and has
alleviated and successfully addressed issues of poverty amongst constituents. Nigerians
are looking to learn from the Chinese model, not to duplicate it, but to borrow from the
ideas and logic behind China’s recent rapid economic and social development. According
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to academics at NIIA, “Nigeria is willing to pay the price if we get what we need and
want,”89 and economic growth and progress akin to that of China is a central goal for the
Nigerian government and people. A representative for the Nigeria China Business
Council (NCBC) notes that there is a strong belief that learning from China will improve
Nigeria. When discussing the effects of the increasing engagement with the Chinese on
Nigerians, he had the following to say,
“Well I’ll say it’s been positive; in the sense that the goods that are being
made in China are affordable to Nigerians. Secondly, Nigerians don’t
receive the kind of discrimination and racism they receive from western
nations. Thirdly, Nigeria recognizes the fact that China is an emerging
market economy, just as Nigeria is, and we share a lot of similarities, in
terms of culture, behavior and understanding. We believe that learning
from China from the same background, Nigeria can improve. They are
very strong in small scale enterprises, Nigeria is learning from that. With a
population of over 1.5 billion, they have food security; we believe with
our teeming population we should borrow relief from the Chinese. We
also believe we can learn from their humility, the Chinese are very
humble.
[…]Nigeria is a nation that is growing; that wants genuine partners, that is
desirous of countries that will share their aspirations through
understanding, dialogue and commitment. That we’ve seen with the
Chinese. We’ve had cases where people condemn their products for low
standards, but those issues are being dealt with. We also are noticing that
apart from the little problems with standard, that their heavy industries
coming to Nigeria and they are doing very well.”90
Many of the interview respondents noted their belief that Nigeria is very resource-rich
even beyond its oil reserves but much needs to be done to increase chances to exploit
these other opportunities in towards development. Borrowing technology from China,
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taking cues from China’s humble approach to international relations and engagement, and
ruthlessly pursuing business opportunities, are some of the practices that Nigerians want
to adopt.
Nigerians are seeking knowledge from the Chinese in many areas: economic
development, agriculture, healthcare, education, and capacity building through
technology transfer, and adaptation and infrastructure development91. With regards to
economic development and growth, the particular area of interest for Nigerian
businessmen and policymakers is small and medium enterprise (SME) development. A
banker at the Nigeria Export Import Bank (NEXIM) notes that Nigerian SMEs likely
have the most to gain from increasing engagement with China92. Western capitalist
models of development for the most part were built on economies and industries of scale,
which are the products of specialization. Such large-scale projects have been
predominately unsuccessful in Africa and Nigeria. Reasons for persistent
underdevelopment throughout Africa have been pursued by many scholars and policy
specialists. Theories with a rationale similar to dependency theory have been introduced,
but lasting and sustainable solutions have yet to be discovered. This chapter is not
concerned with contributing to the debate on addressing and solving the issues of
underdevelopment in Nigeria and in Africa, but what remains indisputable is that
continued attempts for industries of scale have mostly failed. A number of factors
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including, but not limited to, external pressure, lack of dependable logistical support, and
unreliable infrastructure have contributed to these failures. This has led to the “need to
look to Asia for new blueprints on development.”93
Accordingly, engagement with China provides a paradigm shift in the approach to
economic development, one that may be better suited for Nigeria’s economic culture and
many budding entrepreneurs. Almost every person is somehow self-employed in the
informal sector, whether or not they have a regular 9 to 5 occupation94. Not only do small
and medium enterprises thrive, they are more successful in an environment and economic
culture that does not appear to be conducive to industries of scale95. This is a significant
similarity shared by China and Nigeria; although China is presently known as the
manufacturing capital of the world, it has built aspects of its economic progress on the
foundation of small and medium enterprises. China’s significant advantage and key factor
in its path to development has not been greater resources but the ability to better organize
and harness their resources, and herein lies the lessons Nigerians are so eager for.
A major area of concern for Nigerian development as discovered by this research
was food production and agricultural production. Based on my travels and research on
Nigeria, food security is not a problem. From the coastal fishing of southern Nigeria to
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the rice paddies and millet fields of the north, adjacent to the semi-arid Sahel region, food
is readily available. Yet as I observed in my extensive travels, all the fresh food came
from what would be typically categorized as subsistence farmers or small-scale
commercial farmers, small to medium size producers. Although food supply in Nigeria is
not problematic for domestic consumers, production is highly inefficient, which limits
gains and potential income in agriculture that could be accrued by the country. The
Nigerian government is noted in Nigerian newspapers and news articles for its food aid,
especially to other African countries; however, food production as a major source of
national income has yet to be adequately developed and for Nigeria, opportunities
abound. Issues of global food security are making Africa’s vast arable land a hot
commodity. Nigeria has a unique opportunity to capitalize on this resource. For example,
the Chinese requested cassava chips from Nigeria to be used as biofuels in China.
Cassava is widely grown in Nigeria in excess of domestic market demands, and the hardy
crop grows everywhere, lining highways throughout the country. Yet according to
Nigerian officials in the federal ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Investment,
Chinese demands have yet to be fulfilled.
China is not the only market eager for Nigerian agricultural products. North of
Nigeria is Niger, a dry and dusty country consisting mainly of a southern section of the
Sahara Desert. Northern Nigeria has been described as semi-arid and when compared to
the lush jungles of the south and the delta regions of the country, it has a much dryer
climate. However, in the Nigerian state of Sokoto, one of the northernmost states, there is
some water and surprisingly quite a bit of agriculture, enough to even grow rice. Crossing
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the border into Niger is a shocking experience. In the few short miles it takes to leave
Nigeria and enter into Birn’nkoni, gone are the farms and the green and the motor
vehicles. In the much poorer Niger, donkeys drawing carts blink away the dust and the
sand that coats everything. Here the petty Nigerian traders are the big men about town
and products from Nigeria bear high costs.
Nigerian farmers have an exceptional opportunity to provide fresh produce, not
only to Niger but to other countries in West Africa, taking advantage of the simplicity of
travel and inter-country trade put in place by ECOWAS. However, Nigerian agriculture is
not developed enough to capitalize on these opportunities. With continued challenges in
transportation logistics due to a suffering infrastructure system, potential additional
income is unremittingly lost. Nigerians interviewed noted the need to invest in the
development of the agricultural sector and Chinese technical training in agriculture and
agricultural research is expected to play a decisive role towards this end. Chinese experts
are travelling to Nigeria to train and Nigerians are going to China to learn and exchange
knowledge.
Perhaps the greatest element of learning as the core motivator in Nigerian agency
in China-Nigeria relations is in its implications for capacity building. As previously
argued, the Chinese option provides African states and Nigeria a new opportunity to
make a selection, to play an active and decisive role in the pursuit of their best interests
and the determination of their future. Through domestic and external efforts, Nigerians
are hoping they will finally be able to identify successful policy solutions that can propel
the country towards sustainable development. Nigeria’s decision-making power, now
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asserted through increased and strategic relations with China has, politically speaking,
afforded greater recognition and respect not only in Nigeria but also on the global stage.
The Chinese have found a different means to address the issues of extreme poverty.
Nigeria (as well as the rest of Africa), in the light of the blatant failure of aid to deal with
the poverty problem in the developing world, is taking note, not to emulate but to learn
from China, employing simpler technologies that address the seminal causes of poverty
rather than complex policy prescription drawn up from perceived symptoms of global
poverty. Nigeria’s increased sense of self-determination allows for Nigerian-generated
solutions to Nigerian problems. Nigerians by nature have a better understanding of
domestic problems and thereby a better foundation from which to decipher solutions that
can produce both short and long term benefits for all Nigerians. The necessary human
development for such a solution is coming with some assistance from the Chinese.
Chinese training and education is equipping Nigerians to better manage their own
economy, while Chinese competition is spurring domestic (Nigerian) competitors
towards higher productivity and better business models. Nigerians are learning how to be
successful and self-supporting--or at least, self-promoting--from the Chinese.
Economic Benefit
The last theme uncovered by this research is that Nigerians increasingly engage
with China because of the economic benefit it brings to them, specifically profitability
and affordability. This last portion examines the relevance of engagement with the
Chinese especially as increasing trade with China has become arguably the most visible
indicator of growing ties between China and Nigeria.
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Federal Government
The previous section discussed Nigerian intent to learn from the Chinese
experience in order to grow and develop the Nigerian economy. In order to make
significant progress it is important that the Nigerian government pay special attention to
revitalizing infrastructure. As a result, the government is looking to China to play a role
in the development of Nigerian infrastructure96. Corporate Nigeria 2010/201197 notes
“Nigeria is tackling the problem of transforming transport infrastructure that does not
meet the needs of a modern economy. Although the sector is under-developed, significant
progress is being made by the Federal and State Governments in building and
rehabilitating infrastructure, with the help of funding from international organizations,
private sector input and new policy initiatives” (pp. 168). The article goes on to state,
“…construction is ongoing across the major state roads in many of Nigeria’s 36 states.
With the help of the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB), major
connecting roads that link Nigeria to its neighboring countries are being reconstructed”
(Corporate Nigeria, 2010: pp. 169). Many of the contracts for rebuilding roads are going
to Chinese companies98. The Chinese are very successful in winning contracts because
they are almost always the lowest bidder and also more adept at putting together contracts
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that appeal to decision-makers99. Consequently, the Chinese can be seen all across
Nigeria funding and building, roads, stadiums, dams, power plants, sky scrapers, and
more. They are building roads, expressways, and bridges everywhere in Abuja, the
capital city of Nigeria. Abuja is a young city that is growing rapidly, with the help of
Chinese construction companies, the most visible of which is probably the China Civil
Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC). One of the CCECC’s most prominent
projects is the construction of a light rail network to improve public transportation
options for people that work and live in Abuja. The project began in May of 2009 and is
expected completion is December of 2014. Just as the Chinese are crucial to construction
and infrastructure development in Abuja, they are also important in the rest of the
country, in particular in key trading towns such as but not limited to Kano, Jos, and
Kaduna. Current infrastructure development and consequently economic and social
development in Nigeria is heavily dependent on the efforts of Chinese entities.
The government is also pursuing engagement with China to improve the
communication infrastructure, noting that the Chinese provided Nigeria with their first
communication satellite NigComSat-1. When the satellite developed problems, China
was again the source for a replacement (NigComSat-1R) and an additional satellite.100
These satellites have helped improve communication infrastructure in the country,
although the mobile networks in Nigeria remain over-burdened by heavy demand and
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constant traffic. By further developing the infrastructure in Nigeria, the Nigerian
government hopes to foster conditions that will promote sustainable economic growth.
Business Representatives & Entrepreneurs
Chinese-manufactured products have flooded the Nigerian marketplace
throughout the country, and Nigerians are the engine behind the mass dispersal of
Chinese goods. Purchases are made by crate loads from ports or from Chinatown, broken
down into smaller units, then sold by a third party to yet another party in even smaller
units, until shoppers make contact with the actual traders that finally sell the goods.101.
Businessmen note that they prefer doing business with China because China
provides them with exactly what they need and want in terms of levels of quality; they
note it is easier to acquire low quality goods but upon request higher quality goods are
made available. In addition, the flexibility of Chinese suppliers allows Nigerians to
purchase within their means. The affordability of Chinese products for Nigerian
consumers has also resulted in increased comparative profitability and net income of
Nigerians engaged in the purchase and sale of Chinese products. Nigerian entrepreneurs,
businessmen and industrialists--just like consumers--are doing business with China
because it is an economically viable endeavor that has netted exponential returns despite
the fact that Chinese products are typically considered inferior to Western products, or
are cheaply-made copies. A part of this study’s research found that Chinese products
were just as reliable and sometimes even of equal quality as Western-branded products.
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Interestingly, according to Nigerian market traders, Nigerian manufactured products were
more durable and of better quality; however, logistical and infrastructural limitations
have kept locally produced goods from reaching Nigerian markets in adequate quantities
and affordable prices. This point was echoed by government officials in the Federal
Ministry of Trade and Investment, as well as Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
corroborated by executives in the Nigeria-China Business Council and academics at the
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
Chinese technology has proven itself a good fit for the Nigerian market in terms
of viability and price, and Nigerian businessmen are taking advantage of this opportunity
to shore up their earnings. Profitability is clearly a major reason for doing business with
China but it is not the only reason. A number of factors in the characteristics of business
arrangements with China have combined to attract and nurture business relations, even in
cases where other (non-Chinese) suppliers might offer better products to the Nigerian
market.
A noted motivator for Nigeria's China policy is the relative ease of business in
engaging with China. This theme was prominent in every single interview. Clearly the
Chinese have seen that “Nigeria is a consumer nation102” and are packaging their goods
and services to meet the demands of this consumer base. A Nigerian entrepreneur put it
well, stating, “In all cases, when you engage in business with somebody there are benefits
accruing to you, okay. But I think most especially in the case of Nigeria, two factors I
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consider quite important. Number one, the ease of doing business with them. Ease in the
sense that probably until recently, the Chinese tended to believe more of us than the
Europeans. By the way, all of my working life, we’ve dealt a lot with, in all our dealings
we’ve dealt a lot with the Europeans or the western world rather, let me put it that way.
But towards the tail end of my working career, we have had cause to deal with China and
the ease with which that business was conducted I think attracted me personally and even
encouraged me to be on my own.” This sentiment is echoed by another entrepreneur who
said, “For our company, we are more interested, rather we are interested in doing
business with this Chinese firm because of the ease we got in doing business with them.”
In tandem with the response of ease of business as a major appeal factor for
Chinese firms, interviewees reported that Chinese products were affordable and made
accessible to Nigerians. Nigerian businessmen noted that with the Chinese, they were
able to earn value for money. Granted it wasn’t always a positive outcome, just as good
quality was available for purchase, so also was bad value. Traders could purchase goods
in qualities and quantities that matched their spending thresholds. Mr. Lawal explained,
“I mean as a businessman I have interests in dealing with China because they have good
products. Good cost, low-cost prices that improves my competitive position in the
market. So it’s not for the country, it’s for my business and myself. They have good
products. They have good cheap products. Well, not cheap, good affordable products.”103
When asked to elaborate, he goes on to state, “Because their products are good, are well
priced. Which means if you want to compete, as against the European products, you need
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good prices. European products are very expensive, you know that. And, but Chinese
products are relatively cheaper. So your margin and your competitiveness is enhanced if
you procure from Chinese firms. High turnover and high profit margins, that’s our
objectives as the business is concerned. And the Chinese facilitate that, as I said. They
have the goods and they have the good prices. So it makes us competitive. So we can
achieve our volume and we can achieve our profit margin.”104
Another recurring motivator was that business with the Chinese employed simpler
business processes and Chinese counterparts were considerate and accommodating of
their Nigerian colleagues and business partners. Mr. Ter shared his experience as an
exclusive supplier for some Chinese agencies, "About a year ago, we wanted to represent
some companies in sole agency capacity. We market their products, which they
manufacture and of course at a good price. That we got from the Chinese firms. They
were very willing to make us their sole agents without any pre-condition. Of course we
had a target to meet, but beyond that there were no preconditions... As a starting company
that was quite good for us."105 When asked about the progress of this business venture,
Ter added, "Of course it has been hectic. Particularly in our own field, we are introducing
new products. It’s been quite hectic. There have been a lot of demands from them too, to
meet up our target. We have not met our target as a matter of fact, basically because we
were introducing new products in the Nigerian market. But they were always very
understanding, always telling me ‘yeah we will support you, we will support you; we
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know it’s not easy, it’s not easy.’ In fact, one of the products, the laboratory equipment,
the manufacturers told us that it took them 6-10 years to break into the Chinese market
themselves. So they are not expecting magic from us. They also know that it will take us
quite some time. So far, so good."106
This ease of business for Nigerians is not only arising from enterprise business.
The Chinese government has also implemented policies (immigration, economic and the
like) that facilitate Chinese and Nigerian to engagement and partnership. This support
from the Chinese government in streamlining the business process is evident and has
become a strong attraction for Nigerians. In interviews and informal conversations
regarding Nigeria’s engagement with China, it was reiterated that the process of making
travel arrangements to go to China is simpler and more successful than making travel
arrangements to visit the West. Once Chinese consular visa requirements are met, then
visas to travel to China are issued. There are fewer hoops for Nigerians to jump through.
For example, according to the interviews, a visa to the United States for business
purposes requires those seeking to travel to have certain levels of education. This makes
the U.S., by and large, inaccessible--regardless of the business skill or capital of the
applicant. The business-savvy market trader who may possess little formal education is
essentially denied admittance. China’s visa requirements do not call for higher education,
a good grasp of English or Chinese. The alternative of procuring visas to travel to the
West, even when formal and informal requirements are met, visa applications can be
denied for any reason, and reasons do not have to be disclosed to the applicant. In short,
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travelling to the West is a hassle. A businessman explains, “Once you have the
requirement for visa to go to China, you are given the visa no excuse. As long as you
meet their requirements. It’s not the same with American companies; it’s not the same
with European companies. You fill the visa form, you’ve met all the requirements and
you’re still denied visa. Reasons of course they are not obligated to disclose. We are not
querying that. But, sometimes some of us wonder why you have a requirement,
somebody meets the requirement and you do not, you will not give him what you made
the requirements for.” Recently, however, reports indicate that as a result of abuses of the
system by criminally-motivated Nigerians, the Chinese government has been more
restrictive with the issuance of visas, especially to Nigerians who have never visited
China, until in league with Nigerian counterparts they are able to more directly address
the issue of system abuse107.
Nigerian businessmen note that Chinese manufacturers and suppliers offer
attractive conditions and in certain situations have been the only option, let alone the only
viable one. Mr. Lawal illustrates, “And of course there are times you can only deal with
them. I tell you one example I have now. I want to buy promotional items, pens and biros
[…] customized as gift items. Only Chinese can do that. I mean, they are good at things
like that. So where I go for things like consumables, promotional items, the Chinese are
good at it.” Nigerian traders go to China because of the vast options for business and
extensive catalogs and offerings presented by the Chinese. The region of Guanzhou is
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home to most of the China-based, China/Nigeria business arrangements. Trade expos
there often serve as a one-stop shop even for the businessmen looking to diversify their
business offerings.
The Chinese are noted as very responsive to their Nigerian counterparts, quick to
communicate, flexible and considerate of special circumstances in their negotiations.
They are seen as reliable as well as good communicators. A lot of these factors of
attraction were brought up in contrast to Western business practices and discussed in an
earlier section of this chapter. Based on interviews, is quite clear that the difficulty of
doing business with the U.S. and Europe, and the comparative ease of doing business
with China is pushing Nigerians to choose China.
Consumers
A short stroll into a Nigerian marketplace makes obvious rather quickly the
motivations of Nigerian consumers in increasing Nigerian engagement with China. The
affordability of Chinese imports ordinarily classified as luxury goods has considerably
increased the relative spending power of the average Nigerian. Thanks to the Chinese, it
doesn't matter that the power company, the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN)
has frequent outages because now even the hairdresser at the corner market has her own
generator to provide consistent service to patrons. Thanks to the Chinese, most Nigerians
own at least one mobile phone, many have multiple phones, or pricier multiple SIM card
carrying phones so that they can take advantage of offers from various mobile service
carriers. Whether or not Nigerians make a conscious decision to buy Chinese products,
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the influx of Chinese-made goods is driving down market prices108. Not only are
traditional goods flying off the shelves, even non-traditional Asian and Chinese-oriented
goods, like Malaysian manufactured ginseng-infused instant coffee and portable
electronic acupuncture machines are gaining traction in the Nigerian marketplace109. In
many ways the consumer society in Nigeria looks a lot like the U.S., where quite a bit of
spending goes to the latest toys and gadgets. High definition plasma and LCD televisions
are all the rage, even though most television stations and service providers have yet to
provide high definition service110.
It is important to note, however, that the entry of the Chinese into the Nigerian
marketplace was not and is not an isolated event. As the BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia,
India and China) grew and developed industrially and economically, it became necessary
to find new markets in which to sell goods and increase income generation. Accordingly,
with its remarkably large market, Nigeria has been a key African destination for some of
these countries’ products111.
Chinese manufactured goods in particular have made an impression on the lives
of Nigerian consumers. The affordability of Chinese products has dropped market prices
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of most goods to a fraction of what they were just years ago112. Nigerians are noting that
Chinese-manufactured products have increased standards of living without increasing the
cost of living. With non-essential goods accessible to every Nigerian and in spite of
quality concerns, Nigerians are keen to embrace the opportunity Chinese imports provide
to live a better life. Scholars at NIIA note that the Nigerian disposition is to accept
beneficial economic relations from everyone including China113. Even concerns that
Chinese products are undercutting and destroying domestic Nigerian industry are not
keeping Nigerians from spending money on goods bearing the “Made in China” label.
Clearly, Nigerian consumers are the big winners. A Nigerian notes that, across the board,
"cheap Chinese [products] have been good for the African consumer." Especially
members of the lower socio-economic classes can only afford things made in China and
in an interesting turn, “China becomes the saving grace of so many,” as noted by an
interview respondent. It is important to note that Nigerian culture and society tends
towards immediate satisfaction and a ‘keeping up with the Jones’s’ mentality; these
demands are best met by cheap Chinese products that do not require long-term planning
or saving. Nigerians in the marketplace talked about the days when the only option
available was to buy second-hand goods, but today cheap Chinese imports allow them to
purchase and own brand new products. This adds a level of prestige and self-respect that
hasn’t been lost on Nigerian consumers; as such, the demand for Chinese products
continues to grow at an exponential rate.
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Conclusion
Although a significant amount of information came out of the interviews that
were conducted, it is quite clear that this study is only scratching the surface of ChinaNigeria relations and subsequently Nigeria’s China policy. The central research question
posed by this study is: Why do Nigerians choose to engage with China? The underlying
current through all the identified themes is that engagement with China offers Nigeria
and Nigerians a new opportunity for progress, and that is why Nigerians choose to
engage with China. The significance of these themes is their demonstration of intent and
agency on the part of Nigerians engaging with China. Further still, they lend support to
the central argument of this study: that Africans are willing and active participants in
their engagement with China, and that Nigerians are making state-centric realist decisions
in search of their perceived best interests. Afrobarometer surveys on public opinion in
Africa indicate that, despite the growing literature asserting that Chinese engagement in
Africa is detrimental to Africans, most Africans hold the Chinese in positive regard
(Gadzala & Hanusch, 2010). Approximately 58 percent of Nigerian Afrobarometer
respondents indicated that to some degree they believe that China is helping Nigeria.
Only 10 percent of respondents reported that China was no help; 33 percent noted that
they did not know (Afrobarometer, 2008).
Nigeria is also engaging China in part because of the level of competition that
China has created in the world economy. In addition, China’s disposition towards Nigeria
makes Nigerian pursuit of engagement an almost natural development. Although China is
using Nigeria to pursue its own national interests, Nigerian government officials note that
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Nigeria is doing the very same with China and continues to do so, in part due to China’s
assistance in capacity-building and the financing of key projects in Nigeria. The Nigerian
government sees China as an alternative source to the West for technological
advancement. This view is sound; the Chinese government is more generous with
technology than its Western counterparts (Alden, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). Important
questions have arisen concerning the shelf-life of these technologies, since rapid
advancement makes even today’s technologies obsolete. Because of this process of
obsolescence, the continued viability of the technology that China brings into Nigeria is
under scrutiny by Nigerian regulatory agencies and consumers. In addition, Chinese
hardware and equipment presents a compatibility problem because of language barriers;
this research has discovered that the equipment coming from China is sometimes labeled
in Chinese with Chinese language manuals that are not accessible to even the average
educated Nigerian. However, regardless of these challenges, what matters is that China’s
offer of technology starkly differs from the West’s. As a result, Nigerians are logically
going to China to obtain what the West has withheld.
The continued development of business relationships makes the PRC even more
lucrative for Nigeria because of the relative freedom of access to what Nigerian people
need and demand. Although the relationship is government and business driven, Nigerian
leadership looks to China to source its needs: military, technological, economic and
otherwise. It is relatively easy for Nigerians to trade and have access to China because of
the comparative freedom of entry and competitive affordability of China. This is not to
say no concerns exist; there are significant concerns regarding the quality and safety of
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Chinese products. But in spite of these concerns, the opportunities that China presently
provides outweigh the costs of engagement with China. Nigerians and Africans alike are
also motivated by the easy disbursement of Chinese funding, loans and investments. The
Chinese have made use of barter techniques in many agreements, where services or
access to raw materials is traded, and thus not all transactions require exchange of money,
especially money from Nigerians. Nigerians are undaunted in their approach to China for
funding for ambitious projects. China’s non-interference policy has meant that, typically,
contracts focus on the heart of the business deal and are not contingent on governance
conditions or the implementation of outside-generated policy prescriptions. The point
remains that the Chinese are not concerned with African governance or perceived
standards of humanitarianism or democracy, but instead China’s steadfast belief in
sovereignty means that it falls to Nigerians to determine for themselves what standards
are appropriate and apply them accordingly.
Chinese engagement with African states, especially as facilitated by FOCAC, has
allowed African states, public and private actors and business representatives to meet and
interact whereas they might not otherwise do so. While this may not be an obvious
motive for engaging with China, it is actually of great consequence to Africa and
Nigeria’s growth. China has perhaps unwittingly presented African states with an
opportunity to collaborate and coordinate their efforts. The potential for collaboration is
astounding, especially if appropriately exploited by African actors. A number of Nigerian
lower-level government officials have noted this opportunity and though it wasn’t
brought up in interviews with higher level officers or politicians, the fact that some
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officials feel Nigeria can act on these opportunities, portends the possibility for
corresponding action.
The Chinese element in Nigerian lives is increasingly significant, and while China
presents some very real opportunities to the Nigerian populace, it also presents some very
real threats. However as this chapter has focused mainly on the perceptions that inform
Nigerian motivations and agency in increasing engagement with China, it has not
addressed current Chinese engagement in Nigeria, and areas of concern with regards to
growing engagement with China have also not been addressed. These include the influx
of counterfeit products in China, reports that Nigerian minerals such gold and wolfromite
are being illegally mined and exported by Chinese entities without appropriate
permissions or remuneration to the federal government as required by law. Interview
respondents agree, China’s engagement in Nigeria must be appropriately managed. It
falls then to the Nigerian government to maximize opportunities and minimize threats.
Ultimately, the drivers of Nigerian governmental agency in engagement with China can
be categorized under opportunities and threats.
Offering this chapter as the final word on the motivations of Nigerians in their
increasing engagement with China would be naive. This chapter presents some of the
major discoveries of a study that was conducted in a short span of time. It is quite likely
that further research might find greater weight for other motivating factors not mentioned
in this study. In addition, while broad, this study is hardly comprehensive; the
motivations for other specific categories of Nigerians are not discussed. Regardless, as a
nation, Nigerians have embraced the Chinese option, not just as an alternative to the West
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but also as ancillary to engagement with the West and other nations. To pursue Nigeria’s
own self-interest and objectives, Nigerian actors are hoping to learn from China, taking
advantage of the relative affordability of Chinese products and technology, the assistance
training and education readily offered by the Chinese government, the ease of engaging
the Chinese, the short-term successes of current Nigeria-China relations and the
additional leverage and that a strategic partnership with China has afforded the Nigerian
government in the international arena.
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Chapter 6: Understanding Africa’s China Policy

This chapter discusses the findings of this study and its implications to SinoNigerian relations as well as Sino-African relations, and concludes with
recommendations for future research. China is gaining headway into Africa and fast
becoming an important trading partner for many African states. This new economic
development has resulted in increased competition for African resources and attention in
the economic and political spheres from Chinese and Western interests. This competition
requires that Africa become an active participant in the determination of her future that
potentially could bring a new era of successful development for African states, and a new
environment in which to pursue their own best interests. Nigerian leaders express their
intent to do just that. Although much information was discovered through this research, it
is quite clear that this study is only scratches the surface of China-Nigeria relations and
subsequently Nigeria’s China policy. The central research question posed by this study is:
Why do Nigerians choose to engage with China? The easiest answer is because China
chooses to engage with Nigeria. However, an answer that simple fails to paint an accurate
picture of the dynamics that influence Nigerians’ decision to engage with China. The
underlying theme in this dynamic is that engagement with China offers Nigeria and
Nigerians a new opportunity for progress. Nigerians choose to engage with China
because it is in their best interests.
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The Nigerian government does not have an explicit policy document on China
that outlines objectives in engaging with China. There is no doubt that this is a major
shortcoming and a potential hindrance to maximizing the accrued benefits to Nigeria of
engaging with China. This author contends that the absence of a policy document makes
it difficult to analyze and evaluate the outputs of this relationship because no explicit
objectives exist. However, Nigeria and China have signed an agreement, the NigeriaChina Joint Commission for Cooperation, which details the nature of relations between
the two countries. While such documents might speak to the nature and characteristics of
Nigeria-China relations, it cannot be said definitively that these documents address
Nigeria’s objectives in engaging with China, in the same ways that an explicit policy
document might. An explicit foreign policy document issued by the Nigerian government
would speak directly to the central concerns of this study: what is Nigeria’s foreign
policy is toward China? What the objectives are of state leaders and governmental
administrations that choose to engage with China over other actors? What does Nigeria
stand to gain? Creating a foreign policy document detailing Nigeria’s policy goals and
objectives serves a few strategic purposes. First, Chinese engagement in Africa has been
implied as being detrimental to African governance and policy-making (Tull, 2006; Tull,
2008; Kagan, 2006). However, the presence of explicit Nigerian policies on China would
instead demonstrate deliberate governance and policy-making, and, the level of detail in
such policies would indicate increased Nigerian intent. Second, the articulation of a
policy would require at least a strategic SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and
threats) analysis of the opportunities that engagement with China provides. Such analyses
require attention to fine details and could pave the way for making calculated decisions
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on policy-based objectives and aims. Fieldwork and research have made it clear that
Nigeria has plenty of brilliant minds that are capable of conducting and have already
conducted such analyses and come up with policy recommendations to move the country
forward. Unfortunately the final decision is in the hands of politicians whose primary
aims may not be nation-centric because of overwhelming pressure to use their position to
increase personal gains. Finally, understanding policy goals and objectives provides a
foundation for future evaluation and analysis of the outcomes of Nigerian-Chinese policy
initiatives in Nigeria. The relevance of policy documents as primary source documents
lies in their ability to serve as indicators of Nigerian participation and intent in Chinese
engagement in Nigeria. Policy documents such as foreign policy missives on China,
official reports and statements on China and Chinese enterprises in Nigeria will be
helpful as a launching pad in the articulation of Nigeria’s China policy. Future research
can begin to assess the impact of Chinese engagement in Nigeria with these documents as
a foundation.
Nigerian traders and businesses choose to create partnerships with China
primarily because the Chinese are more likely to treat them as partners. This receptivity
has been missing in Nigeria’s relations with the West. After many years of ill-treatment
and disrespect by the Western countries, who were seen as exploiting Nigeria’s wealth
while sullying its international reputation and stifling significant attempts at economic
growth, Nigerians are attracted by a new-found respect and legitimacy in dealing with
China. Chinese engagement with Nigerians is distinctive because the Chinese have made
a point of displaying vested interest in the development of Nigeria. Discussions of mutual
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benefit are more than political propaganda, the Chinese are not seen as presenting
challenges and setting up roadblocks to Nigeria’s progress. In addition, the Chinese are
making quality products affordable and accessible to the consumer culture prevalent in
Nigeria. The Chinese have made business simple and more profitable for the Nigerian
traders and businesses, leading to partnerships with Chinese suppliers and manufacturers.
This is not to say that trade with China has not created areas of concern. While it is true
that there has been mutual benefit to Nigeria and China as a result of bilateral trade, it is
also true balance of trade data would present China as clearly the big winner in Nigeria,
although the benefits of cheap Chinese products to the spending power of the average
Nigerian may overshadow the trade imbalance.
China is largely importing raw materials from Nigeria while subsequently selling
finished goods and products to Nigerians. This sort of scenario has been described in
political science as indicative of dependency, a situation in which developed countries
grow economically through manufacture of finished goods while the economies of the
developing countries that export raw materials are dependent on the exports from
developed countries because of their inability to produce finished goods. Additionally, as
indicated in Chapter 4, which tested dependency theory, it does not appear that what is at
play in China-Nigeria relations is dependency but rather state-centric realism, a pursuit of
self-interest by both China and Nigeria, both developing states. China stands to benefit
from Nigerian raw materials as well as political influence in Africa; while Nigeria
welcomes Chinese products, it is not dependent on them. China presents Nigeria with
options and opportunities but is not Nigeria’s only option or opportunity. Chinese
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engagement is a portion of a larger picture of the Nigerian economy and Nigerian foreign
relations and while the Chinese are likely Nigeria’s largest trading partner in terms of
volume, it does not hold the spot monetarily—that spot is occupied by the United States.
This iteration of the relationship between Nigeria and China is still quite new, and labels
like ‘dependency’ may be premature, especially in such a dynamic relationship.
However, it is important to remain critical about the state of China-Nigeria relations and
to continue research into the nature and characteristics of Chinese engagement beyond
this study. A situation of dependency may yet develop and the Nigerian government
needs to play an active role in managing its relationship with China.
While the Chinese are going to great lengths to promote the development of
Nigeria-China relations, it is hard to say definitively that one nation is driving relations
more than the other. On one hand the Chinese are courting the Nigerians, accommodating
them and providing them with lucrative deals and options. At the same time, however, it
is clear that Nigerians are leaping at the chance to conduct business and it is logical to
make the claim that Nigerians’ receptiveness to the new opportunities afforded them
through engagement with China is also in its own way perhaps a retroactive driver of
Chinese-Nigerian relations. Nigerians and Chinese are increasingly collaborating in many
different areas. This research has pointed out cultural, economic and political
collaboration. However, collaboration extends beyond those areas and is increasingly
specific. Nigerian and Chinese government are working together on establishing and
monitoring manufacturing standards. This is important as counterfeit products, especially
goods like food stuffs and medication put the rest of society in danger.
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This research has attempted to determine just what Nigeria wants from China.
Based on the findings of this study, Nigerians are keen to learn from China and borrow
from China’s example to improve their present situation and develop economically and
socially. Systematic problems with the Nigerian government and political system still
keep Nigeria from taking full advantage of the new opportunities made available by
Chinese engagement. Issues of inadequate leadership, corruption, lack of infrastructure,
undependable energy supply; these are persistent barriers to faster rates of sustainable
development and progress in Nigeria. These are issues that the Nigerian government
needs to address expediently. It is clear that China-Nigeria relations are not always
beneficial, or always fruitful interaction, but Nigerians are well aware of China’s
increasing global importance and the need not only to actively engage China but to take
advantage of the opportunities presented by China.
Nigeria (and Africa) not easily moved from the West
Although Chinese engagement in Nigeria is growing, the West continues to hold a
marginal advantage in Nigeria especially with regards to sustainable opportunities. To
begin with, there is a fundamental ideological contradiction between Nigeria and the
People’s Republic of China. Nigeria is a growing democracy patterned after the
democratic system employed by the United States of America. This has allowed the
Nigerian government to adopt a Bill of Rights, to promote and protect the recognized
rights of the Nigerian citizen. This Bill of Rights afforded to every Nigerian citizen is not
accommodated in the communist PRC system and this contradicts the Nigerian policy of
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citizen diplomacy that is becoming a major component of Nigerian foreign relations.114
Secondly, engagement with China is noted as a tedious affair because there is a lot of
“unnecessary activity.” Relations between parties in both states are plagued with ancillary
tasks and a significant amount of red tape because the systems of both countries are
incompatible and supplementary action must be taken to allow activities to take place.
For instance Nigerians in China are being harassed by the Chinese authorities for
practicing their religion. In response to the causalities this has caused Nigerians, the
government has to make specific efforts to request that the Chinese government
recognize and respect Nigerians right to practice their religion115.
Although there are some cultural and social similarities between China and Africa
at the general levels, these commonalities do not applicably extend to Nigeria. Nigeria is
culturally capitalist and individualist, the second portion of that descriptive is arguably
not applied to most African culture. Chinese investments are heavily governmentcontrolled, Chinese investments both at home and aboard are mostly tailored by
government. The Nigerian counterparts are usually private individuals with private
enterprises, not necessarily controlled by the Nigerian government. There are
fundamental differences therefore in the way that both governments approach business
and investment. The role of the Nigerian government in the business dealings of
Nigerians is limited especially when compared to the role that the central Chinese
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government plays in Chinese enterprise. The Chinese need for government intervention
in business relations, is not characteristic of Nigerian or Western dealings. Government
intervention to create harmony and orchestrate business agreements and contracts on the
scale of the Chinese would be considered unnecessary and superfluous by Nigerians.
These additional steps and additional players increases the cost of the business
relationship, the number of necessary approvals for projects or contracts can make the
business process wasteful, in terms of time and money.
Nigerians are increasing engaging with the Chinese because of the availability of
opportunities, but under the right conditions, arguably business with Western companies
can and should be simpler. The following excerpt from an interview helps illustrate this
point.
Respondent 1: Nigeria was compelled to move towards the east out
of impatience and disappointment, but costeffectiveness [sic], if we have a sincere approach
from the West that's where we'll move far.
Interviewer: What will it take to develop a sincere approach from
the West?
Respondent 1: The West has to shift from seeing Africa as a
colony. We are an independent people. It is only
then that it [The West] will understand in real
perspective, what Africa needs now.
Respondent 2: In the light of hundreds of years of a Master-servant
relationship-
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Respondent 1: In this era of a global village, era of
communications, the windows are open. It is just
the political will that is needed.116
Irrefutably, Africa and Nigeria are not easily parted from the West; there is a shared
history and a deeper understanding and knowledge of the other that will always remain a
competitive advantage for western interests in Africa. However, for the West to make
use of this advantage it needs to change its approach to African countries and to Nigeria.
Interestingly, following the establishment of a formal strategic partnership between China
and Nigeria, recent tours to Nigeria of high level Western government officials have
sought to do the same. Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have sent
high profile representatives to underpin the importance of their relationships with
Nigeria. While the U.S. sent Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Germany sent Chancellor
Angela Merkel, and the UK, Prime Minister David Cameron. Perhaps generating the
political will is underway to change the dynamics of the relationship between Nigeria and
the West, as well as Africa and the West.
China in Nigeria: good or bad?
A question posed by most of the literature on recent Chinese engagement in
Africa, including Nigeria, is whether Chinese engagement in Africa is good or bad. The
argument can be made that the wrong question is being asked. After all in the words of an
interview respondent, “there is no sincerity in international politics.” This echoes Waltz’s
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2011.

Interview with government official in the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology, July 15,
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(1979) argument that the fundamental aim of states is self-interest and survival. China is
in Africa and in Nigeria in pursuit of its own best interests and it is up to African state
actors to pursue the best interests of their respective countries in their engagement with
China. The argument has been raised that there is no significant difference in Chinese
engagement in Nigeria as compared to that of the West. The difference of Chinese
engagement is that it provides Nigeria and African states with additional options and
opportunities. A Nigerian political scientist warns against portraying China as an
alternative to the West in Africa, noting that the right perspective is to view China as an
opportunity and accordingly to make the best of it117. At the end of the day, the future of
African development lies in the psychological liberalization of the African, an objective
not attained by government policies or well-written action plans.
Managing China
“People are not very comfortable with China but China is a force and must be managed
appropriately!” –Nigerian government employee.118
In order to maximize its benefits from China, the Nigerian government and other
African states need to manage their relations with China, paying particular attention to
protecting and promoting their national interests. It would however, be unwise to
characterize China as a big bad monster. China is rapidly growing economically and in
political power and influence, everybody is engaging with China in order to pursue their
117
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Round table discussion with 6 political scientists and academics at the NIIA, August 16, 2011, Lagos.

Interview with National Agency for Food & Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) executive, July
12, 2011, Abuja.
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own interests and it would behoove African actors to do the same. The key for Africa is
to take a different approach to its foreign policy. African countries have been noted as
being receptive and rather passive in their foreign relations, and if they are to really
benefit from the opportunities presented by China, they need to be at the table
determining the nature of their relations with China.
Limitations and Recommendations
This study is tasked with understanding the motivations of Africans, in particular
Nigerians, that choose to engage with China. However, the findings of a case study of
Nigeria can hardly be construed as indicative of the situation in Africa. Since Nigeria is
part of Africa, there is some logic to the validity of Nigerian motivations being construed
as African motivations. Yet the uniqueness of Nigeria in Africa, and the interesting
details which make for a fascinating study represent both the strengths and weaknesses of
this research. To speak to Africa’s China policy, further research and interviews will need
to be conducted with information-rich individuals who can speak to conditions across the
continent. Examples of such individuals would include policy-makers and economists at
regional and continental agencies, such as the African Development Bank, the Africa
Investment Bank, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), to name a
few. The expertise of the individuals working at these larger-scale agencies might help
shed light on Africa’s China policy beyond Nigeria’s China policy. In the same vein, if
there are some regional and continental policies that pertain to Africa that may be brought
to light by any of these agencies, it is important to note that they may not be applicable to
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a particular African state—Africa is not an inanimate object, nor is it ever a solitary actor.
In the light of all this, it is important to denote that the findings of this study are valid
only to Nigeria and not to Africa. Should any future research look at regional and
continental organizations, it must also concede that findings may not be directly
applicable or representative of any given African country.
The findings of this qualitative case study are not necessarily novel or groundbreaking but there is little doubt that the findings of this research are somewhat relevant,
not only to the expansion of information and knowledge but to the study of political
science and the manner in which states and governments interact. As mentioned earlier
the manner in which China has engaged Africa is new and more business-like and this
study corroborates that claim. The findings of this study have validated some of the
claims published by scholars and journalists on China and Africa (Nigeria specifically)
relations. This is valid because it moves general understanding and critique of this
relationship beyond conjecture but offers up some hard evidence to support and bolster
what is known and said about China and Nigeria. This study also has implications that
extend beyond academia. Any governments and groups interested or affected by Chinese
engagement in Nigeria have a vested interest in the findings of this study. For instance
Western governmental agencies or businesses that are interested in engaging with
Nigeria, or are looking to be more successful and lose fewer contracts to the Chinese, can
through this study identify the characteristics that make the Chinese attractive to the
Nigerians and adapt accordingly. This study has also highlighted the need for a
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coordinated Nigerian effort to maximize benefit and better exploit the opportunities that
engagement with China has made available.
This qualitative case study portion of this project has focused rather significantly
on the perceptions regarding Nigerian objectives and motivations in increasing
engagement with China. By focusing on motivations and objectives, the responses
provided for the most part have the expectation of a positive outcome. This is because
people, expectably, when discussing intent in decision-making, focus on self-benefit and
what they expect to gain and not costs or expected losses. This tendency gives the
impression that this study paints China in a good light. To be clear, it is not the intent of
this study or this researcher to do so. The data unearthed by this study shows that the very
same respondents who hope for an eventual positive outcome for Nigeria from
engagement with China are also aware and outspoken about the negative aspects of
engagement with China and its current and potential threats. Future scholarship into the
details of China’s current engagement with Nigeria, with the data collected will
demonstrate that as with all economic relationships there are gains and losses and China
in Nigeria is no different.
Concerns might also be raised about being able to tell when interviewees were
telling the truth as opposed to when they were feeding lines to the researcher. Especially
in the case of government officials, common sense would dictate that when asked why
Nigeria engages with China, they would respond that it was because it was good for
Nigeria to engage with China. Such a response would be politically appropriate and can
be considered self-preserving because it is a response that wouldn’t jeopardize their jobs
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and offices. In addition, when considering the issue of inherent and systematic corruption
in the government, it is logical to assume that corrupt government officials would
immediately resort to feeding political spin, soft non-specific responses to the questions
posed. While there were some instances when government officials were not informative
or accommodating, they usually made it obvious by rushing through or denying
interviews outright, but such situations were rare. By and large, over the course of this
particular study, the government officials were forthcoming and provided in-depth
answers, offering anecdotes and special examples to illustrate their arguments. Responses
to questions were thoughtful, earnest and specific enough to be controversial. In many
instances respondents gave in to their convictions, speaking passionately, at times
seemingly with no concern for political or diplomatic finesse or tact. Interviewing many
government officials across different ministries, and at varying levels, from the policy
experts on the lower end of the power structure to the department directors and then
political figureheads (politicians), as well as laypeople helped limit the influence of bias
and propaganda in the findings of this study. Incorporating views across different spheres
of Nigerian society and triangulating their responses helped preserve the accuracy of this
study.
It is also necessary to note that most of the participants interviewed for this study
were male. It is difficult to say definitively what sort of an influence that would have on
the findings of this study but it is important to admit that this is an area where there is
limited perspective being offered. General political science beliefs in the feminist
tradition hold the view that a female perspective might afford a different lens for

180

examining an issue and may bring to light other phenomena that might not have been
identified by a male perspective (Ring, 1987). Future research would need to take
particular care to identify and interview women who engage with China, either in the
capacity of government or business and perhaps otherwise. This supports the general
argument of verification process and quality control efforts that the triangulation of
information received, would result in the development of the most accurate codes and
findings that tell the true story of the phenomena being studied and provide a reliable
picture of Chinese and Nigerian relations and Nigerian intentions in this interaction.
Other un-represented or inadequately represented groups include state level
government officials, Nigerian consumers, non-governmental organizations (such as
human rights activists), young professionals119 and rural Nigerians. Although this
research did make a conscious effort to interview many different people across different
socio-economic profiles and industries to get a better grasp of China-Nigeria relations
and to understand Nigeria’s current China policy, future studies into Nigeria China
relations can benefit from expanding the diversity of perspectives. This study is a step in
the right direction but there is still more that needs to be done. Future scholarship in this
area needs to conduct case studies of other African countries to understand better ChinaAfrica relations and to establish organized information that can be used in comparing
Chinese engagement across African countries to compile a more accurate composite and
comprehensive picture of China in Africa that is supported by empirical evidence.
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Most people interviewed fit an older age demographic, very few if any were less than 30 years old. The
research protocol did not request biological information, like age.
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Future Research
A perspective not adequately addressed by current literature is the position that
growing Sino-African relations can be viewed as political and economic interdependency
as a result of China’s push to establish a new international economic regime that dilutes
the influence of the West (particularly the U.S.) in the world market. The Chinese have
taken strategic steps to attract African states and have been successful in persuading them
to collude not only in dyadic arrangements but at the international institutional level.
China’s currying the favor of African states has afforded it some additional
maneuverability at the United Nations. Africans have expressed a desire to emulate
China’s quick road to development; Western industrialization has taken longer to
implement, and time is not something that most African states can afford to squander,
especially in the light of the dire state of current conditions in Africa. Mugabe’s reference
to a “Look East Policy” is perhaps the most popular of many explicit examples of African
state actors’ intentions to imitate the Chinese. Undoubtedly, increasing use of terms like
‘South-South Solidarity’, ‘mutual development and cooperation’, and the identifiable
relations of China and African states has fostered affinity between the two sides.
It is possible that China is attempting to create a new international economic
regime on the foundations of an interdependent relationship, as opposed to the dependent
relationship traditionally formed with African states. This argument builds upon the
initial arguments presented by Carmody and Owusu, who maintained that China and the
U.S. have engaged in geopolitical competition over Africa and its resources with different
end games in sight (2007). While making comparatively limited references to U.S.
objectives in Africa, the authors propose that China is endeavoring to use African states
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to reset the processes of the global economic system. They argue that Chinese short-term
stratagem intends to meet the needs of the growing domestic industry as well as the
demands of an increasingly materialistic (daresay capitalist) Chinese consumer base.
Simultaneously, Chinese long-term stratagem is to advance the industrial capacity of
African states to secure a secondary, comprehensive supply for leaner times when
Chinese industry fails to meet domestic consumer demands. This evidence of this
strategy is apparent in China’s significant investment in infrastructure in African states
(Mutukwa, 1977; Alden, 2007).
With the end of the Cold War and current U.S. involvement in two expensive
wars, China’s influence is growing as the Chinese economy flourishes. LumumbaKasongo claims that uncertainty is growing at the global level, and theories applied to
international relations fall short of addressing current events in general, and in particular,
Africa’s demand for global change (1999). With increasing globalization, the nature of
relations between states is shifting. Advances in communications and information
technology are changing the face of international relations. Chinese efforts to establish a
new economic and geo-political regime clearly indicate a need to diminish uncertainty.
International regimes are useful for reducing uncertainty, minimizing transaction costs
and preventing market failures (Keohane, 1984).
Future research can explore the position that Chinese-African relations are
developing as a result of mutual vulnerability and a growing interdependence. As defined
by Waltz, “‘interdependence’ describes a condition in which anything that happens
anywhere in the world may affect somebody, or everybody, elsewhere” (Waltz 1979,
139). Additionally, Chinese development of an interdependent relationship with Africa
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fits the neoliberal institutionalism literature on interdependence. According to Keohane
and Nye (1977), interdependence poses a situation in world politics where reciprocal
effects occur among actors from different countries. Growing Sino-African relations can
be examined using Keohane and Nye’s characterization of a complex interdependent
relationship.
Special attention needs to be paid to the role of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) Forum as the platform for multi-level, multi-focus China-African
relations. FOCAC is taking on the appearance of an international institution; it is more
than a formal organization. Institutions affect state behavior and international institutions
and regimes facilitate cooperation between sovereign power-seeking states (Keohane,
1984). FOCAC has and continues to serve as a facilitator of Sino-Africa relations. The
amalgamation of individual and collective interests has allowed for the development of
an international institution in FOCAC and an international regime made up of China and
African states. The platforms FOCAC establishes and the role it plays in promoting
partnerships between African and Chinese entities occur at all levels--from individual
market traders to government representatives and agencies. As African and Chinese
interests continue to converge and complement each other, collaboration in an
international regime can help promote and protect these interests in the global arena.
China, through FOCAC and its African foreign relations, may be attempting to
develop a new international economic regime. Collusion between African elites and
China through the development of an international regime affords all parties the
opportunity to achieve objectives that would be out of reach without the cooperation of
other states in an international regime. As Chinese ideology is not always in tune with
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that of the U.S., the current hegemon and general Western ideologies, it makes sense that
China would seek out the support of African states and other developing countries to
establish an international political economy well suited to its particular interests and
accommodating of Chinese ideologies (Keohane, 1964; Carmody and Owusu, 2007). Just
as there is significant focus on the Chinese perspective of this relationship it is also
important that future studies continue to examine in great detail the role of African states
in order to more accurately identify the global implications of this growing engagement.
Current literature on Sino-African relations, as well as this study has
demonstrated the need to pursue further systematic research into this iteration of
international relations. This study has only begun to scratch the surface of Nigeria-China
relations. There remain another 51 countries in Africa, most of whom have relations with
China that have yet to thoroughly investigated. Undoubtedly China is Africa to stay and
African states are not only permissive but are also actively engaging the Chinese. It
remains to be seen whether African states will adequately manage this new relationship
to maximize on the benefits that the Chinese opportunity presents.
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Appendix A: Abbreviations & Acronyms

AERC

African Economic Research Consortium

AfDB

African Development Bank

AU

African Union

BOI

Bank of Industry

BRIC

Brazil, Russia, India and China (identified as newly industrialized economies)

CCECC

China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation

CICIR

China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations

ECLA

United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

ECP

Emerging Capital Partners

EFCC

Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

FDI

Foreign Direct Investment

FOCAC

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GNI

Gross National Income

IGO

Inter-Governmental Organization

ITC

International Trade Centre

LCCI

Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry

MDGs

Millennium Development Goals
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MFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

₦

Naira, Nigerian currency

NAFDAC

National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control

NCBC

Nigeria-China Business Council

NEPAD

New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NEXIM

Nigerian Export-Import Bank

NICAF

Nigerian-China Friendship Association

NIIA

Nigerian Institute of International Affairs

NIPC

Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

PHCN

Power Holding Company of Nigeria

PRC

People's Republic of China

RMRDC

Raw Materials Research and Development Council

SME

Small and Medium Enterprise

SON

Standards Organization of Nigeria

UN

United Nations

UN
COMTRADE

United Nations Commodity Trade

UNCTAD

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNFPA

United Nations Population Fund

USD

US Dollars

WTO

World Trade Organization

223

Appendix B: Interview Protocol

Interview Questions for Government Officials
1. How would you characterize the nature of the relationship between your government
and China?
2. Why do you think that China is interested in engaging with your country?
3. In your own words, what have been the effects of Chinese engagement in your
country?
4. Why do you think your country is engaging with China?
5. Is there a foreign policy document issued by your government on their interaction
with China?
6. What do you think are the objectives being sought by the government and how do
you think they can be realized?
7. What has been the result so far? Do you think these objectives been met? Please
provide examples.
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Interview Questions for Business and Industry Representatives
1. As a business and industry representative, why do you think your country is interested
in engaging with China?
2. How would you characterize the nature of the relationship between your organization
and China? Do you have any trade agreements with Chinese firms?
3. Why is your organization engaging with China?
4. What are the objectives being sought by your organization and how do you plan on
realizing them?
5. What has been the result so far? Have these objectives been met? Please provide
examples.

Follow-up Questions added during Fieldwork Period:
6. What are the unique advantages that engagement with China presents?
7. What are the unique disadvantages of engagement with China?
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Appendix C: Informed Consent Form 1
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Appendix D: Informed Consent Form 2
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Appendix E: Informed Consent Form 3
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Appendix F: List of Official Interview Respondents

#
1

Name*
Lazarus
Yerima

2

Peter Ter

3

B.D. Lawal

4

Foreign
Service
Officer

5

Civil Servant

6

Banker

7

Banker

8

Civil Servant

9

Civil Servant

10

Civil Servant

11

Civil Servant

Occupation
Industrial Engineer & Entrepreneur
that works with Chinese
manufacturers and suppliers, and
also sells Nigerian semi-processed
minerals and other products to
Chinese purchasers. Also attended a
FOCAC conference.
Small Business Owner, IT software
and hardware supplier
Medium-Large Business
owner/Telecommunications Investor
Political Division, Nigerian
Embassy Washington DC,
(previously assigned to the Nigerian
Foreign Service Pacific Division
which includes China)
Deputy Director in National Agency
for Food and Drug Administration
and Control (NAFDAC)
NEXIM (Nigeria Export-Import
Bank)
NEXIM (Nigeria Export-Import
Bank)
Bilateral Relations & Public
Relations officer in National Agency
for Food and Drug Administration
and Control (NAFDAC)
Policy Specialist, Planning and
Policy Analysis division of the
Federal Ministry of Science and
Technology
Department director in the Federal
Ministry of Science and Technology

Category
Business

Associate Director, Policy &
Planning Analysis division, Federal
Ministry of Science and Technology

Date**
01/06/11

Business

01/10/11

Business

04/05/11

Government

04/06/11

Government

07/12/11

Business

07/13/11

Business

07/13/11

Government

07/14/11

Government

07/14/11

Government

07/14/11

Government

07/15/11
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#
12

Name*
Civil Servant

13

Market
Trader

14

Chibueze
Okereke

15

Market
Trader

16

Market
Trader

17

Civil Servant

18

Civil Servant

19

Civil Servant

20

Banker

21

Civil Servant

22

Market
Trader

Occupation
Recently retired, prior responsibility
in construction and policy-making in
housing and urban development
Owns 3 shops (down from 10) and
employs 8 workers in the open
market, and makes 6 trips each year
to China, Thailand and Indonesia to
buy "mother care" products, and 2
trips per year to USA and United
Kingdom. Respondent was
approached and interviewed outside
the Chinese consulate in Abuja.
Businessman/Contractor
interviewed outside the Chinese
consulate in Abuja.
Textile trader in Wuse Market who
buys drapes/curtains from China

Category
Government

Kitchen appliance trader in Wuse
Market, products sourced from
China
Director in Directorate of Technical
Co-operation in Africa (DTCA), the
Technical Aids Corps (TAC) which
sends Nigerian professionals,
teachers, doctors, judges, executives
etc to volunteer in African,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries (very similar to the US’
Peace Corps).
Bilateral Relations officer in Nigeria
Information Service
Bilateral Relations officer in Federal
Ministry of Information and
Communications
Central Bank of Nigeria (at time of
interview was 2 weeks retired from
this job)
Bilateral relations desk at the
National Planning Commission
Men's apparel trader in Wuse
Market, travels to China 3 times a
year

Date**
07/16/11

Business

07/18/11

Business

07/18/11

Business

07/18/11

Business

07/18/11

Government

07/19/11

Government

07/19/11

Government

07/19/11

Business

07/25/11

Government

07/26/11

Business

07/26/11
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#
23

Name*
Market
Trader

24

Civil Servant

25

Civil Servant

26

Economist

27

Economist

28

Market
Trader

29

Market
Trader

30

Market
Trader

31

Business
Owner
Civil Servant

32

33

Trade
Promoter/
Lobbyist

34

Civil Servant

Occupation
Women's shoes and bags and wares
trader in Wuse Market, travels to
China 4 times a year. Showed an
official invitation to China ImportExport Fair
(www.cantonfair.org.cn). Has
attended the fair 3 times, and meets
Chinese suppliers there.
Director of External Affairs, Federal
Ministry of Tourism, Culture and
National Orientation
UNESCO office in the Federal
Ministry of Tourism, Culture and
National Orientation
Former Resident Representative,
African Development Bank
Current Resident Representative,
African Development Bank
Furniture and Office equipment
trader in Wuse Market, travelled to
China twice, first time in 2010.
Travelled once to China, buys
instead from Chinatown in Lagos
due to recent visa issues
Home applicances trader, travels to
China 3-4 times a year depending on
demand. Has been travelling to
China since 2003
Medium-Large Business owner of
Door Supply Company
Bilateral Relations desk at the
Federal Ministry of Trade and
Investment
Director of the Nigeria-China
Business Council (NCBC), a private
sector organization that partners
with the Nigerian government to
organize trademissions to China and
receive trade missions from China
Department of Investor Relations at
the Nigerian Investment Promotion
Commission, a para-statal agency.

Category
Business

Date**
07/26/11

Government

07/27/11

Government

07/27/11

Other

07/27/11

Other

07/27/11

Business

07/28/11

Business

07/28/11

Business

07/28/11

Business

07/28/11

Government

07/29/11

Other

07/29/11

Government

08/10/11
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#
35

36

37

38
39

40

Name*
Foreign
Service
Officer
Chinese
national

Foreign
Service
Officer
Civil Servant
Foreign
Service
Officer
Senator

41

Financial
Investor

42

Jerry Gana

Occupation
Regional relations director at the
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Category
Government

Date**
08/11/11

Manager of a mining operation in
Business
Zamfara State. Chinese national that
has worked in Africa for over 10
years, working in many African
countries including Cote D'Ivoire,
Zambia, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Zimbabwe and South Africa,
as well as Nigeria (list of countries
is not conclusive).
Foreign service officer in the
Government
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs

08/10/11

Executive in the Nigerian
Investment Promotion Commission
Foreign service officer in the
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Government

08/12/11

Government

08/12/11

Senator in the Nigerian cabinet who
serves on the Health committee and
travelled with a delegation to China
to address issues of counterfeit
medicines from China entering
Nigerian marketplaces.
Nigerian financial investor with
some business dealings with the
Chinese as well as some exposure to
Chinese investments in the Nigerian
economy.
Previously served as the Federal
Minister for multiple ministries
incuding the Federal Ministry of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Federal Ministry of
Information and Communications.
Now works in the private sector.

Government

08/12/11

Business

08/13/11

Government/
Business

08/13/11

08/11/11

232

#
43

Name*
Business
Consultant

44

Academic

45

Salesperson

46

Salesperson

47

Salesperson

Occupation
Nigerian national that attended
university in China and studied
Chinese, works as a liason for
Nigerian and Chinese companies,
offering translation services among
others. An independent contractor
that works on a short-term contract
basis, often travelling to China for
work projects.
Academic at the Nigerian Institute
of International Affairs (NIIA).
Interviewed in a panel discussion
format with other academics.
Independent contractor for a
Chinese supplier of acupuncture
equipment that uses a tianshi format
similar to a pyramid scheme where
the salespersons are paid by
commission with bonuses for
milestones reached as well as for
new salepeople brought to the
company.
Independent contractor for a
Chinese supplier of acupuncture
equipment that uses a tianshi format
similar to a pyramid scheme where
the salespersons are paid by
commission with bonuses for
milestones reached as well as for
new salepeople brought to the
company.
Independent contractor for a
Chinese supplier of acupuncture
equipment that uses a tianshi format
similar to a pyramid scheme where
the salespersons are paid by
commission with bonuses for
milestones reached as well as for
new salepeople brought to the
company.

Category
Business

Date**
08/14/11

Academic

08/16/11

Business

08/11/11

Business

08/12/11

Business

08/12/11
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#
48

Name*
Salesperson

49

Salesperson

50

Academic

51

Academic

52

Trade
Promoter/
Lobbyist

53

Academic

54

Salesman

55

Academic

Occupation
Independent contractor for a
Chinese supplier of acupuncture
equipment that uses a tianshi format
similar to a pyramid scheme where
the salespersons are paid by
commission with bonuses for
milestones reached as well as for
new salepeople brought to the
company.
Independent contractor for a
Chinese supplier of acupuncture
equipment that uses a tianshi format
similar to a pyramid scheme where
the salespersons are paid by
commission with bonuses for
milestones reached as well as for
new salepeople brought to the
company.
Academic at the Nigerian Institute
of International Affairs (NIIA).
Interviewed in a panel discussion
format with other academics.
Academic at the Nigerian Institute
of International Affairs (NIIA).
Recently returned from completing a
doctorate degreee in China.
Executive at the Nigerian
Association of Chambers of
Commerce, Industry, Mines and
Agriculture (NACCIMA) in Lagos.
Academic at the Nigerian Institute
of International Affairs (NIIA).
Interviewed in a panel discussion
format with other academics.
Nigerian employed by Chinese
company that sells automated
banking machinery.
Academic at the Nigerian Institute
of International Affairs (NIIA).
Interviewed in a panel discussion
format with other academics.

Category
Business

Date**
08/12/11

Business

08/12/11

Academic

08/16/11

Academic

08/16/11

Business

08/17/11

Academic

08/16/11

Business

08/13/11

Academic

08/16/11

234

#
56

Name*
Academic

57

Academic

58

Pat Utomi

59

Ambassador
Victor
Chibundu

60
61

Banker
Chinese
national

62

Chief Ojo
Maduekwe

Occupation
Academic at the Nigerian Institute
of International Affairs (NIIA).
Interviewed in a panel discussion
format with other academics.
Academic at the Nigerian Institute
of International Affairs (NIIA).
Interviewed in a panel discussion
format with other academics.
Published Nigerian scholar and
politician with a backgrounds in
economics and development and
business owner with dealings with
China.
Founder and chief executive of the
Nigeria-China Friendship
Association (NICAF). Respondent
was a former Nigerian ambassador
to China and established
organization to help promote private
non-government relationships
between Chinese and Nigerian
entitities.
Bank of Industry (Nigeria).
Chinese national just arrived in
Nigeria to work as a manager for a
Tianshi project that contracts with
independent Nigerian salespersons
to sell acupuncture machines. First
time out of China and first time in
Africa.
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
current Nigerian Ambassador to
Canada

Category
Academic

Date**
08/16/11

Academic

08/16/11

Academic/
Business

08/17/11

Other

08/18/11

Business
Business

08/18/11
08/19/11

Government

08/20/11

* Names are provided where permitted by interview respondents according to IRB
regulations and informed consent form.
** *Interview dates do not follow chronological order as the interviews are listed in
numerical fashion based on order of informed consent forms signatures.
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Appendix G: China’s Africa Policy Document
China's African Policy
2006/09/20

China's African Policy

January 2006
Foreword
The first few years of the new century witness a continuation of complex and profound changes in the
international situation and further advance of globalization. Peace and development remain the main themes
of our times. Safeguarding peace, promoting development and enhancing cooperation, which is the common
desire of all peoples, represents the irresistible historical trend. On the other hand, destabilizing factors and
uncertainties in the international situation are on the rise. Security issues of various kinds are interwoven.
Peace remains evasive and development more pressing.
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China, the largest developing country in the world, follows the path of peaceful development and pursues an
independent foreign policy of peace. China stands ready to develop friendly relations and cooperation with
all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence so as to contribute to peace,
stability and common prosperity around the world.
The African continent, which encompasses the largest number of developing countries, is an important force
for world peace and development. China-Africa traditional friendly relations face fresh opportunities under
the new circumstances. By this African Policy Paper, the Chinese Government wishes to present to the
world the objectives of China's policy towards Africa and the measures to achieve them, and its proposals
for cooperation in various fields in the coming years, with a view to promoting the steady growth of ChinaAfrica relations in the long term and bringing the mutually-beneficial cooperation to a new stage.
Part I:

Africa's Position and Role
Africa has a long history, vast expanse of land, rich natural resources and huge potential for development.
After long years of struggle, the African people freed themselves from colonial rule, wiped out apartheid,
won independence and emancipation, thus making significant contribution to the progress of civilization.
Following their independence, countries in Africa have been conscientiously exploring a road to
development suited to their national conditions and seeking peace, stability and development by joint efforts.
Thanks to the concerted efforts of African countries and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/the African
Union (AU), the political situation in Africa has been stable on the whole, regional conflicts are being
gradually resolved and economy has been growing for years. The NEPAD has drawn up an encouraging
picture of African rejuvenation and development. African countries have actively participated in the SouthSouth cooperation and worked for the North-South dialogue. They are playing an increasingly important role
in international affairs.
Africa still faces many challenges on its road of development. However, with the persistent efforts of African
countries and the continuous support of the international community, Africa will surely surmount difficulties
and achieve rejuvenation in the new century.
Part II:

China's Relations with Africa
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China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange. Sharing similar historical experience,
China and Africa have all along sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle for national
liberation and forged a profound friendship.
The founding of the People's Republic of China and the independence of African countries ushered in a new
era in China-Africa relations. For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close political ties and
frequent exchange of high-level visits and people-to-people contacts. Our bilateral trade and economic
cooperation have grown rapidly; cooperation in other fields has yielded good results; and consultation and
coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has provided assistance to the best of its
ability to African countries, while African countries have also rendered strong support to China on many
occasions.
Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development-these are the principles guiding
China-Africa exchange and cooperation and the driving force to lasting China-Africa relations.
Part III:

China's African Policy
Enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries has always been an important component of
China's independent foreign policy of peace. China will unswervingly carry forward the tradition of ChinaAfrica friendship, and, proceeding from the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and African peoples,
establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa, featuring political equality and mutual
trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. The general principles and objectives of China's
African policy are as follows:
- Sincerity, friendship and equality. China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects
African countries' independent choice of the road of development and supports African countries' efforts to
grow stronger through unity.
- Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. China supports African countries' endeavor for
economic development and nation building, carries out cooperation in various forms in the economic and
social development, and promotes common prosperity of China and Africa.
- Mutual support and close coordination. China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the UN and other
multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to
appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and
development in Africa.
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- Learning from each other and seeking common development. China and Africa will learn from and draw
upon each other's experience in governance and development, strengthen exchange and cooperation in
education, science, culture and health. Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance capacity building,
China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development.
The one China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and development of China's
relations with African countries and regional organizations. The Chinese Government appreciates the fact
that the overwhelming majority of African countries abide by the one China principle, refuse to have official
relations and contacts with Taiwan and support China's great cause of reunification. China stands ready to
establish and develop state-to-state relations with countries that have not yet established diplomatic ties with
China on the basis of the one China principle.
Part IV

Enhancing All-round Cooperation Between China and Africa
1. The political field
(1) High-level visits
China will maintain the momentum of mutual visits and dialogues between Chinese and African leaders, with
a view to facilitating communication, deepening friendship and promoting mutual understanding and trust.
(2) Exchanges between legislative bodies
China favors increased multi-level and multi-channel friendly exchanges on the basis of mutual respect
between China's National People's Congress (NPC) on the one hand and parliaments of African countries
and the Pan-African Parliament of the AU on the other, for the purpose of deepening understanding and
cooperation.
(3) Exchanges between political parties
The Communist Party of China (CPC) develops exchanges of various forms with friendly political parties and
organizations of African countries on the basis of the principles of independence, equality, mutual respect
and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The purpose of such exchanges is to increase
understanding and friendship and seek trust and cooperation.
(4) Consultation mechanisms
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Mechanisms such as national bilateral committees between China and African countries, political
consultation between foreign ministries, joint(mixed) committees on trade and economic cooperation and
mixed committees on science and technology should be established and improved, so as to institutionalize
dialogue and consultation in a flexible and pragmatic manner.
(5) Cooperation in international affairs
China will continue to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with African countries on the international arena,
conduct regular exchange of views, coordinate positions on major international and regional issues and
stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity
and human rights. China supports African nations' desire to be an equal partner in international affairs.
China is devoted, as are African nations, to making the UN play a greater role, defending the purposes and
principles of the UN Charter, establishing a new international political and economic order featuring justice,
rationality, equality and mutual benefit, promoting more democratic international relationship and rule of law
in international affairs and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.
(6) Exchanges between local governments
China's Central Government attaches importance to the exchanges between local governments of China
and African countries, vigorously supports twin province/state and twin city relationship aimed at facilitating
bilateral exchanges and cooperation in local development and administration.
2. The economic field
(1) Trade
The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to facilitate African commodities' access to
Chinese market and fulfill its promise to grant duty-free treatment to some goods from the least developed
African countries, with a view to expanding and balancing bilateral trade and optimizing trade structure. It
intends to settle trade disputes and frictions properly through bilateral or multilateral friendly consultation,
mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Efforts will be made to encourage business communities
on both sides to set up China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry. When conditions are ripe,
China is willing to negotiate Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with African countries and African regional
organizations.
(2) Investment
The Chinese Government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises' investment and business in Africa,
and will continue to provide preferential loans and buyer credits to this end. The Chinese Government is
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ready to explore new channels and new ways for promoting investment cooperation with African countries,
and will continue to formulate and improve relevant policies, provide guidance and service and offer
convenience. African countries are welcome to make investment in China. The Chinese Government will
continue to negotiate, conclude and implement the Agreement on Bilateral Facilitation and Protection of
Investment and the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation with African Countries. The two sides
should work together to create a favorable environment for investment and cooperation and protect the
legitimate rights and interests of investors from both sides.
(3) Financial cooperation
To further develop China-Africa cooperation in the area of finance, the Chinese Government will support the
effort of Chinese financial institutions to increase exchanges and cooperation with their counterparts in
African countries as well as regional financial institutions in Africa.
(4) Agricultural cooperation
China intends to further promote its agricultural cooperation and exchanges with African nations at various
levels, through multiple channels and in various forms. Focus will be laid on the cooperation in land
development, agricultural plantation, breeding technologies, food security, agricultural machinery and the
processing of agricultural and side-line products. China will intensify cooperation in agricultural technology,
organize training courses of practical agricultural technologies, carry out experimental and demonstrative
agricultural technology projects in Africa and speed up the formulation of China-Africa Agricultural
Cooperation Program.
(5) Infrastructure
The Chinese Government will step up China-Africa cooperation in transportation, communication, water
conservancy, electricity and other infrastructures. It will vigorously encourage Chinese enterprises to
participate in the building of infrastructure in African countries, scale up their contracts, and gradually
establish multilateral and bilateral mechanisms on contractual projects. Efforts will be made to strengthen
technology and management cooperation, focusing on the capacity-building of African nations.
(6) Resources cooperation
The Chinese Government facilitates information sharing and cooperation with Africa in resources areas. It
encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to cooperate with African nations in various ways
on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit and common development, to develop and exploit rationally
their resources, with a view to helping African countries to translate their advantages in resources to
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competitive strength, and realize sustainable development in their own countries and the continent as a
whole.
(7) Tourism cooperation
China will implement the program of Chinese citizens' group tour to some African nations and, grant more
African countries, as they wish and as far as feasible, Approved Destination Status for out-bound Chinese
tourist groups. China welcomes citizens from African nations for a tour of the country.
(8) Debt reduction and relief
China is ready to continue friendly consultation with some African countries with a view to seek solution to,
or reduction of, the debts they owe to China. It will urge the international community, developed countries in
particular, to take more substantial action on the issue of debt reduction and relief for African nations.
(9) Economic assistance
In light of its own financial capacity and economic situation, China will do its best to provide and gradually
increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached.
(10) Multilateral cooperation
China is ready to enhance consultation and coordination with Africa within multilateral trade systems and
financial institutions and work together to urge the UN and other international organizations to pay more
attention to the question of economic development, promote South-South cooperation, push forward the
establishment of a just and rational multilateral trade system and make the voices of developing countries
heard in the decision-making of international financial affairs. It will step up cooperation with other countries
and international organizations to support the development of Africa and help realize Millennium
Development Goals in Africa.
3. Education, science, culture, health and social aspects
(1) Cooperation in human resources development and education
The Chinese Government will give full play to the role of its "African Human Resources Development
Foundation" in training African personnel. It will identify priority areas, expand areas of cooperation and
provide more input according to the needs of African countries so as to achieve greater results.
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Exchange of students between China and Africa will continue. China will increase the number of government
scholarships as it sees fit, continue to send teachers to help African countries in Chinese language teaching
and carry out educational assistance project to help develop Africa's weak disciplines. It intends to
strengthen cooperation in such fields as vocational education and distance learning while encouraging
exchanges and cooperation between educational and academic institutions of both sides.
(2) Science and technology cooperation
Following the principles of mutual respect, complementarity and sharing benefits, China will promote its
cooperation with Africa in the fields of applied research, technological development and transfer, speed up
scientific and technological cooperation in the fields of common interest, such as bio-agriculture, solar
energy utilization, geological survey, mining and R&D of new medicines. It will continue its training programs
in applied technologies for African countries, carry out demonstration programs of technical assistance, and
actively help disseminate and utilize Chinese scientific and technological achievements and advanced
technologies applicable in Africa.
(3) Cultural exchanges
China will implement agreements of cultural cooperation and relevant implementation plans reached with
African countries, maintain regular contacts with their cultural departments and increase exchanges of artists
and athletes. It will guide and promote cultural exchanges in diverse forms between people's organizations
and institutions in line with bilateral cultural exchange programs and market demand.
(4) Medical and health cooperation
China is ready to enhance medical personnel and information exchange with Africa. It will continue to send
medical teams and provide medicines and medical materials to African countries, and help them establish
and improve medical facilities and train medical personnel. China will increase its exchanges and
cooperation with African countries in the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS
and malaria and other diseases, research and application of traditional medicine and experience concerning
mechanism for public health emergencies.
(5) Media cooperation
China wishes to encourage multi-tiered and multi-formed exchange and cooperation between the media on
both sides, so as to enhance mutual understanding and enable objective and balanced media coverage of
each other. It will facilitate the communication and contacts between relevant government departments for
the purpose of sharing experiences on ways to handle the relations with media both domestic and foreign,
and guiding and facilitating media exchanges.
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(6) Administrative cooperation
China will carry out exchange and cooperation with African countries in civil service system building, public
administration reform and training of government personnel. The two sides may study the feasibility of
setting up a mechanism for personnel and administrative cooperation.
(7) Consular cooperation
China will hold regular/irregular consular consultations with African countries during which the two sides may
have amicable discussions on urgent problems or questions of common interest in bilateral or multilateral
consular relations in order to improve understanding and expand cooperation. The Chinese side will work
with Africa to facilitate personnel flow and ensure the safety of their nationals.
(8) People-to-people exchange
China will encourage and facilitate the exchanges between people's organizations of China and Africa,
especially the youth and women, with a view to increasing the understanding, trust and cooperation of
people on both sides. It will encourage and guide Chinese volunteers to serve in African countries.
(9) Environmental cooperation
China will actively promote China-Africa cooperation in climate change, water resources conservation, antidesertification, bio-diversity and other areas of environmental protection by facilitating technological
exchange.
(10) Disaster reduction, relief and humanitarian assistance
China will actively carry out personnel exchange, training and technological cooperation in the fields of
disaster reduction and relief. It will respond quickly to African countries' request for urgent humanitarian aid,
encourage and support exchange and cooperation between the Red Cross Society of China and other
NGOs on the one side and their African counterparts on the other side.
4. Peace and security
(1) Military cooperation
China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out militaryrelated technological exchanges and cooperation. It will continue to help train African military personnel and
support defense and army building of African countries for their own security.
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(2) Conflict settlement and peacekeeping operations
China supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organizations and African countries
concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within our own capacity. It will urge the UN
Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa. It will continue its support to
and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.
(3) Judicial and police cooperation
China is prepared to promote exchange and cooperation between Chinese and African judicial and law
enforcement departments. The two sides may learn from each other in legal system building and judicial
reform so as to be better able to prevent, investigate and crack down on crimes. China will work together
with African countries to combat transnational organized crimes and corruption, and intensify cooperation on
matters concerning judicial assistance, extradition and repatriation of criminal suspects.
China will cooperate closely with immigration departments of African countries in tackling the problem of
illegal migration, improve exchange of immigration control information and set up an unimpeded and efficient
channel for intelligence and information exchange.
(4) Non-traditional security areas
In order to enhance the ability of both sides to address non-traditional security threats, it is necessary to
increase intelligence exchange, explore more effective ways and means for closer cooperation in combating
terrorism, small arms smuggling, drug trafficking, transnational economic crimes, etc.
Part V:

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and Its Follow-up Actions
Launched in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has become an effective mechanism for the
collective dialogue and multilateral cooperation between China and Africa and put in place an important
framework and platform for a new type of China-Africa partnership featuring long-term stability, equality and
mutual benefit.
China attaches importance to the positive role of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in strengthening
political consultation and pragmatic cooperation between China and Africa, and stands ready to work with
African countries to conscientiously implement the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation, the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development and the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation-Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006) and its follow-up action plans.
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China will work with African countries within the framework of the Forum to explore new ways to enhance
mutual political trust, promote the comprehensive development of pragmatic cooperation, further improve
the mechanism of the forum, and try to find the best way for furthering cooperation between the Forum and
the NEPAD.
Part VI:
China's Relations with African Regional Organizations
China appreciates the significant role of the AU in safeguarding peace and stability in the region and
promoting African solidarity and development. China values its friendly cooperation with the AU in all fields,
supports its positive role in regional and international affairs and stands ready to provide the AU assistance
to the best of its capacity.
China appreciates and supports the positive role of Africa's sub-regional organizations in promoting political
stability, economic development and integration in their own regions and stands ready to enhance its
amicable cooperation with those organizations.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China Copyright@2004
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Appendix H: Egyptian President Mubarak’s Ten Principles of Africa-China Cooperation
(11/10/2009)

The Egyptian president Mubarak addressed the Fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference
on November 8. He put forward the ten principles of deepening the Africa-China
cooperation and realizing the sustainable development.
I.

Reiterate the principle of sticking to the equal treatment, sincere cooperation,
mutual benefit and win-win progress, which was established when the FOCAC
was just founded;

II.

Go on to promote the dialogue and consultation on Africa-China cooperation,
strengthen the coordination of the both sides’ stands and protect the mutual
benefits of African and Chinese peoples;

III.

Strengthen the bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation, support the efforts
of realizing peace and stabilization in the African continent, which is the
foundation of realizing the all-around development of African countries;

IV.

Africa and China make joint efforts to consolidate the consciousness of
democracy in the international relations, and combat the double standard
practiced in the political and economic field;

V.

Change the marginalization of Africa and the developing countries in the current
international policy making system, demand more rights to participate in the
world economic and financial organizations and groups, especially in Group of
Eight (G8) and Group of Twenty (G20), so as to guarantee the effective
participation of Africa and the developing countries in instituting new economic
and trade systems.

VI.

The developed countries should bear the responsibility of the current economic
and financial crisis so it is necessary for them to keep the promise to eliminate the
effect of the crisis on African countries, strengthen the capability of realizing
development, eliminating poverty, and especially guaranteeing grain security;

VII.

Call for common efforts to end the Doha Round negotiation at the earliest time,
develop along the direction of bringing beneficial to African countries and ending
the trade protection policies taken by the developed countries, especially those of
targeting the merchandise and agricultural products exported from African
countries.
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VIII.

Stress that the development partners must realize their promises to reduce the debt
of African countries and increase official aids or direct investment in Africa.
These are all the promises made by the developed countries many years ago,
which still remain to be performed to help with the implementation of Africa
development programs and realize the United Nations Millennium Development
Goals;

IX.

Insist that Africa is eligible to get the necessary aid in technology and funding to
fight the effect caused by the climate changes. African countries have been mostly
affected, though they are not the principal contributors to the climate changes. He
stresses that the advanced industrial countries should follow the promise of
reducing emission of green house gases and wishes that a fair and balanced
initiative be concluded at the Copenhagen Climate Conference which will be held
in the next month to support the capability of African countries to fight the effect
of climate change and solve the problems of desertification, draught [sic] and
flood hazard that some African countries are facing.

The Fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference was held in the coastal city Sharm El Sheikh,
Egypt on November 8-9, with nearly a hundred ministerial-level officials form 49
African countries including China attending the conference.
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Appendix I: Joint Communiqué Between the People's Republic of China and the Federal
Republic of Nigeria
Abuja, 15 April 2002)

At the invitation of President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of China paid a state visit to Nigeria from
14 to 16 April, 2002.
During the visit the two leaders discussed a wide range of issues, including the
furtherance of bilateral relations ad well as regional and international issues of common
interest. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the results of the visit.
1. The two sides expressed satisfaction with the progress achieved so far in their
friendly relations and cooperation which are anchored on the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence over the past 31 years since their establishment of
diplomatic ties. The two sides reaffirmed as the basic principle guiding ChinaNigeria relations in the 21st Century, the four-point agreement reached by the two
Presidents during President Obasanjo's visit to China in August 2001. These
include sincere friendship and mutual trust, mutual benefit and common
development, enhanced consultation and mutual support, and commitment to a
long-term perspective and a future-oriented relationship. The two sides also
reaffirmed their determination to build on past achievements while working
together to push the existing friendly relations to greater heights.
2. The two sides share the view that China-Nigeria bilateral cooperation in trade and
economic activities with its huge potentials, remains a powerful driving force
behind the development of China-Nigeria relations. They resolved to work
together to further develop the cooperation in these areas. While implementing
conscientiously the economic cooperation and trade agreements already signed,
the two governments pledged to continue to encourage their companies and
enterprises to step up exchanges and cooperation and create conditions to
facilitate trade and investment between them. The two sides stressed the
significance of mutual cooperation in oil and natural gas ventures and their
readiness to encourage and support active participation of Chinese enterprises in
Nigeria's energy development projects.
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3. Both sides expressed their readiness to encourage their enterprises to carry out
cooperation in the areas of infrastructural development including the railways.
4. Both sides expressed their willingness to facilitate China-Nigeria cooperation in
defence science, technology and industry.
5. On agriculture, the Chinese side reiterated its readiness to assist Nigeria develop
its massive agricultural potentials, especially in the area of production of rice and
other grains.
6. On international issues, the two sides agreed that China and Nigeria share
extensive interests in maintaining world peace, facilitating the establishment of a
just and equitable new international political and economic order, strengthening
South-South cooperation and promoting the cause of universal prosperity, and
that they have an important role to play in these endeavors. They expressed their
readiness for continuous and enhanced consultation and cooperation in
international affairs.
7. Both sides expressed unflinching support for each other's efforts to safeguard
national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. While are Chinese
side values and appreciates the role of Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, in
regional and continental matters, the Nigerian side reiterates the one-China policy
that there is but one China in the world, the Government of the People's Republic
of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China, and
Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory, and that Nigeria will only enter
into private sector led trade and economic relations with Taiwan.
8. Both sides expressed concern over the new challenges to developing countries
brought about by globalization and urge the international community to adopt
positive measures to ensure the economic security of developing countries by
enhancing their developmental capacity.
9. The two sides emphasized the important role of the United Nations in the
maintenance of international peace and security and promoting global economic
and social progress, a role no other international organisations could replace. Both
sides are however in favour of reforms of the United Nations in such a way that
the demand by its member states for democratisation of international relations
would be met and that the organisation would more effectively fulfill its mandate
under the UN Charter. In this connection, China supports greater representation of
African States in the Security Council.
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10. Both sides condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and firmly
support the international community in using every lawful means to fight the
scourge. Both sides maintain that in combating terrorism, efforts should be made
to address both its root cause and symptoms, and while international cooperation
should be strengthened, the leading role of the UN and its Security Council should
be further reinforced.
11. The two sides viewed the pursuit of peace, stability and development, as well as
the settlement of regional conflicts and eradication of poverty, as pressing
problems facing African countries. The Chinese Government supports the African
Union and other sub-regional organisations in Africa and believes they can be
utilised to achieve peace and stability and promote the integration in Africa. The
Chinese side supports the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD),
and expressed the willingness to work together with the international community
to assist Africa in more concrete and effective ways to achieve sustainable
economic development.
12. On the cooperation between China and Africa generally, and particularly the
China-Africa Cooperation Forum and Mechanism, the two sides also expressed
their readiness to implement the follow-up actions of the Forum through enhanced
consultation and coordination, so as to contribute to the new partnership between
China and Africa featuring long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit.
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Appendix J: Joint Press Communiqué between the Government of the People's Republic
of China and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
(Beijing, 28 February 2008)

At the invitation of President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China,
President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua of the Federal Republic of Nigeria paid a state visit to
the People's Republic of China from 27 February to 1 March 2008. President Yar'Adua
and his entourage were warmly received by the government and people of China.
During the visit, the two Presidents reviewed the sound growth of China-Nigeria
relations since the establishment of diplomatic relations. They expressed satisfaction at
the evolving strategic partnership and the momentum of the ties between their two
countries in recent years, and decided to step up consultation between the two
governments by launching a strategic dialogue in due course to promote the in-depth
growth of bilateral relations.
The two leaders acknowledged the steady rise in the volume of trade, economic
and technical cooperation between the two countries and pledged to further deepen and
expand their mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation. They agreed to promptly hold
meetings of the joint commission between the two countries to take stock of
achievements in bilateral trade and economic cooperation and plan future cooperation.
President Hu Jintao pledged China's support for President Yar'Adua's programme
of economic and social transformation of Nigeria as reflected in the Seven Point Agenda.
On his part, President Yar'Adua applauded the remarkable achievements China has made
in economic and social development and reaffirmed Nigeria's commitment to the oneChina policy.
The two Presidents reviewed developments in Africa and stressed the vital
importance of enduring peace and stability to the progress and prosperity of the continent.
The Chinese side hailed Nigeria's long-standing role in the cause of peace in Africa and
the Nigerian side applauded the contribution made by China in support of the efforts of
the African Union in the peaceful resolution of conflict situations in Africa. In this
regard, the two leaders called for greater support of the international community to
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facilitate the early deployment of the African Union-United Nations hybrid peacekeeping
force in Darfur.
The Presidents underscored the essential nature of Africa-China cooperation.
They reiterated that the two sides will continue to work to advance the new type of
China-Africa strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic
win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges and mutual learning, and expressed the view
that the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the policy measures the
Chinese Government adopted to strengthen pragmatic cooperation with Africa have
provided a viable framework and strong support for promoting the mutually beneficial
cooperation between China and Africa.
President Hu Jintao and President Yar'Adua agreed to maintain regular contacts
between Nigeria and China. The two leaders affirmed that such consultations and
dialogue at the highest level were imperative at this time when the two countries seek to
continue to play a positive role in regional and global affairs.
At the conclusion of the discussions, President Yar'Adua extended an invitation to
President Hu Jintao to undertake a state visit to Nigeria. President Hu expressed thanks to
President Yar'Adua for the invitation.
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Appendix K: Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in Economic and Social
Development from 1st FOCAC conference
2000/11/17

The Forum on China-Africa Co-operation - Ministerial Conference 2000 was held in
Beijing, China from 10 to 12 October 2000. Ministers from China and 44 African
countries exchanged views and are convinced of the imperatives for a dynamic, new
strategic partnership between Africa and the PRC. The Ministers commit themselves to
co-operating in all fields, especially social and economic development, on the basis of
equality and mutual respect with a view to renewing, developing and expanding ChinaAfrica co-operation in the 21st century.

1. Foreword
1.1 The Ministers reviewed with satisfaction the results of the co-operation between
China and African countries over the past 50 years. The Ministers believe that such cooperation, not only directly benefits their peoples, but also enhances friendship and
mutual understanding. The Ministers note that China and African countries have made
great efforts in recent years to explore new forms of co-operation, particularly between
enterprises. They, however, note that both Africa and China still have great potential,
which should be properly managed and strategically directed for their mutual benefit.
1.2 The Ministers also agree that, in view of the present unjust and inequitable world
order. China and African countries should position themselves to influence the
establishment of a new world order which will reflect their needs and interests. To this
end, they agree to adopt a workable programme towards the creation of a new strategic
partnership for sustainable development in the 21st century.
1.3 The Ministers further observe that globalization currently presents more challenges
and risks than opportunities to the vast number of developing countries and therefore
express their determination to strengthen the existing co-operation between China and
African countries in all fields. They also agree to earnestly explore new ideas and
strategies to develop their respective economics and enhance their capabilities to
participate in globalization.
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1.4 In pursuit of the foregoing objectives the Ministers reiterate that China and African
countries will honor the following principles of co-operation for their future
development:
1.4.1 equality and mutual benefit
1.4.2 diversity in form and content
1.4.3 emphasis on practical results
1.4.4 pursuit of common progress
1.4.5 amicable settlement of differences
2. Inter-governmental Co-operation
2.1 The Ministers maintain that the two sides should use and improve the existing
bilateral consultation mechanisms to strengthen inter-governmental links, explore new
areas of co-operation, closely monitor the progress in their existing co-operation and
share experiences in order to enhance their mutually beneficial partnership. In light of the
development and changes in their bilateral economic and trade relations, the two sides
agree to continue to review and conclude agreements as necessary, with a view to
encouraging preferential market access for products from African countries into China.
2.2 The Ministers agree to promote the exchange of high-level visits and conduct regular
inter-governmental dialogue and co-operation, so as to create a favorable climate for
business contacts and trade between China and Africa. In addition, they undertake to
promote positive interaction with relevant trade and commercial organizations and assist
in the establishment of effective communication links between such organizations in
China and Africa, in order to ensure that they play an active role in the development of
our economies.
2.3 The Chinese government undertakes to continue to co-operate with and provide
development assistance to African countries, focusing on the promotion of local
industries, sourcing of local materials and the creation of employment. Such development
assistance should support national policies of African countries and be awarded in
consultation with national governments. Projects will be aimed at the utilization of local
expertise and materials, the creation of local employment and the development of human
resources of African countries.
2.4 To support African countries in their economic and social development, the Chinese
side undertakes to continue providing assistance to African countries, within its capacity,
in light of specific economic conditions of the recipient countries and within the
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framework of South-South co-operation. This support will mainly take the form of aid
grants, concessional loans and interest-free loans to be mainly used in areas determined
by both sides.
3. Trade and Investment
3.1 The Ministers acknowledge progress in the area of trade and investment promotion
and express their readiness to develop a strategy by creating an enabling legal and
business environment, so that such co-operation will gradually play a leading role in the
China-Africa economic partnership.
3.2 The Ministers agree to conclude an appropriate legal framework on:
3.2.1 trade promotion and capacity building;
3.2.2 encouragement, protection and guarantee of investments;
3.2.3 avoidance of double taxation;
3.2.4 enhancement of co-operation in marine shipping and air transportation
3.3 The Ministers agree to undertake joint efforts to improve trade and investment
environment through such measures as granting each other preferential treatment in
conformity with existing national laws, equitable treatment to all investors together with
investment guarantees and just settlement of eventual disputes, in accordance with
internationally accepted rules and practices.
4. Trade
4.1 The Ministers note the necessity to move towards balanced and enhanced trade and
acknowledge the need to assist in improving the production capacity in Africa and in
diversifying the composition of African exports. They pledge to collaborate and share
experience in overcoming Africa's export dependence on primary commodities, single
products and raw materials.
4.2 The Ministers stress the need to harmonize their trade policies and to participate
actively in trade negotiations, including within the framework of the WTO, in order to
ensure that the multilateral trading system contributes to enhanced competitiveness,
economic growth and sustainable development of their countries.
4.3 The Ministers express the readiness of their business communities to vigorously
explore and benefit from all opportunities offered by their respective markets, in an
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enterprising spirit, while complying with internationally accepted norms and quality
standards in their exported products.
4.4 Noting with concern the imbalance in the two-way trade and the need to address it as
soon as possible, the Chinese side undertakes to:
4.4.1 encourage its enterprises to give preference to the import of African products in the
light of market demand and conditions;
4.4.2 strive to make its investment and trade centers in Africa a success, and to facilitate
the establishment of similar centers of African countries in China, so that these centers
will play an effective bridging role in facilitating exchanges and communications
between enterprises of the two sides;
4.4.3 establish a China-Africa Joint Business Council in co-ordination with the Chambers
of Commerce of African countries and professional organizations, so as to put in place a
dialogue and consultation mechanism with African enterprises and promote economic cooperation and trade between them; and
4.4.4 establish a China-Africa Products Exhibition Center in China to promote two-way
trade and facilitate access for African products to the Chinese market.
4.5 The Ministers state importance of providing better and preferential access to the
Chinese market for African exports of commercial importance.
4.6 The Ministers agree to ensure better access to each other's market, in the context of
multilateral trade liberalization and progress made with due regard to regional integration
arrangements in Africa.
5. Investment
5.1 The Ministers pledge to encourage mutual investment by their enterprises, the
exchange of experience in business management, the setting up of joint ventures or sole
ownership enterprises, including small or medium ones and the establishment of joint
business for a, as key factors in the China-Africa economic partnership.
5.2 The Chinese side will set aside special funds to support and encourage investment by
well-established Chinese enterprises in African countries to set up joint equity or cooperation projects adapted to local need in terms of job creation and transfer of
technologies.
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5.3 The Chinese side agrees to share with African countries its experience in the field of
investment promotion relating to the establishment and management of free and special
economic zones.
5.4 The Minister agree to identify their complementarities in order to invest in common
projects through bilateral and/or trilateral co-operation channels.
5.5 They agree that the Joint Business Council to be established between their
public/private seetors will be aimed at organizing regular business meetings among their
economic operators and professional organizations as well as training seminars on doing
business with special focus on their market specific aspects.
5.6 The Minister express their readiness to develop further, as necessary, the finance
schemes needed to implement mutual investment and economic partnership between
China and Africa.
6. Co-operation in Engineering and Other Infrastructural Projects
6.1 The Minister positively appraise the co-operation between the two sides in
engineering projects in African countries. The Chinese side will continue to encourage
well-established Chinese enterprises to participate in economic and infrastructure
construction and development projects in African countries. It also expresses its readiness
to make available its modern and appropriate technologies, as well as managerial
expertise, in various areas such as engineering contracting, technical and management cooperation. It will also encourage these enterprises to enhance co-operation with their
counterparts in Africa and employ, as well as train more local people, including the usage
of locally available resources. In such co-operation, the Chinese side may also consider
accepting various forms of payment such as payment in kind, to ease African countries'
financial burden and help increase their export to China.
7. Financial Co-operation
7.1 Noting that co-operation between financial institutions of China and African countries
has just started, the Ministers express their determination to encourage them to
vigorously look into the possibility of co-operation in such forms as parallel and cofinancing arrangement. They believe that it is imperative to continue to enhance financial
co-operation between China and the African Development Bank Group (ADB), the
Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTA) and other multilateral
financial institutions in Africa, in particular to implement the bilateral agreement on
technical co-operation concluded between China and the ADB.
8. Debt Relief and Cancellation
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8.1 The Ministers note with concern that the heavy debt burden not only seriously
hampers the economic growth of African countries, but also causes worsening social
problems. They welcome the international efforts for debt relief or cancellation over the
past few years and call on developed countries and international financial institutions that
are main creditors to fulfil their commitments at an early date. The momentum on debt
relief over the past years must be maintained and developed.
8.2 The Chinese side notes that African debt to China does not constitute the bulk of the
continent's debt stock and that China is herself a developing country and a net debtor.
Notwithstanding this, the Chinese side expresses its readiness to help relieve the debt
burden of African countries. In this connection, the Chinese side undertakes to reduce or
cancel debt amounting to 10 billion RMB yuan owed by the heavily indebted poor
countries and least developed countries in Africa in the coming two year. The details will
be discussed through bilateral channels.
8.3 The Ministers recognize that China, as a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council, is a significant partner in developing support around the issue of debt
relief for Africa.
9. Tourism
9.1 The Ministers acknowledge that tourism is an important economic activity which has
the potential for generation financial resources that will help Africa's accelerated
economic growth, the creation of employment opportunities and the alleviation of
poverty. They agree to co-operate in promoting tourism and undertake to encourage
investment in the development of tourism infrastructure and capacity, with specific focus
on the development of small, micro and medium enterprises.
10. Migration
10.1 The Ministers agree that their respective governments will facilitate the processing
of applications for work permits and visas, in line with the existing legislation and policy
pertaining to migration, and that deficiencies will be addressed within the framework of
bilateral agreements.
11. Agricultural Co-operation
11.1 The Ministers express their readiness to share their respective countries' experience
in various fields of agricultural development and fisheries.
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11.2 Realizing the vital importance of agricultural development to climinating poverty
and ensuring food security, the Ministers are determined to take all the necessary
measures to ensure successful co-operation in this area.
11.3 The two sides also agree to further explore effective ways of trilateral co-operation
among China, African countries and the relevant international institutions such as the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
12.Exploration and Utilization of Natural Resources and Energy
12.1 Cognizant of the importance of their respective natural resources, the two sides
agree to co-operate in the use of such resources. China agree that Africa needs to
beneficiate its agricultural, mineral and metallurgical resources, in order to generate
industrial economic activities. In this regard, China agrees to promote investment in, and
exploration and beneficiation of metallurgical resources and that such beneficiation
should be done in Africa.
12.2 The Ministers agree to facilitate the exploration and beneficiation of such resources
on a reciprocal basis with due consideration to sound environmental practices.
13. Scientific, Technological and Cultural Co-operation
13.1 Aware of the importance of scientific, technological and cultural co-operation, the
two sides commit themselves to:
13.1.1 enhancing co-operation in the areas of basic and applied research, and
development and transfer of technology;
13.1.2 supporting the upgrading of Africa's indigenous technologies;
13.1.3 working together for the extension of technologies already developed and
employed, such as utilization of solar energy, disaster prevention, management and relief,
as well as development of water resources, so as to make them serve the economic
revitalization of both China and African countries; and
13.1.4 increasing cultural exchanges, particularly the exchange of visits by high-level
cultural delegations and sports and art groups, setting up more art exhibitions in each
other's territory, and making a greater effort to study and promote each other's culture.
14. Co-operation in Medical Care Public Health
14.1 Recognizing the positive role of the Chinese medical teams in Africa and grateful
for the efforts of the Chinese government in this regard, the African Ministers welcome
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the commitment made by the Chinese side to send more medical teams to African
countries and they promise to create suitable working and living conditions for these
teams.
14.2 The Chinese side agrees to give positive consideration to the requests of African
countries and promises to continue to provide them with medical equipment, facilities,
medicine and more training to local medical personnel, and promote co-operation in the
use of traditional medicine and pharmacy, so as to ensure more fruitful results in such cooperation.
14.3 The two sides agree to conduct co-operation in such areas as reducing infant and
maternal mortality rates, and preventing and treating HIV/AIDS, malaria, tropical and
other diseases.
15. Education and Human Resources Development
15.1 The Minister agree to expand co-operation in education and human resources
development. The Chinese side pledges to:
15.1.1 grant more scholarships to African students to study in China, continue to send
teachers to Africa to help local institutions of higher learning improve their disciplines
and specialties, and set up channels of communications between universities of the two
sides for the study of the Chinese and African civilizations; and
15.1.2 establish an African Human Resources Development Fund and gradually increase
financial contribution to the Fund for the training of professionals of different disciplines
for African countries.
15.2 The two sides agree to work out country-specific training plans through appropriate
channels, identify specific co-operation projects and facilitate their implementation.
16.Environmental management and Bio-diversity
16.1 The Ministers support international efforts towards environmental management and
sustainable human development. The two sides express their commitment to the key
elements of the various environmental conventions and undertake to forge closer cooperation and joint participation in capacity building for integrating environmental
management in national development.
16.2 In pursuit of this, China and Africa undertake to co-operate in all fields of
environmental management, including pollution control, bio-diversity conservation,
protection of forest eco-systems, fisheries and wildlife management in order to ensure
economic and sustainable human development.
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17. Trilateral Co-operation
17.1 The two sides stress the importance of the development of trilateral co-operation to
achieve the objectives contained in the present programme of co-operation and the
promotion of Sino-African relation, notably within the framework of South-South cooperation. They note that such an initiative will lead to the effective utilization of
available financial resources for the further development of human and natural resources
of the countries involved.
18. Co-operation on Arms Control
18.1 The Ministers express deep concern at the large influx of small arms and light
weapons to conflict areas in Africa and agree that this constitutes a threat to peace,
security/stability and development on the continent. They pledge to fully co-operate at
international for a to prevent and combat the problem of illicit proliferation, circulation
and trafficking of small arms and light weapons.
19. Multilateral Co-operation
19.1 Convinced of the pivotal importance of closer South-South co-operation under the
current circumstances, the two sides agree to:
19.1.1 strengthen co-operation and consultation at multilateral for a such as the UN
System, UNCTAD, and the WTO, so as to safeguard the common interests of the
developing countries; and
19.1.2 co-ordinate positions in reforming multilateral economic and trade regimes and
formulating relevant rules, with a view to increasing the collective bargaining capacity of
developing countries, and make joint efforts towards the democratization of international
relations and the establishment of a just and equitable new international economic order.
19.2 The Ministers agree to work for the reform of the United Nations and particularly
the UN Security Council that will be geographically representative. We call for the
recognition of the legitimate place due to Africa in the Security Council, the
organizations and specialized agencies of the United Nation system.
20.Follow-up Mechanisms
20.1 The Ministers agree to establish corresponding committees for follow-up actions of
the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation at Ministerial level.
20.2 The two sides agree to set up joint follow-up mechanisms at various levels. Under
these mechanisms, the Ministers will meet in three years time to evaluate progress in the
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implementation of the Programme, Senior Officials in two years time and Ambassadors
resident in China on a regular basis. The Senior Officials Meetings and the Ministerial
Conferences will be convened in China and Africa on an alternate basis within the
framework of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation.
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Appendix L: Address by Mr. Olusegun Obasanjo, President and Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the
54th Session of The United Nations General Assembly
Thursday, 23 September 1999

A little over two decades ago I addressed this Assembly as head of a military
Government in Nigeria. On that occasion the focus of my statement was the urgent need
to terminate colonial rule in Namibia and Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, and dismantle the
racist apartheid South Africa. Today it is a great source of joy for me and my delegation
that a distinguished son of Namibia is presiding over the affairs of the fifty-fourth session
of the United Nations General Assembly. My delegation assures you, Sir, of its full
cooperation and unwavering support throughout your tenure
May I also convey through you, Sir, our deep appreciation to your predecessor,
Mr. Didier Opertti of Uruguay, for the able and efficient manner in which he conducted
the proceedings of the fifty-third session.
Our appreciation also goes to the Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, for his
visionary leadership and the invaluable work of the Secretariat under his stewardship.
Permit me also to warmly welcome, on behalf of my country and delegation, the
Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of Nauru and the Kingdom of Tonga, which have just
joined this family of nations.
I stand before this Assembly today very proud to be the leader of a Nigeria that
has successfully managed the transition to democracy after a decade and a half of military
rule. I would like to seize this opportunity to express the profound appreciation of all
Nigerians for the international support and encouragement which combined so effectively
with the relentless determination of Nigerians themselves to reconstruct and transform
their country into a vibrant democracy.
Our Administration has raised the hopes of Nigerians, and their expectations are
correspondingly high. We are well aware of the enormity of the challenges that we face.
But we are fully resolved to tackle our numerous social, economic and political problems
head on. And, by the Grace of God, we will not fail.

264

Since assuming office some four months ago our administration has put in place
an institutional framework for the purpose of reconciling competing interests and groups
in our society. Our democratic institutions are now operating effectively within the
system of checks and balances enshrined in our Constitution. Furthermore, we have opted
for a policy of inclusiveness in all our political appointments, with a Cabinet, for
instance, in which all registered political parties are represented, thus moving away from
the divisive practice of winner takes all.
Our Administration has initiated policies aimed at revitalizing the economy in
order to create an enabling environment for investment and economic growth. We have
also put in place an appropriate legal framework for the protection of foreign investments
and repatriation of legitimate profits.
Other measures that we have taken include a vigorous anti-corruption campaign;
the promotion of transparency and accountability in public life; the abolition of decrees
and regulations which hindered the inflow of foreign investment; the generation of
opportunities for employment and income savings for domestic investment; and the
privatization of key State enterprises, such as electricity and telecommunications;
legislation and other measures to redress obvious cases of neglect and injustice done to
ethnic minorities, particularly in the oil-producing areas of the Niger delta region, and to
deal with the problems of the environment; investigation of past human rights violations,
with a view to promoting and protecting fundamental freedoms; and strengthening the
capacity of the law enforcement agencies to promote law and order, as well as security,
and to deal more effectively with the problem of drug trafficking.
Africa is indeed proud and glad to see the end of this century coincide with the
total elimination of colonialism and the twin menace of constitutionalized racism in the
southern part of the continent. The United Nations deserves our warm commendation for
the crucial role it has played in this process.
Let me also pay tribute to the thousands who lost their lives in the struggle for
freedom so that those of us alive today can proudly say we have the destiny of the
continent in our own hands. It is, however, a destiny which poses monumental challenges
in our effort to improve the quality of life on our continent. We must strive to alleviate
the grinding poverty and material deprivation that has persistently remained a feature of
our political freedom.
As we approach the dawn of the new millennium, the defining feature of our
increasingly interdependent world is accelerated globalization, and the liberalization of
production, trade, investment and finance.
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But for us in the developing world the reality today is quite different.
Globalization, in its various manifestations, is already experiencing a troubled
relationship with the imperatives of development.
It is rather tragic that Africa, the least developed of all the regions and the least
able to cope with external shocks, has borne the brunt of the adverse effects of
globalization of the world economy. There are grim statistics which indicate that the
well-known marginalization of the African continent has turned into delinkage from the
global scene.
Since 1992 Africa's exports and imports as a share of world trade has declined
from 4 per cent to 2 per cent. Africa's development is presently straitjacketed by a debt
burden of around $300 billion. The continent is experiencing import compression, weak
productivity and low output. On the average, factories that are still operating do so at less
than 30 per cent of installed capacity. Africa's share in total foreign direct investment
inflows to developing countries has dropped from 11 per cent in the late 1980s to less
than 5 per cent in the second half of the 1990s, and to a meagre 1.2 per cent of world
foreign direct investment flows in 1997.
This trend has continued, despite the efforts of African countries to implement
far-reaching economic reforms and maintain macroeconomic stability, particularly
through the introduction of a more open and business-friendly investment environment,
and the provision of incentives to attract foreign investment.
In the quest for a better and fairer management of a globalized world economy, it
is now incumbent upon us to direct our searchlight on the unsatisfactory evolution of the
multilateral trading system. In participating in the historic Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations that ushered in the new rules-based trading system, the developing
world had hoped that the new trading regime would enhance their trading fortunes,
facilitate their effective integration into the world economy, and arrest their
marginalization from the global trading system.
Unfortunately, however, the vast majority of developing countries, particularly in
Africa, have so far been unable to reap the benefits arising from their membership of the
World Trade Organization. Africa's trade prospects continue to be hampered by the
nonimplementation of the special and differential provisions that favour developing
countries, and the increasingly protectionist measures that are being imposed against their
export products. Besides, the paucity of technical and financial assistance that would
have enabled the developing countries to take advantage of the limited market access
opportunities that exist continues to deepen Africa's marginalization in the globalized
world economy.
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Without doubt, the biggest monetary and financial obstacle confronting
developing countries is the chronic debt overhang. According to United Nations figures,
the global debt of all developing countries stood at $567 billion in 1980, and $1.4 trillion
in 1992. In that 12-year period these countries made foreign debt payments totalling $1.6
trillion. Now, out of the 41 countries which the World Bank describes as heavily indebted
poor countries, 33 are African countries, a group that some believe is richly deserving of
its own special category: severely indebted low-income countries. Today in sub-Saharan
Africa every man, woman and child owes $357. This is a continent where millions live in
abject poverty, earning around $100 a year, or 27 cents a day. Some African countries
now spend as much as four times on servicing debts as they do on education and health
care. Some countries spend up to 40 per cent of their national budgets on debt servicing.
Furthermore, it is reliably estimated that for every dollar given in official development
aid, $3 go back to the rich countries in debt service payments.
I make bold to assert that calling for debt relief for developing countries is not a
plea for charity, but is an urgent matter of social and economic justice. It has to be
redressed if there is to be peace and stability in the twentyfirst century. Therefore, we
propose definitive debt cancellation, not just reduction or rescheduling of the debt service
regime. Eligibility should be limited to unpayable debts, which for Africa means the bulk
of the $300 billion current stock of debt. There should be debt remission that is not
predicated on the institutionally harsh conditionalities of structural adjustment
programmes. There should be recognition on both sides of the bargaining table that
lenders and borrowers share joint responsibilities for debts incurred in circumstances that
are morally questionable in the first place. Debt cancellation should benefit ordinary
people.
Nigerians rightly expect democracy to yield perceptible dividends in their lives.
Our Administration will, however, find the task of meeting this expectation virtually
impossible without substantial reduction of our debt burden, especially as we call on the
same citizens to make the sacrifices that are implicit in the recent measures aimed at
prudent management of our national economy.
I wish to invite the attention of the Assembly to the related issue of illegal capital
flight from Africa. It is an open secret that much of Africa's wealth has been illegally
siphoned out of the continent by corrupt regimes and unpatriotic individuals working in
collaboration with foreign partners. Nigeria and many African countries would be able to
pay off large portions of their debts if only they could recover some of the capital
illegally stashed abroad. We thus believe that now is the time to collectively deal with
this issue.
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In this regard, Nigeria calls for a concerted effort by the international community,
through an international convention, for the repatriation to Africa and the developing
world of all capital illegally transferred from these countries. Such an international
convention or agreement is legally feasible and morally sustainable. It will compel
participating banks to disclose the source of the illegal accounts they hold, repatriate
them to the countries of rightful ownership and subject the guilty parties to the full
weight of national and international law.
It is with a heavy heart that I raise the issue of the HIV/AIDS pandemic
throughout Africa. Our continent is bearing the brunt of this terrible disease that now kills
around 2 million Africans annually, thus officially overtaking malaria as Africa's number
one primary healthcare problem. This situation is even more frightening in that it has now
left 6 million children orphaned in the eastern and southern parts of Africa. In West
Africa the disease has been spreading just as rapidly. Unlike malaria, which is location
specific, HIV/AIDS knows neither climatic nor regional boundaries. Global cooperation
is an imperative if we are to succeed in dealing with this scourge.
Among the immediate challenges facing Nigeria and Africa today is resolving the
many conflicts raging on the continent. Today, as many as 19 sub-Saharan countries are
engaged in armed conflicts. The negative impact of these conflicts in human, social,
economic and environmental destruction does not need to be described here. Nigeria and
indeed the entire West African subregion have devoted considerable human, material,
political and diplomatic resources to the resolution of these crises in the subregion,
starting with Liberia and subsequently Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. Similarly, efforts
are being made in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Angola towards peaceful
resolution of their conflicts.
Indeed, African leaders at the recent summit of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) in Algiers, and at the urging of the Nigerian delegation, agreed to declare next
year as the Year of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa. By this declaration, we have
dedicated ourselves to making the year 2000 the year when Africans direct all their
efforts into effectively eliminating armed conflicts on their continent. We hope to build
on the fresh momentum for peace occasioned by the budding peace initiatives in Congo,
Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Angola.
We are also agreed on the overriding need to uphold codes of decency, ethics and
minimum standards of decorum among African Governments and their leadership. Gone
are the days when the OAU turned a blind eye to the excesses and abuses of power by
member Governments. Forceful and undemocratic changes of Governments will no
longer be overlooked or tolerated. We intend to condemn in absolute terms all violations
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of these codes and to ostracize their perpetrators. It is our duty and moral responsibility to
treat our citizens decently and humanely.
My country has always believed that the threat to international peace and security
from any corner of the globe should be considered a threat to the peace and security of
the world as a whole. While the maintenance of international peace and security remains
the primary responsibility of the Security Council, the Charter provision for the
complementary role of regional and subregional groups has also proved to be critical to
the maintenance of peace at the regional and global levels. The establishment of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) is a clear testimony of our commitment to subregional peace. As the record
shows, ECOMOG succeeded in putting an end to the Liberian war in 1997, reinstating
the democratically elected President of Sierra Leone in 1998, and bringing about the
current Peace Agreement for Sierra Leone signed in Lomé in July 1999.
The time has come, however, for the Security Council to assume its full
responsibility, specifically in Sierra Leone and other conflict flash points in Africa. For
too long, the burden of preserving international peace and security in West Africa has
been left almost entirely to a few States in our subregion. The non-implementation of the
Peace Agreement and Nigeria's continual burden in Sierra Leone is unacceptably draining
Nigeria financially. For our economy to take off, this bleeding has to stop. The United
Nations needs to do more in providing logistics and financial support to assist regional
peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, as well as enhancing the welfare of refugees
worldwide without discrimination.
My delegation believes that it has never been the purpose of the United Nations
Organization to prescribe democracy and change for its members and yet make little or
no progress in the democratization of its own organs, such as the Security Council. My
delegation accordingly urges the General Assembly, during this session, to conclude
deliberations and reach agreement on the modalities for the reform and expansion of the
Security Council so that the Millennium Assembly will adopt them next year — and not
later.
How can the United Nations continue to perpetuate and justify a situation where
Africa is the only continent without a permanent seat in the Security Council? In order to
promote reform and democratization of the Security Council, Africa, with 53 Member
States, should be allocated at least two permanent seats — commensurate not only with
the continent's size and population, but with its track record also of contributing to the
maintenance of international peace and security.
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I wish to reaffirm our belief that the United Nations is the most universal body
ever designed for collectively resolving humankind's common problems. Our
Organization has come a long way since its establishment 54 years ago. Although created
in a different era and under different circumstances, and in spite of numerous constraints,
the United Nations has continuously sought to adapt itself to the changes in the
international political arena. It has been able to accomplish this to some degree, but it
remains an institution whose working methods, procedures and administrative structure
have in many respects become outdated.
Yet the world as we know it today without the United Nations would be
inconceivable. For it has come to symbolize hope for a better and more secure future for
many, particularly in the developing areas of the world. Indeed, though a majority of our
countries could not be members when the Organization was created, we are today its
strongest defenders and advocates of the ideals for which it stands. We believe in the
family of nations, and within that family the strong members have the responsibility to
protect and strengthen the weaker members.
At the close of the twentieth century and the beginning of the third millennium,
there is a need for stock-taking and for proper assessment of the implementation of
previous resolutions emanating especially from the major world summits and conferences
which took place in this decade. Such an effort would bring us closer to the realization of
the purposes and objectives of our Organization. In this regard, I stand before the
Assembly and pledge Nigeria's continued contributions and positive commitment to the
ideals of the Charter of the United Nations.

